International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Thomas Vidick

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2023
CRYPTO
Simple Tests of Quantumness Also Certify Qubits
A test of quantumness is a protocol that allows a classical verifier to certify (only) that a prover is not classical. We show that tests of quantumness that follow a certain template, which captures recent proposals such as [KCVY21,KLVY22], in fact can do much more. Namely, the same protocols can be used for certifying a qubit, a building-block that stands at the heart of applications such as certifiable randomness and classical delegation of quantum computation. Certifying qubits was previously only known to be possible based on the hardness of the Learning with Errors problem and the use of adaptive hardcore bits [BCM+21]. Our framework allows certification of qubits based only on the existence of post-quantum trapdoor claw-free functions, or on quantum fully homomorphic encryption. These can be instantiated, for example, from Ring Learning with Errors. This has the potential to improve the efficiency of qubit certification and derived functionalities. On the technical side, we show that the quantum soundness of any such protocol can be reduced to proving a bound on a simple algorithmic task: informally, answering “two challenges simultaneously” in the protocol. Our reduction formalizes the intuition that these protocols demonstrate quantumness by leveraging the impossibility of rewinding a general quantum prover. This allows us to prove tight bounds on the quantum soundness of [KCVY21] and [KLVY22], showing that no quantum polynomial-time prover can succeed with probability larger than cos2 π8 ≈ 0.853. Previously, only an upper bound on the success probability of classical provers, and a lower bound on the success probability of quantum provers, were known. We then extend this proof of quantum soundness to show that provers that approach the quantum soundness bound must perform almost anti-commuting measurements. This certifies that the prover holds a qubit.
2022
CRYPTO
Succinct Classical Verification of Quantum Computation 📺
We construct a classically verifiable succinct interactive argument for quantum computation (BQP) with communication complexity and verifier runtime that are poly-logarithmic in the runtime of the BQP computation (and polynomial in the security parameter). Our protocol is secure assuming the post-quantum security of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and Learning with Errors (LWE). This is the first succinct argument for quantum computation in the plain model; prior work (Chia-Chung-Yamakawa, TCC ’20) requires both a long common reference string and non-black-box use of a hash function modeled as a random oracle. At a technical level, we revisit the framework for constructing classically verifiable quantum computation (Mahadev, FOCS ’18). We give a self-contained, modular proof of security for Mahadev’s protocol, which we believe is of independent interest. Our proof readily generalizes to a setting in which the verifier’s first message (which consists of many public keys) is compressed. Next, we formalize this notion of compressed public keys; we view the object as a generalization of constrained/programmable PRFs and instantiate it based on indistinguishability obfuscation. Finally, we compile the above protocol into a fully succinct argument using a (sufficiently composable) succinct argument of knowledge for NP. Using our framework, we achieve several additional results, including – Succinct arguments for QMA (given multiple copies of the witness), – Succinct non-interactive arguments for BQP (or QMA) in the quantum random oracle model, and – Succinct batch arguments for BQP (or QMA) assuming post-quantum LWE (without iO).
2021
EUROCRYPT
Classical proofs of quantum knowledge 📺
Tina Zhang Thomas Vidick
We define the notion of a proof of knowledge in the setting where the verifier is classical, but the prover is quantum, and where the witness that the prover holds is in general a quantum state. We establish simple properties of our definition, including that, if a nondestructive classical proof of quantum knowledge exists for some state, then that state can be cloned by an unbounded adversary, and that, under certain conditions on the parameters in our definition, a proof of knowledge protocol for a hard-to-clone state can be used as a (destructive) quantum money verification protocol. In addition, we provide two examples of protocols (both inspired by private-key classical verification protocols for quantum money schemes) which we can show to be proofs of quantum knowledge under our definition. In so doing, we introduce techniques for the analysis of such protocols which build on results from the literature on nonlocal games. Finally, we show that, under our definition, the verification protocol introduced by Mahadev (FOCS 2018) is a classical argument of quantum knowledge for QMA relations. In all cases, we construct an explicit quantum extractor that is able to produce a quantum witness given black-box quantum (rewinding) access to the prover, the latter of which includes the ability to coherently execute the prover's black-box circuit controlled on a superposition of messages from the verifier.
2020
CRYPTO
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments for QMA, with preprocessing 📺
We initiate the study of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments for languages in QMA. Our first main result is the following: if Learning With Errors (LWE) is hard for quantum computers, then any language in QMA has an NIZK argument with preprocessing. The preprocessing in our argument system consists of (i) the generation of a CRS and (ii) a single (instance-independent) quantum message from verifier to prover. The instance-dependent phase of our argument system involves only a single classical message from prover to verifier. Importantly, verification in our protocol is entirely classical, and the verifier needs not have quantum memory; its only quantum actions are in the preprocessing phase. Our second contribution is to extend the notion of a classical proof of knowledge to the quantum setting. We introduce the notions of arguments and proofs of quantum knowledge (AoQK/PoQK), and we show that our non-interactive argument system satisfies the definition of an AoQK. In particular, we explicitly construct an extractor which can recover a quantum witness from any prover which is successful in our protocol. Finally, we show that any language in QMA has an (interactive) proof of quantum knowledge.
2019
EUROCRYPT
A Quantum-Proof Non-malleable Extractor 📺
In privacy amplification, two mutually trusted parties aim to amplify the secrecy of an initial shared secret X in order to establish a shared private key K by exchanging messages over an insecure communication channel. If the channel is authenticated the task can be solved in a single round of communication using a strong randomness extractor; choosing a quantum-proof extractor allows one to establish security against quantum adversaries.In the case that the channel is not authenticated, this simple solution is no longer secure. Nevertheless, Dodis and Wichs (STOC’09) showed that the problem can be solved in two rounds of communication using a non-malleable extractor, a stronger pseudo-random construction than a strong extractor.We give the first construction of a non-malleable extractor that is secure against quantum adversaries. The extractor is based on a construction by Li (FOCS’12), and is able to extract from source of min-entropy rates larger than 1 / 2. Combining this construction with a quantum-proof variant of the reduction of Dodis and Wichs, due to Cohen and Vidick (unpublished) we obtain the first privacy amplification protocol secure against active quantum adversaries.
2019
EUROCRYPT
Verifier-on-a-Leash: New Schemes for Verifiable Delegated Quantum Computation, with Quasilinear Resources 📺
The problem of reliably certifying the outcome of a computation performed by a quantum device is rapidly gaining relevance. We present two protocols for a classical verifier to verifiably delegate a quantum computation to two non-communicating but entangled quantum provers. Our protocols have near-optimal complexity in terms of the total resources employed by the verifier and the honest provers, with the total number of operations of each party, including the number of entangled pairs of qubits required of the honest provers, scaling as $$O(g\log g)$$ for delegating a circuit of size g. This is in contrast to previous protocols, whose overhead in terms of resources employed, while polynomial, is far beyond what is feasible in practice. Our first protocol requires a number of rounds that is linear in the depth of the circuit being delegated, and is blind, meaning neither prover can learn the circuit or its input. The second protocol is not blind, but requires only a constant number of rounds of interaction.Our main technical innovation is an efficient rigidity theorem which allows a verifier to test that two entangled provers perform measurements specified by an arbitrary m-qubit tensor product of single-qubit Clifford observables on their respective halves of m shared EPR pairs, with a robustness that is independent of m. Our two-prover classical-verifier delegation protocols are obtained by combining this rigidity theorem with a single-prover quantum-verifier protocol for the verifiable delegation of a quantum computation, introduced by Broadbent.