## CryptoDB

### Nirvan Tyagi

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

CRYPTO

Mangrove: A Scalable Framework for Folding-based SNARKs
Abstract

We present a framework for building efficient folding-based SNARKs. First we develop a new ``uniformizing'' compiler for NP statements that converts any poly-time computation to a sequence of identical simple steps. The resulting uniform computation is especially well-suited to be processed by a folding-based IVC scheme. Second, we develop two optimizations to folding-based IVC. The first reduces the recursive overhead of the IVC by restructuring the relation to which folding is applied. The second employs a ``commit-and-fold'' strategy to further simplify the relation. Together, these optimizations result in a folding-based SNARK that has a number of attractive features. First, the scheme uses a constant-size transparent common reference string (CRS). Second, the prover has (i) low memory footprint, (ii) makes only two passes over the data, (iii) is highly parallelizable, and (iv) is concretely efficient. Proving time is comparable to leading monolithic SNARKs, and is significantly faster than other streaming SNARKs. For example, for proving $2^{24}$ constraints, we estimate that a Mangrove prover takes about $64$ seconds, $10$ times faster than Spartan SNARK, while using less than 160MB of memory.

2024

ASIACRYPT

MuxProofs: Succinct Arguments for Machine Computation from Vector Lookups
Abstract

Proofs for machine computation prove the correct execution of arbitrary programs that operate over fixed instruction sets (e.g., RISC-V, EVM, Wasm).
A standard approach for proving machine computation is to prove a universal set of constraints that encode the full instruction set at each step of the program execution.
This approach incurs a proving cost per execution step on the order of the total sum of instruction constraints for all of the instructions in the set, despite each step of the program only executing a single instruction.
Existing proving approaches that avoid this universal cost per step (and incur only the cost of a single instruction's constraints per step) either fail to provide zero-knowledge or rely on recursive proof composition for which security relies on the heuristic instantiation of the random oracle.
We present new protocols for proving machine execution that resolve these limitations, enabling prover efficiency on the order of only the executed instructions while achieving zero-knowledge and avoiding recursive proofs.
Our core technical contribution is a new primitive that we call a succinct vector lookup argument which enables a prover to build up a machine execution ``on-the-fly''.
We propose succinct vector lookups for both univariate polynomial and multivariate polynomial commitments in which vectors are encoded on cosets of a multiplicative subgroup and on subcubes of the boolean hypercube, respectively.
We instantiate our proofs for machine computation by integrating our vector lookups with existing efficient, succinct non-interactive proof systems for NP.

2022

EUROCRYPT

A Fast and Simple Partially Oblivious PRF, with Applications
📺
Abstract

We build the first construction of a partially oblivious pseudorandom function (POPRF) that does not rely on bilinear pairings. Our construction can be viewed as combining elements of the 2HashDH OPRF of Jarecki, Kiayias, and Krawczyk with the Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF. We analyze our POPRF’s security in the random oracle model via reduction to a new one-more gap strong Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption. The most significant technical challenge is establishing confidence in the new assumption, which requires new proof techniques that enable us to show that its hardness is implied by the q-DL assumption in the algebraic group model.
Our new construction is as fast as the current, standards-track OPRF 2HashDH protocol, yet provides a new degree of flexibility useful in a variety of applications. We show how POPRFs can be used to prevent token hoarding attacks against Privacy Pass, reduce key management complexity in the OPAQUE password authenticated key exchange protocol, and ensure stronger security for password breach alerting services.

2021

ASIACRYPT

Proofs for Inner Pairing Products and Applications
📺
Abstract

We present a generalized inner product argument and demonstrate its applications to pairing-based languages. We apply our generalized argument to prove that an inner pairing product is correctly evaluated with respect to committed vectors of $n$ source group elements. With a structured reference string (SRS), we achieve a logarithmic-time verifier whose work is dominated by $6 \log n$ target group exponentiations. Proofs are of size $6 \log n$ target group elements, computed using $6n$ pairings and $4n$ exponentiations in each source group.
We apply our inner product arguments to build the first polynomial commitment scheme with succinct (logarithmic) verification, $O(\sqrt{d})$ prover complexity for degree $d$ polynomials (not including the cost to evaluate the polynomial), and a SRS of size $O(\sqrt{d})$. Concretely, this means that for $d=2^{28}$, producing an evaluation proof in our protocol is $76\times$ faster than doing so in the KZG commitment scheme, and the CRS in our protocol is $1000\times$ smaller: $13$MB vs $13$GB for KZG.
As a second application, we introduce an argument for aggregating $n$ Groth16 zkSNARKs into an $O(\log n)$ sized proof. Our protocol is significantly faster ($>1000\times$) than aggregating SNARKs via recursive composition: we aggregate $\sim 130,000$ proofs in $25$ minutes, versus $90$ proofs via recursive composition. Finally, we further apply our aggregation protocol to construct a low-memory SNARK for machine computations that does not rely on recursive composition. For a computation that requires time $T$ and space $S$, our SNARK produces proofs in space $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(S+T)$, which is significantly more space efficient than a monolithic SNARK, which requires space $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(S \cdot T)$.

2020

CRYPTO

Handling Adaptive Compromise for Practical Encryption Schemes
📺 ★
Abstract

We provide a new definitional framework capturing the multi-user security of encryption schemes and pseudorandom functions in the face of adversaries that can adaptively compromise users' keys. We provide a sequence of results establishing the security of practical symmetric encryption schemes under adaptive compromise in the random oracle or ideal cipher model. The bulk of analysis complexity for adaptive compromise security is relegated to the analysis of lower-level primitives such as pseudorandom functions.
We apply our framework to give proofs of security for the BurnBox system for privacy in the face of border searches and the in-use searchable symmetric encryption scheme due to Cash et al. In both cases, prior analyses had bugs that our framework helps avoid.

2019

CRYPTO

Asymmetric Message Franking: Content Moderation for Metadata-Private End-to-End Encryption
📺
Abstract

Content moderation is crucial for stopping abusive and harassing messages in online platforms. Existing moderation mechanisms, such as message franking, require platform providers to be able to associate user identifiers to encrypted messages. These mechanisms fail in metadata-private messaging systems, such as Signal, where users can hide their identities from platform providers. The key technical challenge preventing moderation is achieving cryptographic accountability while preserving deniability.In this work, we resolve this tension with a new cryptographic primitive: asymmetric message franking (AMF) schemes. We define strong security notions for AMF schemes, including the first formal treatment of deniability in moderation settings. We then construct, analyze, and implement an AMF scheme that is fast enough to use for content moderation of metadata-private messaging.

#### Coauthors

- Dan Boneh (1)
- Benedikt Bünz (1)
- Sofía Celi (1)
- Binyi Chen (1)
- Trisha Datta (1)
- Zijing Di (1)
- Paul Grubbs (1)
- Joseph Jaeger (1)
- Julia Len (1)
- Mary Maller (1)
- Ian Miers (1)
- Pratyush Mishra (1)
- Wilson Nguyen (2)
- Thomas Ristenpart (2)
- Nicholas T. Sullivan (1)
- Stefano Tessaro (1)
- Nirvan Tyagi (6)
- Psi Vesely (1)
- Christopher A. Wood (1)
- Lucas Xia (1)