International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Junko Takahashi

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
TCHES
Curse of Re-encryption: A Generic Power/EM Analysis on Post-Quantum KEMs
This paper presents a side-channel analysis (SCA) on key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on the Fujisaki–Okamoto (FO) transformation and its variants. The FO transformation has been widely used in actively securing KEMs from passively secure public key encryption (PKE), as it is employed in most of NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) candidates for KEM. The proposed attack exploits side-channel leakage during execution of a pseudorandom function (PRF) or pseudorandom number generator (PRG) in the re-encryption of KEM decapsulation as a plaintext-checking oracle that tells whether the PKE decryption result is equivalent to the reference plaintext. The generality and practicality of the plaintext-checking oracle allows the proposed attack to attain a full-key recovery of various KEMs when an active attack on the underlying PKE is known. This paper demonstrates that the proposed attack can be applied to most NIST PQC third-round KEM candidates, namely, Kyber, Saber, FrodoKEM, NTRU, NTRU Prime, HQC, BIKE, and SIKE (for BIKE, the proposed attack achieves a partial key recovery). The applicability to Classic McEliece is unclear because there is no known active attack on this cryptosystem. This paper also presents a side-channel distinguisher design based on deep learning (DL) for mounting the proposed attack on practical implementation without the use of a profiling device. The feasibility of the proposed attack is demonstrated through experimental attacks on various PRF implementations (a SHAKE software, an AES software, an AES hardware, a bit-sliced masked AES software, and a masked AES hardware based on threshold implementation). Although it was difficult to implement the oracle using the leakage from the TI-based masked hardware, the success of the proposed attack against these implementations (even except for the masked hardware), which include masked software, confirms its practicality.
2021
ASIACRYPT
Fault-Injection Attacks against NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 3 KEM Candidates
We investigate __all__ NIST PQC Round 3 KEM candidates from the viewpoint of fault-injection attacks: Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, FrodoKEM, HQC, NTRU Prime, and SIKE. All KEM schemes use variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, so the equality test with re-encryption in decapsulation is critical. We survey effective key-recovery attacks when we can skip the equality test. We found the existing key-recovery attacks against Kyber, NTRU, Saber, FrodoKEM, HQC, one of two KEM schemes in NTRU Prime, and SIKE. We propose a new key-recovery attack against the other KEM scheme in NTRU Prime. We also report an attack against BIKE that leads to leakage of information of secret keys. The open-source pqm4 library contains all KEM schemes except Classic McEliece and HQC. We show that giving a single instruction-skipping fault in the decapsulation processes leads to skipping the equality test __virtually__ for Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, and SIKE. We also report the experimental attacks against them. We also report the implementation of NTRU Prime allows chosen-ciphertext attacks freely and the timing side-channel of FrodoKEM reported in Guo, Johansson, and Nilsson (CRYPTO 2020) remains, while there are no such bugs in their NIST PQC Round 3 submissions.
2010
EPRINT
Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys
Junko Takahashi Toshinori Fukunaga
This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) on AES with 192 and 256-bit keys. We show a new attack in which both 192 and 256-bit keys are retrieved within a feasible computational time. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time, we implement the proposed attack using C code on a PC. As a result, we successfully recover the original 192-bit key using 3 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts within 5 minutes, and 256-bit key using 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and 2 pairs of correct and faulty plaintexts within 10 minutes.
2010
EPRINT
Efficient Differential Fault Analysis for AES
This paper proposes improved post analysis methods for Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) against AES. In detail, we propose three techniques to improve the attack efficiency as 1) combining previous DFA methods, 2) performing a divide-and-conquer attack by considering the AES key-schedule structure, and 3) taking the linearity of the MixColumns operation into account. As a result, the expectation of the analysis time in the previous work can be reduced to about one sixteenth. Notice that these improvements are based on the detailed analysis of the previous DFA methods and the calculation time and memory cost in practical implementations. Moreover, the proposed techniques can be widely applied to DFA attacks under different assumptions.
2010
CHES

Program Committees

CHES 2020