International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Kenneth G. Paterson

Affiliation: Royal Holloway, University of London

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2019
TOSC
libInterMAC: Beyond Confidentiality and Integrity in Practice 📺
Boldyreva et al. (Eurocrypt 2012) defined a fine-grained security model capturing ciphertext fragmentation attacks against symmetric encryption schemes. The model was extended by Albrecht et al. (CCS 2016) to include an integrity notion. The extended security model encompasses important security goals of SSH that go beyond confidentiality and integrity to include length hiding and denial-of-service resistance properties. Boldyreva et al. also defined and analysed the InterMAC scheme, while Albrecht et al. showed that InterMAC satisfies stronger security notions than all currently available SSH encryption schemes. In this work, we take the InterMAC scheme and make it fully ready for use in practice. This involves several steps. First, we modify the InterMAC scheme to support encryption of arbitrary length plaintexts and we replace the use of Encrypt-then-MAC in InterMAC with modern noncebased authenticated encryption. Second, we describe a reference implementation of the modified InterMAC scheme in the form of the library libInterMAC. We give a performance analysis of libInterMAC. Third, to test the practical performance of libInterMAC, we implement several InterMAC-based encryption schemes in OpenSSH and carry out a performance analysis for the use-case of file transfer using SCP. We measure the data throughput and the data overhead of using InterMAC-based schemes compared to existing schemes in OpenSSH. Our analysis shows that, for some network set-ups, using InterMAC-based schemes in OpenSSH only moderately affects performance whilst providing stronger security guarantees compared to existing schemes.
2019
PKC
Safety in Numbers: On the Need for Robust Diffie-Hellman Parameter Validation
Steven D. Galbraith Jake Massimo Kenneth G. Paterson
We consider the problem of constructing Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters which pass standard approaches to parameter validation but for which the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is relatively easy to solve. We consider both the finite field setting and the elliptic curve setting.For finite fields, we show how to construct DH parameters (p, q, g) for the safe prime setting in which $$p=2q+1$$ is prime, q is relatively smooth but fools random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with some reasonable probability, and g is of order q mod p. The construction involves modifying and combining known methods for obtaining Carmichael numbers. Concretely, we provide an example with 1024-bit p which passes OpenSSL’s Diffie-Hellman validation procedure with probability $$2^{-24}$$ (for versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0i). Here, the largest factor of q has 121 bits, meaning that the DLP can be solved with about $$2^{64}$$ effort using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. We go on to explain how this parameter set can be used to mount offline dictionary attacks against PAKE protocols. In the elliptic curve case, we use an algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen to construct an elliptic curve E over a finite field $${\mathbb {F}}_p$$ having a specified number of points n. We are able to select n of the form $$h\cdot q$$ such that h is a small co-factor, q is relatively smooth but fools random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with some reasonable probability, and E has a point of order q. Concretely, we provide example curves at the 128-bit security level with $$h=1$$ , where q passes a single random-base Miller-Rabin primality test with probability 1/4 and where the elliptic curve DLP can be solved with about $$2^{44}$$ effort. Alternatively, we can pass the test with probability 1/8 and solve the elliptic curve DLP with about $$2^{35.5}$$ effort. These ECDH parameter sets lead to similar attacks on PAKE protocols relying on elliptic curves.Our work shows the importance of performing proper (EC)DH parameter validation in cryptographic implementations and/or the wisdom of relying on standardised parameter sets of known provenance.
2018
TOSC
Frequency-smoothing encryption: preventing snapshot attacks on deterministically encrypted data
Marie-Sarah Lacharité Kenneth G. Paterson
Statistical analysis of ciphertexts has been recently used to carry out devastating inference attacks on deterministic encryption (Naveed, Kamara, and Wright, CCS 2015), order-preserving/revealing encryption (Grubbs et al., S&P 2017), and searchable encryption (Pouliot and Wright, CCS 2016). At the heart of these inference attacks is classical frequency analysis. In this paper, we propose and evaluate another classical technique, homophonic encoding, as a means to combat these attacks. We introduce and develop the concept of frequency-smoothing encryption (FSE) which provably prevents inference attacks in the snapshot attack model, wherein the adversary obtains a static snapshot of the encrypted data, while preserving the ability to efficiently and privately make point queries. We provide provably secure constructions for FSE schemes, and we empirically assess their security for concrete parameters by evaluating them against real data. We show that frequency analysis attacks (and optimal generalisations of them for the FSE setting) no longer succeed.
2018
TCHES
Cold Boot Attacks on Ring and Module LWE Keys Under the NTT
Martin R. Albrecht Amit Deo Kenneth G. Paterson
In this work, we consider the ring- and module- variants of the LWE problem and investigate cold boot attacks on cryptographic schemes based on these problems, wherein an attacker is faced with the problem of recovering a scheme’s secret key from a noisy version of that key. The leakage resilience of cryptography based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem has been studied before, but there are only limited results considering the parameters observed in cold boot attack scenarios. There are two main encodings for storing ring- and module-LWE keys, and, as we show, the performance of cold boot attacks can be highly sensitive to the exact encoding used. The first encoding stores polynomial coefficients directly in memory. The second encoding performs a number theoretic transform (NTT) before storing the key, a commonly used method leading to more efficient implementations. We first give estimates for a cold boot attack complexity on the first encoding method based on standard algorithms; this analysis confirms that this encoding method is vulnerable to cold boot attacks only at very low bit-flip rates. We then show that, for the second encoding method, the structure introduced by using an NTT is exploitable in the cold boot setting: we develop a bespoke attack strategy that is much cheaper than our estimates for the first encoding when considering module-LWE keys. For example, at a 1% bit-flip rate (which corresponds roughly to what can be achieved in practice for cold boot attacks when applying cooling), a cold boot attack on Kyber KEM parameters has a cost of 243 operations when the second, NTT-based encoding is used for key storage, compared to 270 operations with the first encoding. On the other hand, in the case of the ring-LWE-based KEM, New Hope, the cold boot attack complexities are similar for both encoding methods.
2017
CRYPTO
2017
ASIACRYPT
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
CRYPTO
2016
TCC
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
PKC
2015
CRYPTO
2014
CRYPTO
2014
CRYPTO
2014
PKC
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
ASIACRYPT
2014
FSE
2013
PKC
2013
PKC
2013
CRYPTO
2013
CRYPTO
2013
FSE
2012
EUROCRYPT
2012
PKC
2012
ASIACRYPT
2012
ASIACRYPT
2011
FSE
2011
EUROCRYPT
2011
ASIACRYPT
2011
ASIACRYPT
2010
EPRINT
Plaintext-Dependent Decryption: A Formal Security Treatment of SSH-CTR
Kenneth G. Paterson Gaven J. Watson
This paper presents a formal security analysis of SSH in counter mode in a security model that accurately captures the capabilities of real-world attackers, as well as security-relevant features of the SSH specifications and the OpenSSH implementation of SSH. Under reasonable assumptions on the block cipher and MAC algorithms used to construct the SSH Binary Packet Protocol (BPP), we are able to show that the SSH BPP meets a strong and appropriate notion of security: indistinguishability under buffered, stateful chosen-ciphertext attacks. This result helps to bridge the gap between the existing security analysis of the SSH BPP by Bellare et al. and the recently discovered attacks against the SSH BPP by Albrecht et al. which partially invalidate that analysis.
2010
EPRINT
Time-Specific Encryption
Kenneth G. Paterson Elizabeth A. Quaglia
This paper introduces and explores the new concept of Time-Specific Encryption (TSE). In (Plain) TSE, a Time Server broadcasts a key at the beginning of each time unit, a Time Instant Key (TIK). The sender of a message can specify any time interval during the encryption process; the receiver can decrypt to recover the message only if it has a TIK that corresponds to a time in that interval. We extend Plain TSE to the public-key and identity-based settings, where receivers are additionally equipped with private keys and either public keys or identities, and where decryption now requires the use of the private key as well as an appropriate TIK. We introduce security models for the plain, public-key and identity-based settings. We also provide constructions for schemes in the different settings, showing how to obtain Plain TSE using identity-based techniques, how to combine Plain TSE with public-key and identity-based encryption schemes, and how to build schemes that are chosen-ciphertext secure from schemes that are chosen-plaintext secure. Finally, we suggest applications for our new primitive, and discuss its relationships with existing primitives, such as Timed Release Encryption and Broadcast Encryption.
2010
EUROCRYPT
2008
PKC
2008
PKC
2008
EPRINT
Efficient One-round Key Exchange in the Standard Model
We consider one-round identity-based key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.
2007
EPRINT
Certificateless Encryption Schemes Strongly Secure in the Standard Model
Alexander W. Dent Benoît Libert Kenneth G. Paterson
This paper presents the first constructions for certificateless encryption (CLE) schemes that are provably secure against strong adversaries in the standard model. It includes both a generic construction for a strongly secure CLE scheme from any passively secure scheme as well as a concrete construction based on the Waters identity-based encryption scheme.
2007
EPRINT
On the Relations Between Non-Interactive Key Distribution, Identity-Based Encryption and Trapdoor Discrete Log Groups
Kenneth G. Paterson Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan
We investigate the relationships between identity-based non-interactive key distribution and identity-based encryption. We provide constructions for these schemes that make use of general trapdoor discrete log groups. We then investigate the schemes that result in two concrete settings, obtaining new, provably secure, near-practical identity-based encryption schemes.
2007
EPRINT
Attacking the IPsec Standards in Encryption-only Configurations
Jean Paul Degabriele Kenneth G. Paterson
At Eurocrypt 2006, Paterson and Yau demonstrated how flaws in the Linux implementation of IPsec could be exploited to break encryption-only configurations of ESP, the IPsec encryption protocol. Their work highlighted the dangers of not using authenticated encryption in fielded systems, but did not constitute an attack on the actual IPsec standards themselves; in fact, the attacks of Paterson and Yau should be prevented by any standards-compliant IPsec implementation. In contrast, this paper describes new attacks which break any RFC-compliant implementation of IPsec making use of encryption-only ESP. The new attacks are both efficient and realistic: they are ciphertext-only and need only the capability to eavesdrop on ESP-encrypted traffic and to inject traffic into the network. The paper also reports our experiences in applying the attacks to a variety of implementations of IPsec, and reflects on what these experiences tell us about how security standards should be written so as to simplify the task of software developers.
2006
EUROCRYPT
2006
EPRINT
Efficient Identity-based Signatures Secure in the Standard Model
Kenneth G. Paterson Jacob C. N. Schuldt
The only known construction of identity-based signatures that can be proven secure in the standard model is based on the approach of attaching certificates to non-identity-based signatures. This folklore construction method leads to schemes that are somewhat inefficient and leaves open the problem of finding more efficient direct constructions. We present the first such construction. Our scheme is obtained from a modification of Waters' recently proposed identity-based encryption scheme. It is computationally efficient and the signatures are short. The scheme's security is proven in the standard model and rests on the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in groups equipped with a pairing.
2006
EPRINT
A Cryptographic Tour of the IPsec Standards
Kenneth G. Paterson
In this article, we provide an overview of cryptography and cryptographic key management as they are specified in IPsec, a popular suite of standards for providing communications security and network access control for Internet communications. We focus on the latest generation of the IPsec standards, recently published as Request for Comments 4301–4309 by the Internet Engineering Task Force, and how they have evolved from earlier versions of the standards.
2006
EPRINT
Pairings for Cryptographers
Many research papers in pairing based cryptography treat pairings as a ``black box''. These papers build cryptographic schemes making use of various properties of pairings. If this approach is taken, then it is easy for authors to make invalid assumptions concerning the properties of pairings. The cryptographic schemes developed may not be realizable in practice, or may not be as efficient as the authors assume. The aim of this paper is to outline, in as simple a fashion as possible, the basic choices that are available when using pairings in cryptography. For each choice, the main properties and efficiency issues are summarized. The paper is intended to be of use to non-specialists who are interested in using pairings to design cryptographic schemes.
2006
EPRINT
An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme
Xuefei Cao Kenneth G. Paterson Weidong Kou
This paper demonstrates that a certificateless signature scheme recently proposed by Gorantla and Saxena is insecure. It is shown that an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can then forge valid signatures for that signer without knowledge of the signer's private key.
2005
ASIACRYPT
2005
FSE
2005
PKC
2005
EPRINT
Cryptography in Theory and Practice: The Case of Encryption in IPsec
Kenneth G. Paterson Arnold K.L. Yau
This paper studies the gaps that exist between cryptography as studied in theory, as defined in standards, as implemented by software engineers, and as actually consumed by users. Our focus is on IPsec, an important and widely-used suite of protocols providing security at the IP layer of network communications. Despite well-known results in theoretical cryptography highlighting the vulnerabilities of unauthenticated encryption, the IPsec standards currently mandate its support. We present evidence that such ``encryption-only'' configurations are in fact still often selected by users in practice, even with strong warnings advising against this in the IPsec standards. We then describe a variety of attacks against such configurations and report on their successful implementation in the case of the Linux kernel implementation of IPsec. Our attacks are realistic in their requirements, highly efficient, and recover the complete contents of IPsec-protected datagrams. Our attacks still apply when integrity protection is provided by a higher layer protocol, and in some cases even when it is supplied by IPsec itself. Finally in this paper, we reflect on the reasons why this unsatisfactory situation persists, and make some recommendations for the future development of IPsec and cryptographic software in general.
2004
EUROCRYPT
2004
FSE
2004
EPRINT
Why Quantum Cryptography?
Kenneth G. Paterson Fred Piper Ruediger Schack
Quantum Key Exchange (QKE, also known as Quantum Key Distribution or QKD) allows communicating parties to securely establish cryptographic keys. It is a well-established fact that all QKE protocols require that the parties have access to an authentic channel. Without this authenticated link, QKE is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Unfortunately this fact is frequently overlooked, resulting in exaggerated claims and/or false expectations about the potential impact of QKE. In this paper we present a systematic comparison of QKE with traditional key exchange protocols in realistic secure communication systems.
2003
ASIACRYPT
2003
EPRINT
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography
Sattam S. Al-Riyami Kenneth G. Paterson
This paper introduces the concept of 'certificateless public key cryptography' (CL-PKC). In contrast to traditional public key cryptographic systems, CL-PKC does not require the use of certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. It does rely on the use of a trusted third party (TTP) who is in possession of a master key. In these respects, CL-PKC is similar to identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). On the other hand, CL-PKC does not suffer from the key escrow property that seems to be inherent in ID-PKC. Thus CL-PKC can be seen as a model for the use of public key cryptography that is intermediate between traditional certificated PKC and ID-PKC. We make concrete the concept of CL-PKC by introducing certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE), signature and key exchange schemes. We also demonstrate how hierarchical CL-PKC can be supported. The schemes are all derived from pairings on elliptic curves. The lack of certificates and the desire to prove the schemes secure in the presence of an adversary who has access to the master key requires the careful development of new security models. For reasons of brevity, the focus in this paper is on the security of CL-PKE. We prove that our CL-PKE scheme is secure in a fully adaptive adversarial model, provided that an underlying problem closely related to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem is hard.
2003
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of a Message Authentication Code due to Cary and Venkatesan
Simon R. Blackburn Kenneth G. Paterson
We present a cryptanalysis of a MAC proposal at CRYPTO 2003 due to Cary and Venkatesan. Our attacks find collisions for the MAC and yield MAC forgeries, both faster than a straightforward application of the birthday paradox would suggest.
2002
EPRINT
ID-based Signatures from Pairings on Elliptic Curves
Kenneth G. Paterson
We present an efficient identity-based signature scheme which makes use of bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. Our scheme is similar to the generalized ElGamal signature scheme. We consider the security of our scheme.
2002
EPRINT
Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings
Sattam S. Al-Riyami Kenneth G. Paterson
Joux's protocol is a one round, tripartite key agreement protocol that is more bandwidth-efficient than any previous three-party key agreement protocol. But it is insecure, suffering from a simple man-in-the-middle attack. This paper shows how to make Joux's protocol secure, presenting several tripartite, authenticated key agreement protocols that still require only one round of communication. A pass-optimal authenticated and key confirmed tripartite protocol that generalises the station-to-station protocol is also presented. The security properties of the new protocols are studied using provable security methods and heuristic approaches. Applications for the protocols are also discussed.
1999
FSE
1994
JOFC

Program Committees

Crypto 2018
Crypto 2016
FSE 2016
Eurocrypt 2015
PKC 2014
Asiacrypt 2013
Eurocrypt 2013
Asiacrypt 2012
Crypto 2012
Eurocrypt 2011
Crypto 2011
PKC 2010
PKC 2009
Eurocrypt 2008
Crypto 2007
PKC 2006
Eurocrypt 2006
Asiacrypt 2006