## CryptoDB

### Nilanjan Datta

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

CIC

FEDT: Forkcipher-based Leakage-resilient Beyond-birthday-secure AE
Abstract

<p>There has been a notable surge of research on leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) schemes, in the bounded as well as the unbounded leakage model. The latter has garnered significant attention due to its detailed and practical orientation. Designers have commonly utilized (tweakable) block ciphers, exemplified by the TEDT scheme, achieving $\mathcal{O}(n-\log(n^2))$-bit integrity under leakage and comparable AE security in the black-box setting. However, the privacy of TEDT was limited by $n/2$-bits under leakage; TEDT2 sought to overcome these limitations by achieving improved security with $\mathcal{O}(n-\log n)$-bit integrity and privacy under leakage.</p><p>This work introduces FEDT, an efficient leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) scheme based on fork-cipher. Compared to the state-of-the-art schemes TEDT and TEDT2, which process messages with a rate of $1/2$ block per primitive call for encryption and one for authentication, FEDT doubles their rates at the price of a different primitive. FEDT employs a more parallelizable tree-based encryption compared to its predecessors while maintaining $\mathcal{O}(n-\log n)$-bit security for both privacy and integrity under leakage. FEDT prioritizes high throughput at the cost of increased latency. For settings where latency is important, we propose FEDT*, which combines the authentication part of FEDT with a CTR-based encryption. FEDT* offers security equivalent to FEDT while increasing the encryption rate of $4/3$ and reducing the latency. </p>

2023

TOSC

Tight Multi-User Security Bound of DbHtS
Abstract

In CRYPTO’21, Shen et al. proved that Two-Keyed-DbHtS construction is secure up to 22n/3 queries in the multi-user setting independent of the number of users. Here the underlying double-block hash function H of the construction realized as the concatenation of two independent n-bit keyed hash functions (HKh,1,HKh,2), and the security holds under the assumption that each of the n-bit keyed hash function is universal and regular. The authors have also demonstrated the applicability of their result to the key-reduced variants of DbHtS MACs, including 2K-SUM-ECBC, 2K-PMAC_Plus and 2K-LightMAC_Plus without requiring domain separation technique and proved 2n/3-bit multi-user security of these constructions in the ideal cipher model. Recently, Guo and Wang have invalidated the security claim of Shen et al.’s result by exhibiting three constructions, which are instantiations of the Two-Keyed-DbHtS framework, such that each of their n-bit keyed hash functions are O(2−n) universal and regular, while the constructions themselves are secure only up to the birthday bound. In this work, we show a sufficient condition on the underlying Double-block Hash (DbH) function, under which we prove an improved 3n/4-bit multi-user security of the Two-Keyed-DbHtS construction in the ideal-cipher model. To be more precise, we show that if each of the n-bit keyed hash function is universal, regular, and cross-collision resistant then it achieves the desired security. As an instantiation, we show that two-keyed Polyhash-based DbHtS construction is multi-user secure up to 23n/4 queries in the ideal-cipher model. Furthermore, due to the generic attack on DbHtS constructions by Leurent et al. in CRYPTO’18, our derived bound for the construction is tight.

2023

TOSC

Cascading Four Round LRW1 is Beyond Birthday Bound Secure
Abstract

In CRYPTO’02, Liskov et al. introduced the concept of a tweakable block cipher, a novel symmetric key primitive with promising applications. They put forth two constructions for designing such tweakable block ciphers from conventional block ciphers: LRW1 and LRW2. While subsequent efforts extended LRW2 to achieve security beyond the birthday bound (e.g., cascaded LRW2 in CRYPTO’12 by Landecker et al.), the extension of LRW1 remained unexplored until Bao et al.’s work in EUROCRYPT’20 that considered cascaded LRW1, a one-round extension of LRW1 - entailing masking the LRW1 output with the given tweak and re-encrypting it with the same block cipher. They showed that CLRW1 offers security up to 22n/3 queries. However, this result was challenged by Khairallah’s recent birthday bound distinguishing attack on cascaded LRW1, effectively refuting the security claim of Bao et al. Consequently, a pertinent research question emerges: How many rounds of cascaded LRW1 are required to obtain security beyond the birthday bound? This paper addresses this question by establishing that cascading LRW1 for four rounds suffices to ensure security beyond the birthday bound. Specifically, we demonstrate that 4 rounds of CLRW1 guarantees security for up to 23n/4 queries. Our security analysis is based from recent advancements in the mirror theory technique for tweakable random permutations, operating within the framework of the Expectation Method.

2021

TOSC

Improved Security Bound of (E/D)WCDM
📺
Abstract

In CRYPTO’16, Cogliati and Seurin proposed a block cipher based nonce based MAC, called Encrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer (EWCDM), that gives 2n/3 bit MAC security in the nonce respecting setting and n/2 bit security in the nonce misuse setting, where n is the block size of the underlying block cipher. However, this construction requires two independent block cipher keys. In CRYPTO’18, Datta et al. came up with a single-keyed block cipher based nonce based MAC, called Decrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer (DWCDM), that also provides 2n/3 bit MAC security in the nonce respecting setting and n/2 bit security in the nonce misuse setting. However, the drawback of DWCDM is that it takes only 2n/3 bit nonce. In fact, authors have shown that DWCDM cannot achieve beyond the birthday bound security with n bit nonces. In this paper, we prove that DWCDM with 3n/4 bit nonces provides MAC security up to O(23n/4) MAC queries against all nonce respecting adversaries. We also improve the MAC bound of EWCDM from 2n/3 bit to 3n/4 bit. The backbone of these two results is a refined treatment of extended mirror theory that systematically estimates the number of solutions to a system of bivariate affine equations and non-equations, which we apply on the security proofs of the constructions to achieve 3n/4 bit security.

2020

TOSC

INT-RUP Secure Lightweight Parallel AE Modes
📺
Abstract

Owing to the growing demand for lightweight cryptographic solutions, NIST has initiated a standardization process for lightweight cryptographic algorithms. Specific to authenticated encryption (AE), the NIST draft demands that the scheme should have one primary member that has key length of 128 bits, and it should be secure for at least 250 − 1 byte queries and 2112 computations. Popular (lightweight) modes, such as OCB, OTR, CLOC, SILC, JAMBU, COFB, SAEB, Beetle, SUNDAE etc., require at least 128-bit primitives to meet the NIST criteria, as all of them are just birthday bound secure. Furthermore, most of them are sequential, and they either use a two pass mode or they do not offer any security when the adversary has access to unverified plaintext (RUP model). In this paper, we propose two new designs for lightweight AE modes, called LOCUS and LOTUS, structurally similar to OCB and OTR, respectively. These modes achieve notably higher AE security bounds with lighter primitives (only a 64-bit tweakable block cipher). Especially, they satisfy the NIST requirements: secure as long as the data complexity is less than 264 bytes and time complexity is less than 2128, even when instantiated with a primitive with 64-bit block and 128-bit key. Both these modes are fully parallelizable and provide full integrity security under the RUP model. We use TweGIFT-64[4,16,16,4] (also referred as TweGIFT-64), a tweakable variant of the GIFT block cipher, to instantiate our AE modes. TweGIFT-64-LOCUS and TweGIFT-64-LOTUS are significantly light in hardware implementation. To justify, we provide our FPGA based implementation results, which demonstrate that TweGIFT-64-LOCUS consumes only 257 slices and 690 LUTs, while TweGIFT-64-LOTUS consumes only 255 slices and 664 LUTs.

2020

TOSC

Release of Unverified Plaintext: Tight Unified Model and Application to ANYDAE
📺
Abstract

Authenticated encryption schemes are usually expected to offer confidentiality and authenticity. In case of release of unverified plaintext (RUP), an adversary gets separated access to the decryption and verification functionality, and has more power in breaking the scheme. Andreeva et al. (ASIACRYPT 2014) formalized RUP security using plaintext awareness, informally meaning that the decryption functionality gives no extra power in breaking confidentiality, and INT-RUP security, covering authenticity in case of RUP. We describe a single, unified model, called AERUP security, that ties together these notions: we prove that an authenticated encryption scheme is AERUP secure if and only if it is conventionally secure, plaintext aware, and INT-RUP secure. We next present ANYDAE, a generalization of SUNDAE of Banik et al. (ToSC 2018/3). ANYDAE is a lightweight deterministic scheme that is based on a block cipher with block size n and arbitrary mixing functions that all operate on an n-bit state. It is particularly efficient for short messages, it does not rely on a nonce, and it provides maximal robustness to a lack of secure state. Whereas SUNDAE is not secure under release of unverified plaintext (a fairly simple attack can be mounted in constant time), ANYDAE is. We make handy use of the AERUP security model to prove that ANYDAE achieves both conventional security as RUP security, provided that certain modest conditions on the mixing functions are met. We describe two simple instances, called MONDAE and TUESDAE, that conform to these conditions and that are competitive with SUNDAE, in terms of efficiency and optimality.

2020

TOSC

ESTATE: A Lightweight and Low Energy Authenticated Encryption Mode
📺
Abstract

NIST has recently initiated a standardization project for efficient lightweight authenticated encryption schemes. SUNDAE, a candidate in this project, achieves optimal state size which results in low circuit overhead on top of the underlying block cipher. In addition, SUNDAE provides security in nonce-misuse scenario as well. However, in addition to the block cipher circuit, SUNDAE also requires some additional circuitry for multiplication by a primitive element. Further, it requires an additional block cipher invocation to create the starting state. In this paper, we propose a new lightweight and low energy authenticated encryption family, called ESTATE, that significantly improves the design of SUNDAE in terms of implementation costs (both hardware area and energy) and efficient processing of short messages. In particular, ESTATE does not require an additional multiplication circuit, and it reduces the number of block cipher calls by one. Moreover, it provides integrity security even under the release of unverified plaintext (or RUP) model. ESTATE is based on short-tweak tweakable block ciphers (or tBC, small ’t’ denotes short tweaks) and we instantiate it with two recently designed tBCs: TweAES and TweGIFT. We also propose a low latency variant of ESTATE, called sESTATE, that uses a round-reduced (6 rounds) variant of TweAES called TweAES-6. We provide comprehensive FPGA based hardware implementation for all the three instances. The implementation results depict that ESTATE_TweGIFT-128 (681 LUTs, 263 slices) consumes much lesser area as compared to SUNDAE_GIFT-128 (931 LUTs, 310 slices). When we moved to the AES variants, along with the area-efficiency (ESTATE_TweAES consumes 1901 LUTs, 602 slices while SUNDAE_AES-128 needs 1922 LUTs, 614 slices), we also achieve higher throughput for short messages (For 16-byte message, a throughput of 1251.10 and 945.36 Mbps for ESTATE_TweAES and SUNDAE_AES-128 respectively).

2020

TOSC

From Combined to Hybrid: Making Feedback-based AE even Smaller
📺
Abstract

In CHES 2017, Chakraborti et al. proposed COFB, a rate-1 sequential block cipher-based authenticated encryption (AE) with only 1.5n-bit state, where n denotes the block size. They used a novel approach, the so-called combined feedback, where each block cipher input has a combined effect of the previous block cipher output and the current plaintext block. In this paper, we first study the security of a general rate-1 feedback-based AE scheme in terms of its overall internal state size. For a large class of feedback functions, we show that the overlying AE scheme can be attacked in 2r queries if the internal state size is n + r bits for some r ≥ 0. This automatically shows that a birthday bound (i.e. 2n/2 queries) secure AE scheme must have at least 1.5n-bit state, whence COFB is almost-optimal (use 1.5n-bit state and provides security up to 2n/2/n queries). We propose a new feedback function, called the hybrid feedback or HyFB, which is a hybrid composition of plaintext and ciphertext feedbacks. HyFB has a key advantage of lower XOR counts over the combined feedback function. This essentially helps in reducing the hardware footprint. Based on HyFB we propose a new AE scheme, called HyENA, that achieves the state size, rate, and security of COFB. In addition, HyENA has significantly lower XOR counts as compared to COFB, whence it is expected to have a smaller implementation as compared to COFB.

2018

CRYPTO

Encrypt or Decrypt? To Make a Single-Key Beyond Birthday Secure Nonce-Based MAC
📺
Abstract

At CRYPTO 2016, Cogliati and Seurin have proposed a highly secure nonce-based MAC called Encrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer ($$\textsf {EWCDM}$$EWCDM) construction, as $$\textsf {E}_{K_2}\bigl (\textsf {E}_{K_1}(N)\oplus N\oplus \textsf {H}_{K_h}(M)\bigr )$$EK2(EK1(N)⊕N⊕HKh(M)) for a nonce N and a message M. This construction achieves roughly $$2^{2n/3}$$22n/3 bit MAC security with the assumption that $$\textsf {E}$$E is a PRP secure n-bit block cipher and $$\textsf {H}$$H is an almost xor universal n-bit hash function. In this paper we propose Decrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer ($$\textsf {DWCDM}$$DWCDM) construction, which is structurally very similar to its predecessor $$\textsf {EWCDM}$$EWCDM except that the outer encryption call is replaced by decryption. The biggest advantage of $$\textsf {DWCDM}$$DWCDM is that we can make a truly single key MAC: the two block cipher calls can use the same block cipher key $$K=K_1=K_2$$K=K1=K2. Moreover, we can derive the hash key as $$K_h=\textsf {E}_K(1)$$Kh=EK(1), as long as $$|K_h|=n$$|Kh|=n. Whether we use encryption or decryption in the outer layer makes a huge difference; using the decryption instead enables us to apply an extended version of the mirror theory by Patarin to the security analysis of the construction. $$\textsf {DWCDM}$$DWCDM is secure beyond the birthday bound, roughly up to $$2^{2n/3}$$22n/3 MAC queries and $$2^n$$2n verification queries against nonce-respecting adversaries. $$\textsf {DWCDM}$$DWCDM remains secure up to $$2^{n/2}$$2n/2 MAC queries and $$2^n$$2n verification queries against nonce-misusing adversaries.

2018

TCHES

Beetle Family of Lightweight and Secure Authenticated Encryption Ciphers
📺
Abstract

This paper presents a lightweight, sponge-based authenticated encryption (AE) family called Beetle. When instantiated with the PHOTON permutation from CRYPTO 2011, Beetle achieves the smallest footprint—consuming only a few more than 600 LUTs on FPGA while maintaining 64-bit security. This figure is significantly smaller than all known lightweight AE candidates which consume more than 1,000 LUTs, including the latest COFB-AES from CHES 2017. In order to realize such small hardware implementation, we equip Beetle with an “extremely tight” bound of security. The trick is to use combined feedback to create a difference between the cipher text block and the rate part of the next feedback (in traditional sponge these two values are the same). Then we are able to show that Beetle is provably secure up to min{c − log r, b/2, r} bits, where b is the permutation size and r and c are parameters called rate and capacity, respectively. The tight security bound allows us to select the smallest security parameters, which in turn result in the smallest footprint.

2018

TOSC

Double-block Hash-then-Sum: A Paradigm for Constructing BBB Secure PRF
📺
Abstract

SUM-ECBC (Yasuda, CT-RSA 2010) is the first beyond birthday bound (BBB) secure block cipher based deterministic MAC. After this work, some more BBB secure deterministic MACs have been proposed, namely PMAC_Plus (Yasuda, CRYPTO 2011), 3kf9 (Zhang et al., ASIACRYPT 2012) and LightMAC_Plus (Naito, ASIACRYPT 2017). In this paper, we have abstracted out the inherent design principle of all these BBB secure MACs and present a generic design paradigm to construct a BBB secure pseudo random function, namely Double-block Hash-then- Sum or in short (DbHtS). A DbHtS construction, as the name implies, computes a double block hash on the message and then sum the encrypted output of the two hash blocks. Our result renders that if the underlying hash function meets certain security requirements (namely cover-free and block-wise universal advantage is low), DbHtS construction provides 2n/3-bit security. We demonstrate the applicability of our result by instantiating all the existing beyond birthday secure deterministic MACs (e.g., SUM-ECBC, PMAC_Plus, 3kf9, LightMAC_Plus) as well as a simple two-keyed variant for each of them and some algebraic hash based constructions.

2018

TOSC

Lightweight and Side-channel Secure 4 × 4 S-Boxes from Cellular Automata Rules
📺
Abstract

This work focuses on side-channel resilient design strategies for symmetrickey cryptographic primitives targeting lightweight applications. In light of NIST’s lightweight cryptography project, design choices for block ciphers must consider not only security against traditional cryptanalysis, but also side-channel security, while adhering to low area and power requirements. In this paper, we explore design strategies for substitution-permutation network (SPN)-based block ciphers that make them amenable to low-cost threshold implementations (TI) - a provably secure strategy against side-channel attacks. The core building blocks for our strategy are cryptographically optimal 4×4 S-Boxes, implemented via repeated iterations of simple cellular automata (CA) rules. We present highly optimized TI circuits for such S-Boxes, that consume nearly 40% less area and power as compared to popular lightweight S-Boxes such as PRESENT and GIFT. We validate our claims via implementation results on ASIC using 180nm technology. We also present a comparison of TI circuits for two popular lightweight linear diffusion layer choices - bit permutations and MixColumns using almost-maximum-distance-separable (almost-MDS) matrices. We finally illustrate design paradigms that combine the aforementioned TI circuits for S-Boxes and diffusion layers to obtain fully side-channel secure SPN block cipher implementations with low area and power requirements.

2017

TOSC

Single Key Variant of PMAC_Plus
Abstract

At CRYPTO 2011, Yasuda proposed the PMAC_Plus message authentication code based on an n-bit block cipher. Its design principle inherits the well known PMAC parallel network with a low additional cost. PMAC_Plus is a rate-1 construction like PMAC (i.e., one block cipher call per n-bit message block) but provides security against all adversaries (under black-box model) making queries altogether consisting of roughly upto 22n/3 blocks (strings of n-bits). Even though PMAC_Plus gives higher security than the standard birthday bound security, with currently available best bound, it provides weaker security than PMAC for certain choices of adversaries. Moreover, unlike PMAC, PMAC_Plus operates with three independent block cipher keys. In this paper, we propose 1k-PMAC_Plus, the first rate-1 single keyed block cipher based BBB (Beyond Birthday Bound) secure (in standard model) deterministic MAC construction without arbitrary field multiplications. 1k-PMAC_Plus, as the name implies, is a simple one-key variant of PMAC_Plus. In addition to the key reduction, we obtain a higher security guarantee than what was proved originally for PMAC_Plus, thus an improvement in two directions.

2017

TOSC

Understanding RUP Integrity of COLM
Abstract

The authenticated encryption scheme COLM is a third-round candidate in the CAESAR competition. Much like its antecedents COPA, ELmE, and ELmD, COLM consists of two parallelizable encryption layers connected by a linear mixing function. While COPA uses plain XOR mixing, ELmE, ELmD, and COLM use a more involved invertible mixing function. In this work, we investigate the integrity of the COLM structure when unverified plaintext is released, and demonstrate that its security highly depends on the choice of mixing function. Our results are threefold. First, we discuss the practical nonce-respecting forgery by Andreeva et al. (ASIACRYPT 2014) against COPA’s XOR mixing. Then we present a noncemisusing forgery against arbitrary mixing functions with practical time complexity. Finally, by using significantly larger queries, we can extend the previous forgery to be nonce-respecting.

#### Coauthors

- Elena Andreeva (1)
- Ritam Bhaumik (1)
- Andrey Bogdanov (1)
- Avik Chakraborti (4)
- Donghoon Chang (1)
- Nilanjan Datta (16)
- Shreya Dey (1)
- Avijit Dutta (9)
- Kushankur Dutta (1)
- Ashrujit Ghoshal (1)
- Ashwin Jha (3)
- Eik List (1)
- Atul Luykx (2)
- Cuauhtemoc Mancillas-Lopez (2)
- Sougata Mandal (2)
- Bart Mennink (3)
- Snehal Mitragotri (1)
- Nicky Mouha (1)
- Debdeep Mukhopadhyay (1)
- Mridul Nandi (12)
- Sikhar Patranabis (1)
- Goutam Paul (2)
- Stjepan Picek (1)
- Rajat Sadhukhan (1)
- Somitra Sanadhya (1)
- Yu Sasaki (2)
- Ferdinand Sibleyras (1)
- Suprita Talnikar (1)
- Elmar Tischhauser (1)
- Kan Yasuda (3)
- Liting Zhang (1)