International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Aleksei Udovenko

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2024
TCHES
OBSCURE: Versatile Software Obfuscation from a Lightweight Secure Element
Software obfuscation is a powerful tool to protect the intellectual property or secret keys inside programs. Strong software obfuscation is crucial in the context of untrusted execution environments (e.g., subject to malware infection) or to face potentially malicious users trying to reverse-engineer a sensitive program. Unfortunately, the state-of-the-art of pure software-based obfuscation (including white-box cryptography) is either insecure or infeasible in practice.This work introduces OBSCURE, a versatile framework for practical and cryptographically strong software obfuscation relying on a simple stateless secure element (to be embedded, for example, in a protected hardware chip or a token). Based on the foundational result by Goyal et al. from TCC 2010, our scheme enjoys provable security guarantees, and further focuses on practical aspects, such as efficient execution of the obfuscated programs, while maintaining simplicity of the secure element. In particular, we propose a new rectangular universalization technique, which is also of independent interest. We provide an implementation of OBSCURE taking as input a program source code written in a subset of the C programming language. This ensures usability and a broad range of applications of our framework. We benchmark the obfuscation on simple software programs as well as on cryptographic primitives, hence highlighting the possible use cases of the framework as an alternative to pure software-based white-box implementations.
2024
TCHES
White-box filtering attacks breaking SEL masking: from exponential to polynomial time
Alex Charlès Aleksei Udovenko
This work proposes a new white-box attack technique called filtering, which can be combined with any other trace-based attack method. The idea is to filter the traces based on the value of an intermediate variable in the implementation, aiming to fix a share of a sensitive value and degrade the security of an involved masking scheme.Coupled with LDA (filtered LDA, FLDA), it leads to an attack defeating the state-ofthe-art SEL masking scheme (CHES 2021) of arbitrary degree and number of linear shares with quartic complexity in the window size. In comparison, the current best attacks have exponential complexities in the degree (higher degree decoding analysis, HDDA), in the number of linear shares (higher-order differential computation analysis, HODCA), or the window size (white-box learning parity with noise, WBLPN). The attack exploits the key idea of the SEL scheme - an efficient parallel combination of the nonlinear and linear masking schemes. We conclude that a proper composition of masking schemes is essential for security.In addition, we propose several optimizations for linear algebraic attacks: redundant node removal (RNR), optimized parity check matrix usage, and chosen-plaintext filtering (CPF), significantly improving the performance of security evaluation of white-box implementations.
2023
TCHES
Cryptanalysis of ARX-based White-box Implementations
Alex Biryukov Baptiste Lambin Aleksei Udovenko
At CRYPTO’22, Ranea, Vandersmissen, and Preneel proposed a new way to design white-box implementations of ARX-based ciphers using so-called implicit functions and quadratic-affine encodings. They suggest the Speck block-cipher as an example target.In this work, we describe practical attacks on the construction. For the implementation without one of the external encodings, we describe a simple algebraic key recovery attack. If both external encodings are used (the main scenario suggested by the authors), we propose optimization and inversion attacks, followed by our main result - a multiple-step round decomposition attack and a decomposition-based key recovery attack.Our attacks only use the white-box round functions as oracles and do not rely on their description. We implemented and verified experimentally attacks on white-box instances of Speck-32/64 and Speck-64/128. We conclude that a single ARX-round is too weak to be used as a white-box round.
2023
TCHES
LPN-based Attacks in the White-box Setting
Alex Charlès Aleksei Udovenko
In white-box cryptography, early protection techniques have fallen to the automated Differential Computation Analysis attack (DCA), leading to new countermeasures and attacks. A standard side-channel countermeasure, Ishai-Sahai-Wagner’s masking scheme (ISW, CRYPTO 2003) prevents Differential Computation Analysis but was shown to be vulnerable in the white-box context to the Linear Decoding Analysis attack (LDA). However, recent quadratic and cubic masking schemes by Biryukov-Udovenko (ASIACRYPT 2018) and Seker-Eisenbarth-Liskiewicz (CHES 2021) prevent LDA and force to use its higher-degree generalizations with much higher complexity.In this work, we study the relationship between the security of these and related schemes to the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem and propose a new automated attack by applying an LPN-solving algorithm to white-box implementations. The attack effectively exploits strong linear approximations of the masking scheme and thus can be seen as a combination of the DCA and LDA techniques. Different from previous attacks, the complexity of this algorithm depends on the approximation error, henceforth allowing new practical attacks on masking schemes which previously resisted automated analysis. We demonstrate it theoretically and experimentally, exposing multiple cases where the LPN-based method significantly outperforms LDA and DCA methods, including their higher-order variants.This work applies the LPN problem beyond its usual post-quantum cryptography boundary, strengthening its interest for the cryptographic community, while expanding the range of automated attacks by presenting a new direction for breaking masking schemes in the white-box model.
2021
EUROCRYPT
Dummy Shuffling against Algebraic Attacks in White-box Implementations 📺
Alex Biryukov Aleksei Udovenko
At CHES 2016, Bos et al. showed that most of existing white-box implementations are easily broken by standard side-channel attacks. A natural idea to apply the well-developed side-channel countermeasure - linear masking schemes - leaves implementations vulnerable to linear algebraic attacks which exploit absence of noise in the white-box setting and are applicable for any order of linear masking. At ASIACRYPT 2018, Biryukov and Udovenko proposed a security model (BU-model for short) for protection against linear algebraic attacks and a new quadratic masking scheme which is provably secure in this model. However, countermeasures against higher-degree attacks were left as an open problem. In this work, we study the effectiveness of another well-known side-channel countermeasure - shuffling - against linear and higher-degree algebraic attacks in the white-box setting. First, we extend the classic shuffling to include dummy computation slots and show that this is a crucial component for protecting against the algebraic attacks. We quantify and prove the security of dummy shuffling against the linear algebraic attack in the BU-model. We introduce a refreshing technique for dummy shuffling and show that it allows to achieve close to optimal protection in the model for arbitrary degrees of the attack, thus solving the open problem of protection against the algebraic attack in the BU-model. Furthermore, we describe an interesting proof-of-concept construction that makes the slot function public (while keeping the shuffling indexes private).
2021
ASIACRYPT
Convexity of division property transitions: theory, algorithms and compact models 📺
Aleksei Udovenko
Integral cryptanalysis is a powerful tool for attacking symmetric primitives, and division property is a state-of-the-art framework for finding integral distinguishers. This work describes new theoretical and practical insights into traditional bit-based division property. We focus on analyzing and exploiting monotonicity/convexity of division property and its relation to the graph indicator. In particular, our investigation leads to a new compact representation of propagation, which allows CNF/MILP modeling for larger S-Boxes, such as 16-bit Super-Sboxes of lightweight block ciphers or even 32-bit random S-boxes. This solves the challenge posed by Derbez and Fouque (ToSC 2020), who questioned the possibility of SAT/SMT/MILP modeling of 16-bit Super-Sboxes. As a proof-of-concept, we model the Super-Sboxes of the 8-round LED by CNF formulas, which was not feasible by any previous approach. Our analysis is further supported by an elegant algorithmic framework. We describe simple algorithms for computing division property of a set of $n$-bit vectors in time $O(n2^n)$, reducing such sets to minimal/maximal elements in time $O(n2^n)$, computing division property propagation table of an $n\times m$-bit S-box and its compact representation in time $O((n+m)2^{n+m})$. In addition, we develop an advanced algorithm tailored to "heavy" bijections, allowing to model, for example, a randomly generated 32-bit S-box.
2020
TOSC
Cryptanalysis of the Legendre PRF and Generalizations 📺
The Legendre PRF relies on the conjectured pseudorandomness properties of the Legendre symbol with a hidden shift. Originally proposed as a PRG by Damgård at CRYPTO 1988, it was recently suggested as an efficient PRF for multiparty computation purposes by Grassi et al. at CCS 2016. Moreover, the Legendre PRF is being considered for usage in the Ethereum 2.0 blockchain.This paper improves previous attacks on the Legendre PRF and its higher-degree variant due to Khovratovich by reducing the time complexity from O(< (p log p/M) to O(p log2 p/M2) Legendre symbol evaluations when M ≤ 4√ p log2 p queries are available. The practical relevance of our improved attack is demonstrated by breaking three concrete instances of the PRF proposed by the Ethereum foundation. Furthermore, we generalize our attack in a nontrivial way to the higher-degree variant of the Legendre PRF and we point out a large class of weak keys for this construction. Lastly, we provide the first security analysis of two additional generalizations of the Legendre PRF originally proposed by Damgård in the PRG setting, namely the Jacobi PRF and the power residue PRF.
2020
TOSC
Lightweight AEAD and Hashing using the Sparkle Permutation Family 📺
We introduce the Sparkle family of permutations operating on 256, 384 and 512 bits. These are combined with the Beetle mode to construct a family of authenticated ciphers, Schwaemm, with security levels ranging from 120 to 250 bits. We also use them to build new sponge-based hash functions, Esch256 and Esch384. Our permutations are among those with the lowest footprint in software, without sacrificing throughput. These properties are allowed by our use of an ARX component (the Alzette S-box) as well as a carefully chosen number of rounds. The corresponding analysis is enabled by the long trail strategy which gives us the tools we need to efficiently bound the probability of all the differential and linear trails for an arbitrary number of rounds. We also present a new application of this approach where the only trails considered are those mapping the rate to the outer part of the internal state, such trails being the only relevant trails for instance in a differential collision attack. To further decrease the number of rounds without compromising security, we modify the message injection in the classical sponge construction to break the alignment between the rate and our S-box layer.
2020
CRYPTO
Alzette: a 64-bit ARX-box (feat. CRAX and TRAX) 📺
S-boxes are the only source of non-linearity in many symmetric cryptographic primitives. While they are often defined as being functions operating on a small space, some recent designs propose the use of much larger ones (e.g., 32 bits). In this context, an S-box is then defined as a subfunction whose cryptographic properties can be estimated precisely. In this paper, we present a 64-bit ARX-based S-box called Alzette which can be evaluated in constant time using only 12 instructions on modern CPUs. Its parallel application can also leverage vector (SIMD) instructions. One iteration of Alzette has differential and linear properties comparable to those of the AES S-box, while two iterations are at least as secure as the AES super S-box. Since the state size is much larger than the typical 4 or 8 bits, the study of the relevant cryptographic properties of Alzette is not trivial. We further discuss how such wide S-boxes could be used to construct round functions of 64-, 128- and 256-bit (tweakable) block ciphers with good cryptographic properties that are guaranteed even in the related-tweak setting. We use these structures to design a very lightweight 64-bit block cipher (CRAX) which outerperforms SPECK-64/128 for short messages on micro-controllers, and a 256-bit tweakable block cipher (TRAX) which can be used to obtain strong security guarantees against powerful adversaries (nonce misuse, quantum attacks).
2018
ASIACRYPT
Attacks and Countermeasures for White-box Designs
Alex Biryukov Aleksei Udovenko
In traditional symmetric cryptography, the adversary has access only to the inputs and outputs of a cryptographic primitive. In the white-box model the adversary is given full access to the implementation. He can use both static and dynamic analysis as well as fault analysis in order to break the cryptosystem, e.g. to extract the embedded secret key. Implementations secure in such model have many applications in industry. However, creating such implementations turns out to be a very challenging if not an impossible task.Recently, Bos et al. [7] proposed a generic attack on white-box primitives called differential computation analysis (DCA). This attack was applied to many white-box implementations both from academia and industry. The attack comes from the area of side-channel analysis and the most common method protecting against such attacks is masking, which in turn is a form of secret sharing. In this paper we present multiple generic attacks against masked white-box implementations. We use the term “masking” in a very broad sense. As a result, we deduce new constraints that any secure white-box implementation must satisfy.Based on the new constraints, we develop a general method for protecting white-box implementations. We split the protection into two independent components: value hiding and structure hiding. Value hiding must provide protection against passive DCA-style attacks that rely on analysis of computation traces. Structure hiding must provide protection against circuit analysis attacks. In this paper we focus on developing the value hiding component. It includes protection against the DCA attack by Bos et al. and protection against a new attack called algebraic attack.We present a provably secure first-order protection against the new algebraic attack. The protection is based on small gadgets implementing secure masked XOR and AND operations. Furthermore, we give a proof of compositional security allowing to freely combine secure gadgets. We derive concrete security bounds for circuits built using our construction.
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
CRYPTO
2016
FSE
2016
ASIACRYPT
2016
TOSC
Exponential S-Boxes: a Link Between the S-Boxes of BelT and Kuznyechik/Streebog
Léo Perrin Aleksei Udovenko
The block cipher Kuznyechik and the hash function Streebog were recently standardized by the Russian Federation. These primitives use a common 8-bit S-Box, denoted

Program Committees

Crypto 2024
FSE 2023
FSE 2022