## CryptoDB

### Tim Beyne

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

CRYPTO

Information-theoretic security with asymmetries
Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of lower bounding any given cost function depending on the false positive and false negative probabilities of adversaries against indistinguishability security notions in symmetric-key cryptography. We take the cost model as an input, so that this becomes a purely information-theoretical question.
We propose power bounds as an easy-to-use alternative for advantage bounds in the context of indistinguishability with asymmetric cost functions. We show that standard proof techniques such as hybrid arguments and the H-coefficient method can be generalized to the power model, and apply these techniques to the PRP-PRF switching lemma, the Even-Mansour (EM) construction, and the sum-of-permutations (SoP) construction.
As the final and perhaps most useful contribution, we provide two methods to convert single-user power bounds into multi-user power bounds, and investigate their relation to the point-wise proximity method of Hoang and Tessaro (Crypto 2016). These method are applied to obtain tight multi-user power bounds for EM and SoP.

2024

ASIACRYPT

Ultrametric integral cryptanalysis
Abstract

A systematic method to analyze divisibility properties is proposed. In integral cryptanalysis, divisibility properties interpolate between bits that sum to zero (divisibility by two) and saturated bits (divisibility by $2^{n - 1}$ for $2^n$ inputs). From a theoretical point of view, we construct a new cryptanalytic technique that is a non-Archimedean multiplicative analogue of linear cryptanalysis. It lifts integral cryptanalysis to characteristic zero in the sense that, if all quantities are reduced modulo two, then one recovers the algebraic theory of integral cryptanalysis. The new technique leads to a theory of trails. We develop a tool based on off-the-shelf solvers that automates the analysis of these trails and use it to show that many integral distinguishers on Present and Simon are stronger than expected.

2023

TOSC

Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis of Feistel Ciphers
Abstract

This paper presents new generic attacks on Feistel ciphers that incorporate the key addition at the input of the non-invertible round function only. This feature leads to a specific vulnerability that can be exploited using multidimensional linear cryptanalysis. More specifically, our approach involves using key-independent linear trails so that the distribution of a combination of the plaintext and ciphertext can be computed. This makes it possible to use the likelihood-ratio test as opposed to the χ2 test. We provide theoretical estimates of the cost of our generic attacks and verify these experimentally by applying the attacks to CAST-128 and LOKI91. The theoretical and experimental findings demonstrate that the proposed attacks lead to significant reductions in data-complexity in several interesting cases.

2023

TOSC

Integral Cryptanalysis Using Algebraic Transition Matrices
Abstract

In this work we introduce algebraic transition matrices as the basis for a new approach to integral cryptanalysis that unifies monomial trails (Hu et al., Asiacrypt 2020) and parity sets (Boura and Canteaut, Crypto 2016). Algebraic transition matrices allow for the computation of the algebraic normal form of a primitive based on the algebraic normal forms of its components by means of wellunderstood operations from linear algebra. The theory of algebraic transition matrices leads to better insight into the relation between integral properties of F and F−1. In addition, we show that the link between invariants and eigenvectors of correlation matrices (Beyne, Asiacrypt 2018) carries over to algebraic transition matrices. Finally, algebraic transition matrices suggest a generalized definition of integral properties that subsumes previous notions such as extended division properties (Lambin, Derbez and Fouque, DCC 2020). On the practical side, a new algorithm is described to search for these generalized properties and applied to Present, resulting in new properties. The algorithm can be instantiated with any existing automated search method for integral cryptanalysis.

2022

TCHES

Cryptanalysis of Efficient Masked Ciphers: Applications to Low Latency
Abstract

This work introduces second-order masked implementation of LED, Midori, Skinny, and Prince ciphers which do not require fresh masks to be updated at every clock cycle. The main idea lies on a combination of the constructions given by Shahmirzadi and Moradi at CHES 2021, and the theory presented by Beyne et al. at Asiacrypt 2020. The presented masked designs only use a minimal number of shares, i.e., three to achieve second-order security, and we make use of a trick to pair a couple of S-boxes to reduce their latency. The theoretical security analyses of our constructions are based on the linear-cryptanalytic properties of the underlying masked primitive as well as SILVER, the leakage verification tool presented at Asiacrypt 2020. To improve this cryptanalytic analysis, we use the noisy probing model which allows for the inclusion of noise in the framework of Beyne et al. We further provide FPGA-based experimental security analysis confirming second-order protection of our masked implementations.

2022

TOSC

Truncated Differential Attacks on Contracting Feistel Ciphers
Abstract

We improve truncated differential attacks on t-branch contracting Feistel ciphers with a domain size of Nt. Based on new truncated differentials, a generic distinguisher for t2 + t − 2 rounds using O(Nt−1) data and time is obtained. In addition, we obtain a key-recovery attack on t2 + 1 rounds with Õ(Nt−2) data and Õ(Nt−1) time. Compared to previous results by Guo et al. (ToSC 2016), our attacks cover more rounds with a lower data-complexity. Applications of the generic truncated differential to concrete ciphers include full-round attacks on some instances of GMiMC-crf, and the best-known key-recovery attack on 17 rounds of the Chinese block cipher standard SM4. In addition, we propose an automated search method for truncated differentials using SMT, which is effective even for trails with probability below the probability of the truncated differential for a random permutation.

2022

CRYPTO

Constructing and Deconstructing Intentional Weaknesses in Symmetric Ciphers
📺
Abstract

Deliberately weakened ciphers are of great interest in political discussion on law enforcement, as in the constantly recurring crypto wars, and have been put in the spotlight of academics by recent progress. A paper at Eurocrypt 2021 showed a strong indication that the security of the widely-deployed stream cipher GEA-1 was deliberately and secretly weakened to 40 bits in order to fulfill European export restrictions that have been in place in the late 1990s. However, no explanation of how this could have been constructed was given. On the other hand, we have seen the MALICIOUS design framework, published at CRYPTO 2020, that allows to construct tweakable block ciphers with a backdoor, where the difficulty of recovering the backdoor relies on well-understood cryptographic assumptions. The constructed tweakable block cipher however is rather unusual and very different from, say, general-purpose ciphers like the AES.
In this paper, we pick up both topics. For GEA-1 we thoroughly explain how the weakness was constructed, solving the main open question of the work mentioned above. By generalizing MALICIOUS we - for the first time - construct backdoored tweakable block ciphers that follow modern design principles for general-purpose block ciphers, i.e., more natural-looking deliberately weakened tweakable block ciphers.

2022

CRYPTO

Differential Cryptanalysis in the Fixed-Key Model
📺
Abstract

A systematic approach to the fixed-key analysis of differential probabilities is proposed. It is based on the propagation of 'quasidifferential trails', which keep track of probabilistic linear relations on the values satisfying a differential characteristic in a theoretically sound way. It is shown that the fixed-key probability of a differential can be expressed as the sum of the correlations of its quasidifferential trails.
The theoretical foundations of the method are based on an extension of the difference-distribution table, which we call the quasidifferential transition matrix. The role of these matrices is analogous to that of correlation matrices in linear cryptanalysis. This puts the theory of differential and linear cryptanalysis on an equal footing.
The practical applicability of the proposed methodology is demonstrated by analyzing several differentials for RECTANGLE, KNOT, Speck and Simon. The analysis is automated and applicable to other SPN and ARX designs. Several attacks are shown to be invalid, most others turn out to work only for some keys but can be improved for weak-keys.

2022

CRYPTO

Provably Secure Reflection Ciphers
📺
Abstract

This paper provides the first analysis of reflection ciphers such as PRINCE from a provable security viewpoint.
As a first contribution, we initiate the study of key-alternating reflection ciphers in the ideal permutation model. Specifically, we prove the security of the two-round case and give matching attacks. The resulting security bound takes form $O(qp^2/2^{2n}+q^2/2^n)$, where q is the number of construction evaluations and p is the number of direct adversarial queries to the underlying permutation. Since the two-round construction already achieves an interesting security lower bound, this result can also be of interest for the construction of reflection ciphers based on a single public permutation.
Our second contribution is a generic key-length extension method for reflection ciphers. It provides an attractive alternative to the FX construction, which is used by PRINCE and other concrete key-alternating reflection ciphers. We show that our construction leads to better security with minimal changes to existing designs. The security proof is in the ideal cipher model and relies on a reduction to the two-round Even-Mansour cipher with a single round key. In order to obtain the desired result, we sharpen the bad-transcript analysis and consequently improve the best-known bounds for the single-key Even-Mansour cipher with two rounds. This improvement is enabled by a new sum-capture theorem that is of independent interest.

2021

CRYPTO

Linear Cryptanalysis of FF3-1 and FEA
📺 ★
Abstract

Improved attacks on generic small-domain Feistel ciphers with alternating round tweaks are obtained using linear cryptanalysis. This results in practical distinguishing and message-recovery attacks on the United States format-preserving encryption standard FF3-1 and the South-Korean standards FEA-1 and FEA-2. The data-complexity of the proposed attacks on FF3-1 and FEA-1 is $O(N^{r/2 - 1.5})$, where $N^2$ is the domain size and $r$ is the number of rounds. For example, FF3-1 with $N = 10^3$ can be distinguished from an ideal tweakable block cipher with advantage $\ge 1/10$ using $2^{23}$ encryption queries. Recovering the left half of a message with similar advantage requires $2^{24}$ data. The analysis of FF3-1 serves as an interesting real-world application of (generalized) linear cryptanalysis over the group $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.

2021

ASIACRYPT

A Geometric Approach to Linear Cryptanalysis
📺
Abstract

A new interpretation of linear cryptanalysis is proposed. This 'geometric approach' unifies all common variants of linear cryptanalysis, reveals links between various properties, and suggests additional generalizations. For example, new insights into invariants corresponding to non-real eigenvalues of correlation matrices and a generalization of the link between zero-correlation and integral attacks are obtained. Geometric intuition leads to a fixed-key motivation for the piling-up principle, which is illustrated by explaining and generalizing previous results relating invariants and linear approximations. Rank-one approximations are proposed to analyze cell-oriented ciphers, and used to resolve an open problem posed by Beierle, Canteaut and Leander at FSE 2019. In particular, it is shown how such approximations can be analyzed automatically using Riemannian optimization.

2020

JOFC

Block Cipher Invariants as Eigenvectors of Correlation Matrices
Abstract

A new approach to invariant subspaces and nonlinear invariants is developed. This results in both theoretical insights and practical attacks on block ciphers. It is shown that, with minor modifications to some of the round constants, Midori-64 has a nonlinear invariant with $$2^{96} + 2^{64}$$ 2 96 + 2 64 corresponding weak keys. Furthermore, this invariant corresponds to a linear hull with maximal correlation. By combining the new invariant with integral cryptanalysis, a practical key-recovery attack on ten rounds of unmodified Midori-64 is obtained. The attack works for $$2^{96}$$ 2 96 weak keys and irrespective of the choice of round constants. The data complexity is $$1.25 \cdot 2^{21}$$ 1.25 · 2 21 chosen plaintexts, and the computational cost is dominated by $$2^{56}$$ 2 56 block cipher calls. The validity of the attack is verified by means of experiments.

2020

JOFC

Revisiting the Wrong-Key-Randomization Hypothesis
Abstract

Linear cryptanalysis is considered to be one of the strongest techniques in the cryptanalyst’s arsenal. In most cases, Matsui’s Algorithm 2 is used for the key recovery part of the attack. The success rate analysis of this algorithm is based on an assumption regarding the bias of a linear approximation for a wrong key, known as the wrong-key-randomization hypothesis. This hypothesis was refined by Bogdanov and Tischhauser to take into account the stochastic nature of the bias for a wrong key. We provide further refinements to the analysis of Matsui’s Algorithm 2 by considering sampling without replacement. This paper derives the distribution of the observed bias for wrong keys when sampling is done without replacement and shows that less data are required in this scenario. It also develops formulas for the success probability and the required data complexity when this approach is taken. The formulas predict that the success probability may reach a peak and then decrease as more pairs are considered. We provide a new explanation for this behavior and derive the conditions for encountering it. We empirically verify our results and compare them to previous work.

2020

TOSC

Cryptanalysis of the Legendre PRF and Generalizations
📺
Abstract

The Legendre PRF relies on the conjectured pseudorandomness properties of the Legendre symbol with a hidden shift. Originally proposed as a PRG by Damgård at CRYPTO 1988, it was recently suggested as an efficient PRF for multiparty computation purposes by Grassi et al. at CCS 2016. Moreover, the Legendre PRF is being considered for usage in the Ethereum 2.0 blockchain.This paper improves previous attacks on the Legendre PRF and its higher-degree variant due to Khovratovich by reducing the time complexity from O(< (p log p/M) to O(p log2 p/M2) Legendre symbol evaluations when M ≤ 4√ p log2 p queries are available. The practical relevance of our improved attack is demonstrated by breaking three concrete instances of the PRF proposed by the Ethereum foundation. Furthermore, we generalize our attack in a nontrivial way to the higher-degree variant of the Legendre PRF and we point out a large class of weak keys for this construction. Lastly, we provide the first security analysis of two additional generalizations of the Legendre PRF originally proposed by Damgård in the PRG setting, namely the Jacobi PRF and the power residue PRF.

2020

CRYPTO

Out of Oddity -- New Cryptanalytic Techniques against Symmetric Primitives Optimized for Integrity Proof Systems
📺
Abstract

The security and performance of many integrity proof systems like SNARKs, STARKs and Bulletproofs highly depend on the underlying hash function. For this reason several new proposals have recently been developed. These primitives obviously require an in-depth security evaluation, especially since their implementation constraints have led to less standard design approaches. This work compares the security levels offered by two recent families of such primitives, namely GMiMC and HadesMiMC. We exhibit low-complexity distinguishers against the GMiMC and HadesMiMC permutations for most parameters proposed in recently launched public challenges for STARK-friendly hash functions. In the more concrete setting of the sponge construction corresponding to the practical use in the ZK-STARK protocol, we present a practical collision attack on a round-reduced version of GMiMC and a preimage attack on some instances of HadesMiMC. To achieve those results, we adapt and generalize several cryptographic techniques to fields of odd characteristic.

2020

TOSC

Dumbo, Jumbo, and Delirium: Parallel Authenticated Encryption for the Lightweight Circus
📺
Abstract

With the trend to connect more and more devices to the Internet, authenticated encryption has become a major backbone in securing the communication, not only between these devices and servers, but also the direct communication among these devices. Most authenticated encryption algorithms used in practice are developed to perform well on modern high-end devices, but are not necessarily suited for usage on resource-constrained devices. We present a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme, called Elephant. Elephant retains the advantages of GCM such as parallelism, but is tailored to the needs of resource-constrained devices. The two smallest instances of Elephant, Dumbo and Jumbo, are based on the 160-bit and 176-bit Spongent permutation, respectively, and are particularly suited for hardware; the largest instance of Elephant, Delirium, is based on 200-bit Keccak and is developed towards software use. All three instances are parallelizable, have a small state size while achieving a high level of security, and are constant time by design.

2020

ASIACRYPT

Cryptanalysis of Masked Ciphers: A not so Random Idea
📺
Abstract

A new approach to the security analysis of hardware-oriented masked ciphers against second-order side-channel attacks is developed. By relying on techniques from symmetric-key cryptanalysis, concrete security bounds are obtained in a variant of the probing model that allows the adversary to make only a bounded, but possibly very large, number of measurements. Specifically, it is formally shown how a bounded-query variant of robust probing security can be reduced to the linear cryptanalysis of masked ciphers.
As a result, the compositional issues of higher-order threshold implementations can be overcome without relying on fresh randomness. From a practical point of view, the aforementioned approach makes it possible to transfer many of the desirable properties of first-order threshold implementations, such as their low randomness usage, to the second-order setting. For example, a straightforward application to the block cipher LED results in a masking using less than 700 random bits including the initial sharing. In addition, the cryptanalytic approach introduced in this paper provides additional insight into the design of masked ciphers and allows for a quantifiable trade-off between security and performance.

2018

ASIACRYPT

Block Cipher Invariants as Eigenvectors of Correlation Matrices
★
Abstract

A new approach to invariant subspaces and nonlinear invariants is developed. This results in both theoretical insights and practical attacks on block ciphers. It is shown that, with minor modifications to some of the round constants, Midori-64 has a nonlinear invariant with $$2^{96}$$ corresponding weak keys. Furthermore, this invariant corresponds to a linear hull with maximal correlation. By combining the new invariant with integral cryptanalysis, a practical key-recovery attack on 10 rounds of unmodified Midori-64 is obtained. The attack works for $$2^{96}$$ weak keys and irrespective of the choice of round constants. The data complexity is $$1.25 \cdot 2^{21}$$ chosen plaintexts and the computational cost is dominated by $$2^{56}$$ block cipher calls. Finally, it is shown that similar techniques lead to a practical key-recovery attack on MANTIS-4. The full key is recovered using 640 chosen plaintexts and the attack requires about $$2^{56}$$ block cipher calls.

#### Program Committees

- Eurocrypt 2023

#### Coauthors

- Tomer Ashur (1)
- Betül Aşkın Özdemir (1)
- Christof Beierle (1)
- Ward Beullens (1)
- Tim Beyne (18)
- Anne Canteaut (1)
- Yu Long Chen (3)
- Siemen Dhooghe (2)
- Itai Dinur (1)
- Christoph Dobraunig (1)
- Maria Eichlseder (1)
- Patrick Felke (1)
- Gregor Leander (2)
- Gaëtan Leurent (1)
- Yunwen Liu (1)
- Bart Mennink (1)
- Amir Moradi (1)
- María Naya-Plasencia (1)
- Léo Perrin (1)
- Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi (1)
- Vincent Rijmen (3)
- Yu Sasaki (1)
- Yosuke Todo (1)
- Aleksei Udovenko (1)
- Michiel Verbauwhede (2)
- Giuseppe Vitto (1)
- Friedrich Wiemer (1)
- Zhenda Zhang (1)