International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Chelsea Komlo


Threshold Signatures with Private Accountability 📺
Chelsea Komlo Dan Boneh
Existing threshold signature schemes come in two flavors: (i) fully private, where the signature reveals nothing about the set of signers that generated the signature, and (ii) accountable, where the signature completely identifies the set of signers. In this paper we propose a new type of threshold signature, called TAPS, that is a hybrid of privacy and accountability. A TAPS signature is fully private from the public's point of view. However, an entity that has a secret tracing key can trace a signature to the threshold of signers that generated it. A TAPS makes it possible for an organization to keep its inner workings private, while ensuring that signers are accountable for their actions. We construct a number of TAPS schemes. First, we present a generic construction that builds a TAPS from any accountable threshold signature. This generic construction is not efficient, and we next focus on efficient schemes based on standard assumptions. We build two efficient TAPS schemes (in the random oracle model) based on the Schnorr signature scheme. We conclude with a number of open problems relating to efficient TAPS
Better than Advertised Security for Non-Interactive Threshold Signatures
We give a unified syntax, and a hierarchy of definitions of security of increasing strength, for non-interactive threshold signature schemes. These are schemes having a single-round signing protocol, possibly with one prior round of message-independent pre-processing. We fit FROST1 and BLS, which are leading practical schemes, into our hierarchy, in particular showing they meet stronger security definitions than they have been shown to meet so far. We also fit in our hierarchy a more efficient version FROST2 of FROST1 that we give. These definitions and results, for simplicity, all assume trusted key generation. Finally, we prove the security of FROST2 with key generation performed by an efficient distributed key generation protocol.