## CryptoDB

### Chenzhi Zhu

#### ORCID: 0000-0002-4276-2797

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

EUROCRYPT

Twinkle: Threshold Signatures from DDH with Full Adaptive Security
Abstract

Sparkle is the first threshold signature scheme in the pairing-free discrete logarithm setting (Crites, Komlo, Maller, Crypto 2023) to be proven secure under adaptive corruptions.
However, without using the algebraic group model, Sparkle's proof imposes an undesirable restriction on the adversary.
Namely, for a signing threshold t<n, the adversary is restricted to corrupt at most t/2 parties.
In addition, Sparkle's proof relies on a strong one-more assumption.
In this work, we propose Twinkle, a new threshold signature scheme in the pairing-free setting which overcomes these limitations.
Twinkle is the first pairing-free scheme to have a security proof under up to t adaptive corruptions without relying on the algebraic group model.
It is also the first such scheme with a security proof under adaptive corruptions from a well-studied non-interactive assumption, namely, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption.
We achieve our result in two steps.
First, we design a generic scheme based on a linear function that satisfies several abstract properties and prove its adaptive security under a suitable one-more assumption related to this function.
In the context of this proof, we also identify a gap in the security proof of Sparkle and develop new techniques to overcome this issue.
Second, we give a suitable instantiation of the function for which the corresponding one-more assumption follows from DDH.

2024

CRYPTO

Pairing-Free Blind Signatures from CDH Assumptions
Abstract

We present the first concurrently-secure blind signatures making black-box use of a pairing-free group for which unforgeability, in the random oracle model, can be proved {\em without} relying on the algebraic group model (AGM), thus resolving a long-standing open question. Prior pairing-free blind signatures without AGM proofs have only been proved secure for bounded concurrency, relied on computationally expensive non-black-box use of NIZKs, or had complexity growing with the number of signing sessions due to the use of boosting techniques.
Our most efficient constructions rely on the chosen-target CDH assumption and can be seen as blind versions of signatures by Goh and Jarecki (EUROCRYPT '03) and Chevallier-Mames (CRYPTO '05). We also give a less efficient scheme with security based on (plain) CDH. The underlying signing protocols consist of four (in order to achieve regular unforgeability) or five moves (for strong unforgeability). All schemes are proved statistically blind in the random oracle model.

2024

CRYPTO

Oblivious issuance of proofs
Abstract

We consider the problem of creating, or issuing, zero-knowledge proofs {\em obliviously}. In this setting, a prover
interacts with a verifier to produce a proof, known only to the verifier.
The resulting proof is transferrable and can be verified non-interactively by anyone. Crucially, the actual proof cannot be linked back to the interaction that produced it. This notion generalizes common approaches to designing blind signatures, which can be seen as the special case of proving ``knowledge of a signing key'', and extends the seminal work of Camenisch and Stadler ('97). We propose a provably secure construction of oblivious proofs, focusing on discrete-logarithm representation equipped with AND-composition.
We also give three applications of our framework. First, we give a publicly verifiable version of the classical Diffie-Hellman based Oblivious PRF. This yields new constructions of blind signatures and publicly verifiable anonymous tokens. Second, we show how to "upgrade" keyed-verification anonymous credentials (Chase et al., CCS'14) to also be concurrently secure blind signatures on the same set of attributes. Crucially, our upgrade maintains the performance and functionality of the credential in the keyed-verification setting, we only change issuance. We observe that the existing issuer proof that the credential is well-formed may be verified by anyone; creating it with our framework makes it a blind signature, adding public verifiability to the credential system. Finally, we provide a variation of the U-Prove credential system that is provably one-more unforgeable with concurrent issuance sessions. This constitutes a fix for the attack illustrated by Benhamouda et al. (EUROCRYPT'21).
Beyond these example applications, as our results are quite general, we expect they may enable modular design of new primitives with concurrent security, a goal that has historically been challenging to achieve.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Threshold and Multi-Signature Schemes from Linear Hash Functions
Abstract

This paper gives new constructions of two-round multi-signatures and threshold signatures for which security relies solely on either the hardness of the (plain) discrete logarithm problem or the hardness of RSA, in addition to assuming random oracles. Their signing protocol is partially non-interactive, i.e., the first round of the signing protocol is independent of the message being signed.
We obtain our constructions by generalizing the most efficient discrete- logarithm based schemes, MuSig2 (Nick, Ruffing, and Seurin, CRYPTO ’21) and FROST (Komlo and Goldberg, SAC ’20), to work with suitably defined linear hash functions. While the original schemes rely on the stronger and more controversial one-more discrete logarithm assumption, we show that suitable instantiations of the hash functions enable security to be based on either the plain discrete logarithm assumption or on RSA. The signatures produced by our schemes are equivalent to those obtained from Okamoto’s identification schemes (CRYPTO ’92).
More abstractly, our results suggest a general framework to transform schemes secure under OMDL into ones secure under the plain DL assumption and, with some restrictions, under RSA.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Revisiting BBS Signatures
Abstract

BBS signatures were implicitly proposed by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham (CRYPTO '04) as part of their group signature scheme, and explicitly cast as stand-alone signatures by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CRYPTO '04). A provably secure version, called BBS+, was then devised by Au, Susilo, and Mu (SCN '06). They are suitable for the use within anonymous credential and DAA systems, as their algebraic structure enables efficient proofs of knowledge of message-signature pairs that support partial disclosure. BBS+ is currently the object of a standardization effort which has led to a recent RFC draft.
BBS+ signatures consist of one group element and two scalars. As our first contribution, we give a new proof of security for a shorter version of BBS+, consisting only of one group element and one scalar. This shorter version is essentially the original BBS proposal, which was lacking a proof of security, and we show it satisfies, under the $q$-SDH assumption, the same provable security guarantees as BBS+. We also give an alternative and tight analysis in the algebraic group model, which heuristically justifies additional flexibility in schemes instantiations.
Furthermore, we provide simplified and shorter zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge a BBS message-signature that support partial disclosure of the message. In instantiations over BLS12-381, our proofs are 896 bits shorter than the prior proposal by Camenisch, Drijvers, and Lehmann (TRUST '16), which is also adopted by the RFC draft.
Finally, we show that BBS satisfies one-more unforgeability in the algebraic group model in a situation, which arises in the context of credentials, where the signer can be asked to sign arbitrary group elements, meant to be commitments, without seeing their openings.

2023

CRYPTO

Snowblind: A Threshold Blind Signature in Pairing-Free Groups
Abstract

Both threshold and blind signatures have, individually, received a considerable amount of attention. However little is known about their combination, i.e., a threshold signature which is also blind, in that no coalition of signers learns anything about the message being signed or the signature being produced. Several applications of blind signatures (e.g., anonymous tokens) would benefit from distributed signing as a means to increase trust in the service and hence reduce the risks of key compromise. This paper builds the first blind threshold signatures in pairing-free groups. Our main contribution is a construction that transforms an underlying blind non-threshold signature scheme with a suitable structure into a threshold scheme, preserving its blindness. The resulting signing protocol proceeds in three rounds, and produces signatures consisting of one group element and two scalars. The underlying non-threshold blind signature schemes are of independent interest, and improve upon the current state of the art (Tessaro and Zhu, EUROCRYPT ’22) with shorter signatures (three elements, instead of four) and simpler proofs of security. All of our schemes are proved secure in the Random Oracle and Algebraic Group Models, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.

2022

EUROCRYPT

Short Pairing-Free Blind Signatures with Exponential Security
📺
Abstract

This paper proposes the first practical pairing-free three-move blind signature schemes that (1) are concurrently secure, (2) produce short signatures (i.e., {\em three} or {\em four} group elements/scalars), and (3) are provably secure either in the generic group model (GGM) or the algebraic group model (AGM) under the (plain or one-more) discrete logarithm assumption (beyond additionally assuming random oracles). We also propose a partially blind version of one of our schemes.
Our schemes do not rely on the hardness of the ROS problem (which can be broken in polynomial time) or of the mROS problem (which admits sub-exponential attacks). The only prior work with these properties is Abe's signature scheme (EUROCRYPT '02), which was recently proved to be secure in the AGM by Kastner et al. (PKC '22), but which also produces signatures twice as long as those from our scheme.
The core of our proofs of security is a new problem, called {\em weighted} {\em fractional} ROS (WFROS), for which we prove (unconditional) exponential lower bounds.

2022

CRYPTO

Better than Advertised Security for Non-Interactive Threshold Signatures
📺
Abstract

We give a unified syntax, and a hierarchy of definitions of security of increasing strength, for non-interactive threshold signature schemes. These are schemes having a single-round signing protocol, possibly with one prior round of message-independent pre-processing. We fit FROST1 and BLS, which are leading practical schemes, into our hierarchy, in particular showing they meet stronger security definitions than they have been shown to meet so far. We also fit in our hierarchy a more efficient version FROST2 of FROST1 that we give. These definitions and results, for simplicity, all assume trusted key generation. Finally, we prove the security of FROST2 with key generation performed by an efficient distributed key generation protocol.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Multi-Source Non-Malleable Extractors and Applications
📺
Abstract

We introduce a natural generalization of two-source non-malleable extractors (Cheragachi and Guruswami, TCC 2014) called as \textit{multi-source non-malleable extractors}. Multi-source non-malleable extractors are special independent source extractors which satisfy an additional non-malleability property. This property requires that the output of the extractor remains close to uniform even conditioned on its output generated by tampering {\it several sources together}. We formally define this primitive, give a construction that is secure against a wide class of tampering functions, and provide applications. More specifically, we obtain the following results:
\begin{itemize}
\item For any $s \geq 2$, we give an explicit construction of a $s$-source non-malleable extractor for min-entropy $\Omega(n)$ and error $2^{-n^{\Omega(1)}}$ in the {\it overlapping joint tampering model}. This means that each tampered source could depend on any strict subset of all the sources and the sets corresponding to each tampered source could be overlapping in a way that we define. Prior to our work, there were no known explicit constructions that were secure even against disjoint tampering (where the sets are required to be disjoint without any overlap).
\item We adapt the techniques used in the above construction to give a $t$-out-of-$n$ non-malleable secret sharing scheme (Goyal and Kumar, STOC 2018) for any $t \leq n$ in the \emph{disjoint tampering model}. This is the first general construction of a threshold non-malleable secret sharing (NMSS) scheme in the disjoint tampering model. All prior constructions had a restriction that the size of the tampered subsets could not be equal.
\item We further adapt the techniques used in the above construction to give a $t$-out-of-$n$ non-malleable secret sharing scheme (Goyal and Kumar, STOC 2018) for any $t \leq n$ in the \emph{overlapping joint tampering model}. This is the first construction of a threshold NMSS in the overlapping joint tampering model.
\item We show that a stronger notion of $s$-source non-malleable extractor that is multi-tamperable against disjoint tampering functions gives a single round network extractor protocol (Kalai et al., FOCS 2008) with attractive features. Plugging in with a new construction of multi-tamperable, 2-source non-malleable extractors provided in our work, we get a network extractor protocol for min-entropy $\Omega(n)$ that tolerates an {\it optimum} number ($t = p-2$) of faulty processors and extracts random bits for {\it every} honest processor. The prior network extractor protocols could only tolerate $t = \Omega(p)$ faulty processors and failed to extract uniform random bits for a fraction of the honest processors.
\end{itemize}

2020

CRYPTO

Guaranteed Output Delivery Comes Free in Honest Majority MPC
📺
Abstract

We study the communication complexity of unconditionally secure MPC with guaranteed output delivery over point-to-point channels for corruption threshold t < n/2, assuming the existence of a public broadcast channel. We ask the question: “is it possible to construct MPC in this setting s.t. the communication complexity per multiplication gate is linear in the number of parties?” While a number of works have focused on reducing the communication complexity in this setting, the answer to the above question has remained elusive until now. We also focus on the concrete communication complexity of evaluating each multiplication gate.
We resolve the above question in the affirmative by providing an MPC with communication complexity O(Cn\phi) bits (ignoring fixed terms which are independent of the circuit) where \phi is the length of an element in the field, C is the size of the (arithmetic) circuit, n is the number of parties. This is the first construction where the asymptotic communication complexity matches the best-known semi-honest protocol. This represents a strict improvement over the previously best-known communication complexity of O(C(n\phi + \kappa) + D_Mn^2\kappa) bits, where \kappa is the security parameter and D_M is the multiplicative depth of the circuit. Furthermore, the concrete communication complexity per multiplication gate is 5.5 field elements per party in the best case and 7.5 field elements in the worst case when one or more corrupted parties have been identified. This also roughly matches the best-known semi-honest protocol, which requires 5.5 field elements per gate.
The above also yields the first secure-with-abort MPC protocol with the same cost per multiplication gate as the best-known semi-honest protocol. Our main result is obtained by compiling the secure-with-abort MPC protocol into a fully secure one.

#### Coauthors

- Renas Bacho (1)
- Mihir Bellare (1)
- Rutchathon Chairattana-Apirom (1)
- Elizabeth Crites (2)
- Vipul Goyal (2)
- Chelsea Komlo (2)
- Julian Loss (1)
- Mary Maller (2)
- Michele Orrù (1)
- Yifan Song (1)
- Akshayaram Srinivasan (1)
- Stefano Tessaro (8)
- Benedikt Wagner (1)
- Greg Zaverucha (1)
- Chenzhi Zhu (10)