International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Luisa Siniscalchi

Affiliation: university of salerno

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
EUROCRYPT
How to Extract Useful Randomness from Unreliable Sources 📺
For more than 30 years, cryptographers have been looking for public sources of uniform randomness in order to use them as a set-up to run appealing cryptographic protocols without relying on trusted third parties. Unfortunately, nowadays it is fair to assess that assuming the existence of physical phenomena producing public uniform randomness is far from reality.  It is known that uniform randomness cannot be extracted from a single weak source. A well-studied way to overcome this is to consider several independent weak sources. However, this means we must trust the various sampling processes of weak randomness from physical processes. Motivated by the above state of affairs, this work considers a set-up where players can access multiple {\em potential} sources of weak randomness, several of which may be jointly corrupted by a computationally unbounded adversary. We introduce {\em SHELA} (Somewhere Honest Entropic Look Ahead) sources to model this situation. We show that there is no hope of extracting uniform randomness from a {\em SHELA} source. Instead, we focus on the task of {\em Somewhere-Extraction} (i.e., outputting several candidate strings, some of which are uniformly distributed -- yet we do not know which). We give explicit constructions of {\em Somewhere-Extractors} for {\em SHELA} sources with good parameters. Then, we present applications of the above somewhere-extractor where the public uniform randomness can be replaced by the output of such extraction from corruptible sources, greatly outperforming trivial solutions. The output of somewhere-extraction is also useful in other settings, such as a suitable source of random coins for many randomized algorithms. In another front, we comprehensively study the problem of {\em Somewhere-Extraction} from a {\em weak} source, resulting in a series of bounds. Our bounds highlight the fact that, in most regimes of parameters (including those relevant for applications), {\em SHELA} sources significantly outperform {\em weak} sources of comparable parameters both when it comes to the process of {\em Somewhere-Extraction}, or in the task of amplification of success probability in randomized algorithms. Moreover, the low quality of somewhere-extraction from weak sources excludes its use in various efficient applications.
2019
PKC
Publicly Verifiable Proofs from Blockchains
Alessandra Scafuro Luisa Siniscalchi Ivan Visconti
A proof system is publicly verifiable, if anyone, by looking at the transcript of the proof, can be convinced that the corresponding theorem is true. Public verifiability is important in many applications since it allows to compute a proof only once while convincing an unlimited number of verifiers.Popular interactive proof systems (e.g., $$\varSigma $$-protocols) protect the witness through various properties (e.g., witness indistinguishability (WI) and zero knowledge (ZK)) but typically they are not publicly verifiable since such proofs are convincing only for those verifiers who contributed to the transcripts of the proofs. The only known proof systems that are publicly verifiable rely on a non-interactive (NI) prover, through trust assumptions (e.g., NIZK in the CRS model), heuristic assumptions (e.g., NIZK in the random oracle model), specific number-theoretic assumptions on bilinear groups or relying on obfuscation assumptions (obtaining NIWI with no setups).In this work we construct publicly verifiable witness-indistinguishable proof systems from any $$\varSigma $$-protocol, based only on the existence of a very generic blockchain. The novelty of our approach is in enforcing a non-interactive verification (thus guaranteeing public verifiability) while allowing the prover to be interactive and talk to the blockchain (this allows us to circumvent the need of strong assumptions and setups). This opens interesting directions for the design of cryptographic protocols leveraging on blockchain technology.
2018
TCC
Continuous NMC Secure Against Permutations and Overwrites, with Applications to CCA Secure Commitments
Non-Malleable Codes (NMC) were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs in ICS 2010 as a relaxation of error correcting codes and error detecting codes. Faust, Mukherjee, Nielsen, and Venturi in TCC 2014 introduced an even stronger notion of non-malleable codes called continuous non-malleable codes where security is achieved against continuous tampering of a single codeword without re-encoding.We construct information theoretically secure CNMC resilient to bit permutations and overwrites, this is the first Continuous NMC constructed outside of the split-state model.In this work we also study relations between the CNMC and parallel CCA commitments. We show that the CNMC can be used to bootstrap a Self-destruct parallel CCA bit commitment to a Self-destruct parallel CCA string commitment, where Self-destruct parallel CCA is a weak form of parallel CCA security. Then we can get rid of the Self-destruct limitation obtaining a parallel CCA commitment, requiring only one-way functions.
2017
CRYPTO
2017
TCC
2017
TCC
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
CRYPTO
2016
TCC
2016
TCC
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT