International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

David Pointcheval

Affiliation: CNRS and DI/ENS, PSL Research University, France

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
PKC
Boosting Verifiable Computation on Encrypted Data 📺
Dario Fiore Anca Nitulescu David Pointcheval
We consider the setting in which an untrusted server stores a collection of data and is asked to compute a function over it. In this scenario, we aim for solutions where the untrusted server does not learn information about the data and is prevented from cheating. This problem is addressed by verifiable and private delegation of computation, proposed by Gennaro, Gentry and Parno (CRYPTO’10), a notion that is close to both the active areas of homomorphic encryption and verifiable computation (VC). However, in spite of the efficiency advances in the respective areas, VC protocols that guarantee privacy of the inputs are still expensive. The only exception is a protocol by Fiore, Gennaro and Pastro (CCS’14) that supports arithmetic circuits of degree at most 2. In this paper we propose new efficient protocols for VC on encrypted data that improve over the state of the art solution of Fiore et al. in multiple aspects. First, we can support computations of degree higher than 2. Second, we achieve public delegatability and public verifiability whereas Fiore et al. need the same secret key to encode inputs and verify outputs. Third, we achieve a new property that guarantees that verifiers can be convinced about the correctness of the outputs without learning information on the inputs. The key tool to obtain our new protocols is a new SNARK that can efficiently handle computations over a quotient polynomial ring, such as the one used by Ring-LWE somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes. This SNARK in turn relies on a new commit-and-prove SNARK for proving evaluations on the same point of several committed polynomials. We propose a construction of this scheme under an extractability assumption over bilinear groups in the random oracle model.
2020
PKC
Linearly-Homomorphic Signatures and Scalable Mix-Nets 📺
Chloé Hébant Duong Hieu Phan David Pointcheval
Anonymity is a primary ingredient for our digital life. Several tools have been designed to address it such as, for authentication, blind signatures, group signatures or anonymous credentials and, for confidentiality, randomizable encryption or mix-nets. When it comes to complex electronic voting schemes, random shuffling of authenticated ciphertexts with mix-nets is the only known tool. However, it requires huge and complex zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee the actual permutation of the initial ciphertexts in a privacy-preserving way. In this paper, we propose a new approach for proving correct shuffling of signed ElGamal ciphertexts: the mix-servers can simply randomize individual ballots, which means the ciphertexts, the signatures, and the verification keys, with an additional global proof of constant size, and the output will be publicly verifiable. The security proof is in the generic bilinear group model. The computational complexity for the each mix-server is linear in the number of ballots. Verification is also linear in the number of ballots, but independent of the number of rounds of mixing. This leads to a new highly scalable technique. Our construction makes use of linearly-homomorphic signatures, with new features, that are of independent interest.
2020
CRYPTO
Dynamic Decentralized Functional Encryption
We introduce Dynamic Decentralized Functional Encryption (DDFE), a generalization of Functional Encryption which allows multiple users to join the system dynamically, without relying on a trusted third party or on expensive and interactive Multi-Party Computation protocols. This notion subsumes existing multi-user extensions of Functional Encryption, such as Multi-Input, Multi-Client, and Ad Hoc Multi-Input Functional Encryption. We define and construct schemes for various functionalities which serve as building-blocks for latter primitives and may be useful in their own right, such as a scheme for dynamically computing sums in any Abelian group. These constructions build upon simple primitives in a modular way, and have instantiations from well-studied assumptions, such as DDH or LWE. Our constructions culminate in an Inner-Product scheme for computing weighted sums on aggregated encrypted data, from standard assumptions in prime-order groups in the Random Oracle Model.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Divisible E-Cash from Constrained Pseudo-Random Functions
Florian Bourse David Pointcheval Olivier Sanders
Electronic cash (e-cash) is the digital analogue of regular cash which aims at preserving users’ privacy. Following Chaum’s seminal work, several new features were proposed for e-cash to address the practical issues of the original primitive. Among them, divisibility has proved very useful to enable efficient storage and spendings. Unfortunately, it is also very difficult to achieve and, to date, quite a few constructions exist, all of them relying on complex mechanisms that can only be instantiated in one specific setting. In addition security models are incomplete and proofs sometimes hand-wavy.In this work, we first provide a complete security model for divisible e-cash, and we study the links with constrained pseudo-random functions (PRFs), a primitive recently formalized by Boneh and Waters. We exhibit two frameworks of divisible e-cash systems from constrained PRFs achieving some specific properties: either key homomorphism or delegability. We then formally prove these frameworks, and address two main issues in previous constructions: two essential security notions were either not considered at all or not fully proven. Indeed, we introduce the notion of clearing, which should guarantee that only the recipient of a transaction should be able to do the deposit, and we show the exculpability, that should prevent an honest user to be falsely accused, was wrong in most proofs of the previous constructions. Some can easily be repaired, but this is not the case for most complex settings such as constructions in the standard model. Consequently, we provide the first construction secure in the standard model, as a direct instantiation of our framework.
2019
JOFC
On the Tightness of Forward-Secure Signature Reductions
In this paper, we revisit the security of factoring-based signature schemes built via the Fiat–Shamir transform and show that they can admit tighter reductions to certain decisional complexity assumptions such as the quadratic-residuosity, the high-residuosity, and the $$\phi $$ ϕ -hiding assumptions. We do so by proving that the underlying identification schemes used in these schemes are a particular case of the lossy identification notion introduced by Abdalla et al. at Eurocrypt 2012. Next, we show how to extend these results to the forward-security setting based on ideas from the Itkis–Reyzin forward-secure signature scheme. Unlike the original Itkis–Reyzin scheme, our construction can be instantiated under different decisional complexity assumptions and has a much tighter security reduction. Moreover, we also show that the tighter security reductions provided by our proof methodology can result in concrete efficiency gains in practice, both in the standard and forward-security setting, as long as the use of stronger security assumptions is deemed acceptable. Finally, we investigate the design of forward-secure signature schemes whose security reductions are fully tight.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
ASIACRYPT
Decentralized Multi-Client Functional Encryption for Inner Product
We consider a situation where multiple parties, owning data that have to be frequently updated, agree to share weighted sums of these data with some aggregator, but where they do not wish to reveal their individual data, and do not trust each other. We combine techniques from Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) and Functional Encryption (FE), to introduce a primitive we call Decentralized Multi-Client Functional Encryption (DMCFE), for which we give a practical instantiation for Inner Product functionalities. This primitive allows various senders to non-interactively generate ciphertexts which support inner-product evaluation, with functional decryption keys that can also be generated non-interactively, in a distributed way, among the senders. Interactions are required during the setup phase only. We prove adaptive security of our constructions, while allowing corruptions of the clients, in the random oracle model.
2017
EUROCRYPT
2017
PKC
2017
PKC
2016
CRYPTO
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
PKC
2015
PKC
2015
PKC
2015
EUROCRYPT
2015
CRYPTO
2014
PKC
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2013
PKC
2013
PKC
2013
CRYPTO
2013
ASIACRYPT
2012
TCC
2012
PKC
2011
PKC
2009
PKC
2009
EUROCRYPT
2009
CRYPTO
2008
EPRINT
Encrypting Proofs on Pairings and Its Application to Anonymity for Signatures
Georg Fuchsbauer David Pointcheval
We give a generic methodology to unlinkably anonymize cryptographic schemes in bilinear groups using the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem and NIZK proofs in the line of Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai. We illustrate our techniques by presenting the first instantiation of anonymous proxy signatures, a recent primitive unifying the functionalities and strong security notions of group and proxy signatures. To construct our scheme, we introduce various efficient NIZK and witness-indistinguishable proofs, and a relaxed version of simulation soundness.
2008
CRYPTO
2008
EPRINT
Anonymous Consecutive Delegation of Signing Rights: Unifying Group and Proxy Signatures
Georg Fuchsbauer David Pointcheval
We define a general model for consecutive delegations of signing rights with the following properties: The delegatee actually signing and all intermediate delegators remain anonymous. As for group signatures, in case of misuse, a special authority can open signatures to reveal the chain of delegations and the signer's identity. The scheme satisfies a strong notion of non-frameability generalizing the one for dynamic group signatures. We give formal definitions of security and show them to be satisfiable by constructing an instantiation proven secure under general assumptions in the standard model. Our primitive is a proper generalization of both group signatures and proxy signatures and can be regarded as non-frameable dynamic hierarchical group signatures.
2007
JOFC
2006
ASIACRYPT
2006
CRYPTO
2006
PKC
2006
PKC
2006
PKC
2006
EPRINT
Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games
Bruno Blanchet David Pointcheval
This paper presents the first automatic technique for proving not only protocols but also primitives in the exact security computational model. Automatic proofs of cryptographic protocols were up to now reserved to the Dolev-Yao model, which however makes quite strong assumptions on the primitives. On the other hand, with the proofs by reductions, in the complexity theoretic framework, more subtle security assumptions can be considered, but security analyses are manual. A process calculus is thus defined in order to take into account the probabilistic semantics of the computational model. It is already rich enough to describe all the usual security notions of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, as well as the basic computational assumptions. As an example, we illustrate the use of the new tool with the proof of a quite famous asymmetric primitive: unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) of the Full-Domain Hash signature scheme under the (trapdoor)-one-wayness of some permutations.
2005
ASIACRYPT
2005
EUROCRYPT
2005
PKC
2005
PKC
2005
EPRINT
Key Derivation and Randomness Extraction
Key derivation refers to the process by which an agreed upon large random number, often named master secret, is used to derive keys to encrypt and authenticate data. Practitioners and standardization bodies have usually used the random oracle model to get key material from a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. However, proofs in the standard model require randomness extractors to formally extract the entropy of the random master secret into a seed prior to derive other keys. This paper first deals with the protocol $\Sigma_0$, in which the key derivation phase is (deliberately) omitted, and security inaccuracies in the analysis and design of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE version 1) protocol, corrected in IKEv2. They do not endanger the practical use of IKEv1, since the security could be proved, at least, in the random oracle model. However, in the standard model, there is not yet any formal global security proof, but just separated analyses which do not fit together well. The first simplification is common in the theoretical security analysis of several key exchange protocols, whereas the key derivation phase is a crucial step for theoretical reasons, but also practical purpose, and requires careful analysis. The second problem is a gap between the recent theoretical analysis of HMAC as a good randomness extractor (functions keyed with public but random elements) and its practical use in IKEv1 (the key may not be totally random, because of the lack of clear authentication of the nonces). Since the latter problem comes from the probabilistic property of this extractor, we thereafter review some \textit{deterministic} randomness extractors and suggest the \emph{'Twist-AUgmented'} technique, a new extraction method quite well-suited for Diffie-Hellman-like scenarios.
2004
ASIACRYPT
2004
CHES
2004
CRYPTO
2004
PKC
2004
JOFC
2004
EPRINT
How to Disembed a Program?
This paper presents the theoretical blueprint of a new secure token called the Externalized Microprocessor (XmP). Unlike a smart-card, the XmP contains no ROM at all. While exporting all the device's executable code to potentially untrustworthy terminals poses formidable security problems, the advantages of ROM-less secure tokens are numerous: chip masking time disappears, bug patching becomes a mere terminal update and hence does not imply any roll-out of cards in the field. Most importantly, code size ceases to be a limiting factor. This is particularly significant given the steady increase in on-board software complexity. After describing the machine's instruction-set we will introduce two XmP variants. The first design is a public-key oriented architecture which relies on a new RSA screening scheme and features a relatively low communication overhead at the cost of computational complexity, whereas the second variant is secret-key oriented and relies on simple MACs and hash functions but requires more communication. For each of these two designs, we propose two protocols that execute and dynamically authenticate arbitrary programs. We also provide a strong security model for these protocols and prove their security under appropriate complexity assumptions.
2004
EPRINT
Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting
Password-based authenticated key exchange are protocols which are designed to be secure even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. Due to the low entropy of passwords, such protocols are always subject to on-line guessing attacks. In these attacks, the adversary may succeed with non-negligible probability by guessing the password shared between two users during its on-line attempt to impersonate one of these users. The main goal of password-based authenticated key exchange protocols is to restrict the adversary to this case only. In this paper, we consider password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party scenario, in which the users trying to establish a secret do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Towards our goal, we recall some of the existing security notions for password-based authenticated key exchange protocols and introduce new ones that are more suitable to the case of generic constructions. We then present a natural generic construction of a three-party protocol, based on any two-party authenticated key exchange protocol, and prove its security without making use of the Random Oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, the new protocol is the first provably-secure password-based protocol in the three-party setting.
2003
ASIACRYPT
2003
ASIACRYPT
2003
CRYPTO
2003
JOFC
2002
ASIACRYPT
2002
CRYPTO
2002
CRYPTO
2002
EUROCRYPT
2002
PKC
2002
EPRINT
Optimal Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Encryption of Arbitrary-Length Messages
This paper considers arbitrary-length chosen-ciphertext secure asymmetric encryption, thus addressing what is actually needed for a practical usage of strong public-key cryptography in the real world. We put forward two generic constructions, gem-1 and gem-2, which apply to explicit fixed-length weakly secure primitives and provide a strongly secure (IND-CCA2) public-key encryption scheme for messages of unfixed length (typically computer files). Our techniques optimally combine a single call to any one-way trapdoor function with repeated encryptions through some weak block-cipher (a simple xor is fine) and hash functions of fixed-length input so that a minimal number of calls to these functions is needed. Our encryption/decryption throughputs are comparable to the ones of standard methods (asymmetric encryption of a session key + symmetric encryption with multiple modes). In our case, however, we formally prove that our designs are secure in the strongest sense and provide complete security reductions holding in the random oracle model.
2002
EPRINT
Security Proofs for an Efficient Password-Based Key Exchange
Password-based key exchange schemes are designed to provide entities communicating over a public network, and sharing a (short) password only, with a session key (e.g, the key is used for data integrity and/or confidentiality). The focus of the present paper is on the analysis of very efficient schemes that have been proposed to the IEEE P1363 Standard working group on password-based authenticated key-exchange methods, but for which actual security was an open problem. We analyze the AuthA key exchange scheme and give a complete proof of its security. Our analysis shows that the AuthA protocol and its multiple modes of operation are provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption, in both the random-oracle and the ideal-cipher models.
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
ASIACRYPT
2001
CRYPTO
2001
PKC
2000
EUROCRYPT
2000
PKC
2000
PKC
2000
PKC
2000
EPRINT
Authenticated Key Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks
Mihir Bellare David Pointcheval Phillip Rogaway
This paper gives definitions and results about password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE), mutual authentication MA), and the combination of these goals (AKE, MA). Such protocols are designed to work despite interference by an active adversary and despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, off line, a user's password. While several such password-based protocols have been suggested, the underlying theory has been lagging, and some of the protocols don't actually work. This is an area strongly in need of foundations, but definitions and theorems here can get overwhelmingly complex. To help manage this complexity we begin by defining a model, one rich enough to deal with password guessing, forward secrecy, server compromise, and loss of session keys. The one model can be used to define various goals. We take AKE (with implicit authentication---no one besides your intended partner could possibly get the key, though he may or may not actually get it) as the basic goal. Then we prove that any secure AKE protocol can be embellished (in a simple and generic way) to also provide for MA. This approach turns out to be simpler than trying to augment an MA protocol to also distribute a session key. Next we prove correctness for the idea at the center of the Encrypted Key-Exchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin and Merritt: we prove (in an ideal-cipher model) that the two-flow protocol at the core of EKE is a secure AKE. Combining with the result above we have a simple 3-flow protocol for AKE,MA which is proven secure against dictionary attack.
2000
JOFC
2000
EPRINT
RSA-OAEP is Secure under the RSA Assumption
Recently Victor Shoup noted that there is a gap in the widely-believed security result of OAEP against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Moreover, he showed that, presumably, OAEP cannot be proven secure from the {\it one-wayness} of the underlying trapdoor permutation. This paper establishes another result on the security of OAEP. It proves that OAEP offers semantic security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, in the random oracle model, under the {\it partial-domain} one-wayness of the underlying permutation. Therefore, this uses a formally stronger assumption. Nevertheless, since partial-domain one-wayness of the RSA function is equivalent to its (full-domain) one-wayness, it follows that the security of RSA--OAEP can actually be proven under the sole RSA assumption, although the reduction is not tight.
1999
ASIACRYPT
1999
EUROCRYPT
1998
CRYPTO
1998
EUROCRYPT
1998
EPRINT
Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of indistinguishability and non-malleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of non-malleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.
1996
ASIACRYPT
1996
EUROCRYPT
1995
EUROCRYPT

Program Committees

Eurocrypt 2018
Crypto 2016
PKC 2016
Eurocrypt 2015
Asiacrypt 2013
Eurocrypt 2012
Eurocrypt 2010
PKC 2010
Asiacrypt 2009
PKC 2009
Asiacrypt 2008
PKC 2007
Crypto 2007
Asiacrypt 2006
PKC 2005
Asiacrypt 2005
Asiacrypt 2004
Eurocrypt 2003
PKC 2002
Eurocrypt 2000