International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Vipul Goyal

Affiliation: Carnegie Mellon University

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
EUROCRYPT
Multi-Source Non-Malleable Extractors and Applications
We introduce a natural generalization of two-source non-malleable extractors (Cheragachi and Guruswami, TCC 2014) called as \textit{multi-source non-malleable extractors}. Multi-source non-malleable extractors are special independent source extractors which satisfy an additional non-malleability property. This property requires that the output of the extractor remains close to uniform even conditioned on its output generated by tampering {\it several sources together}. We formally define this primitive, give a construction that is secure against a wide class of tampering functions, and provide applications. More specifically, we obtain the following results: \begin{itemize} \item For any $s \geq 2$, we give an explicit construction of a $s$-source non-malleable extractor for min-entropy $\Omega(n)$ and error $2^{-n^{\Omega(1)}}$ in the {\it overlapping joint tampering model}. This means that each tampered source could depend on any strict subset of all the sources and the sets corresponding to each tampered source could be overlapping in a way that we define. Prior to our work, there were no known explicit constructions that were secure even against disjoint tampering (where the sets are required to be disjoint without any overlap). \item We adapt the techniques used in the above construction to give a $t$-out-of-$n$ non-malleable secret sharing scheme (Goyal and Kumar, STOC 2018) for any $t \leq n$ in the \emph{disjoint tampering model}. This is the first general construction of a threshold non-malleable secret sharing (NMSS) scheme in the disjoint tampering model. All prior constructions had a restriction that the size of the tampered subsets could not be equal. \item We further adapt the techniques used in the above construction to give a $t$-out-of-$n$ non-malleable secret sharing scheme (Goyal and Kumar, STOC 2018) for any $t \leq n$ in the \emph{overlapping joint tampering model}. This is the first construction of a threshold NMSS in the overlapping joint tampering model. \item We show that a stronger notion of $s$-source non-malleable extractor that is multi-tamperable against disjoint tampering functions gives a single round network extractor protocol (Kalai et al., FOCS 2008) with attractive features. Plugging in with a new construction of multi-tamperable, 2-source non-malleable extractors provided in our work, we get a network extractor protocol for min-entropy $\Omega(n)$ that tolerates an {\it optimum} number ($t = p-2$) of faulty processors and extracts random bits for {\it every} honest processor. The prior network extractor protocols could only tolerate $t = \Omega(p)$ faulty processors and failed to extract uniform random bits for a fraction of the honest processors. \end{itemize}
2021
EUROCRYPT
Threshold Garbled Circuits and Ad Hoc Secure Computation
Garbled Circuits (GCs) represent fundamental and powerful tools in cryptography, and many variants of GCs have been considered since their introduction. An important property of the garbled circuits is that they can be evaluated securely if and only if exactly 1 key for each input wire is obtained: no less and no more. In this work we study the case when: 1) some of the wire-keys are missing, but we are still interested in computing the output of the garbled circuit and 2) the evaluator of the GC might have both keys for a constant number of wires. We start to study this question in terms of non-interactive multi-party computation (NIMPC) which is strongly connected with GCs. In this notion, there is a fixed number of parties (n) that can get correlated information from a trusted setup. Then these parties can send an encoding of their input to an evaluator, which can compute the output of the function. Similarly to the notion of ad hoc secure computation proposed by Beimel et al. [ITCS 2016], we consider the case when less than n parties participate in the online phase, and in addition we let these parties colluding with the evaluator. We refer to this notion as Threshold NIMPC. In addition, we show that when the number of parties participating in the online phase is a fixed threshold l <= n then it is possible to securely evaluate any l-input function. We build our result on top of a new secret-sharing scheme (which can be of independent interest) and on the results proposed by Benhamouda, Krawczyk and Rabin [Crypto 2017]. Our protocol can be used to compute any function in NC1 in the information-theoretic setting and any function in P assuming one-way functions. As a second (and main) contribution, we consider a slightly different notion of security in which the number of parties that can participate in the online phase is not specified, and can be any number c above the threshold l (in this case the evaluator cannot collude with the other parties). We solve an open question left open by Beimel, Ishai and Kushilevitz [Eurocrypt 2017] showing how to build a secure protocol for the case when c is constant, under the Learning with Errors assumption.
2021
EUROCRYPT
Post-Quantum Multi-Party Computation
We initiate the study of multi-party computation for classical functionalities in the plain model, with security against malicious quantum adversaries. We observe that existing techniques readily give a polynomial-round protocol, but our main result is a construction of *constant-round* post-quantum multi-party computation. We assume mildly super-polynomial quantum hardness of learning with errors (LWE), and quantum polynomial hardness of an LWE-based circular security assumption. Along the way, we develop the following cryptographic primitives that may be of independent interest: 1.) A spooky encryption scheme for relations computable by quantum circuits, from the quantum hardness of (a circular variant of) the LWE problem. This immediately yields the first quantum multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme with classical keys. 2.) A constant-round post-quantum non-malleable commitment scheme, from the mildly super-polynomial quantum hardness of LWE. To prove the security of our protocol, we develop a new straight-line non-black-box simulation technique against parallel sessions that does not clone the adversary's state. This technique may also be relevant to the classical setting.
2021
EUROCRYPT
Towards Accountability in CRS Generation
It is well known that several cryptographic primitives cannot be achieved without a common reference string (CRS). Those include, for instance, non-interactive zero-knowledge for NP, or malicious secure computation in fewer than four rounds. The security of those primitives heavily rely upon on the assumption that the trusted authority, who generates the CRS, does not misuse the randomness used in the CRS generation. However, we argue that there is no such thing as an unconditionally trusted authority and every authority must be held accountable for any trust to be well-founded. Indeed, a malicious authority can, for instance, recover private inputs of honest parties given transcripts of the protocols executed with respect to the CRS it has generated. While eliminating trust in the trusted authority may not be entirely feasible, can we at least move towards achieving some notion of accountability? We propose a new notion in which, if the CRS authority releases the private inputs of protocol executions to others, we can then provide a publicly-verifiable proof that certifies that the authority misbehaved. We study the feasibility of this notion in the context of non-interactive zero knowledge and two-round secure two-party computation.
2020
TCC
Round Optimal Secure Multiparty Computation from Minimal Assumptions 📺
We construct a four round secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol in the plain model that achieves security against any dishonest majority. The security of our protocol relies only on the existence of four round oblivious transfer. This culminates the long line of research on constructing round-efficient MPC from minimal assumptions (at least w.r.t. black-box simulation).
2020
EUROCRYPT
Statistical Zaps and New Oblivious Transfer Protocols 📺
We study the problem of achieving statistical privacy in interactive proof systems and oblivious transfer -- two of the most well studied two-party protocols -- when limited rounds of interaction are available. -- Statistical Zaps: We give the first construction of statistical Zaps, namely, two-round statistical witness-indistinguishable (WI) protocols with a public-coin verifier. Our construction achieves computational soundness based on the quasi-polynomial hardness of learning with errors assumption. -- Three-Round Statistical Receiver-Private Oblivious Transfer: We give the first construction of a three-round oblivious transfer (OT) protocol -- in the plain model -- that achieves statistical privacy for receivers and computational privacy for senders against malicious adversaries, based on polynomial-time assumptions. The round-complexity of our protocol is optimal. We obtain our first result by devising a public-coin approach to compress sigma protocols, without relying on trusted setup. To obtain our second result, we devise a general framework via a new notion of statistical hash commitments that may be of independent interest.
2020
CRYPTO
Guaranteed Output Delivery Comes Free in Honest Majority MPC 📺
Vipul Goyal Yifan Song Chenzhi Zhu
We study the communication complexity of unconditionally secure MPC with guaranteed output delivery over point-to-point channels for corruption threshold t < n/2, assuming the existence of a public broadcast channel. We ask the question: “is it possible to construct MPC in this setting s.t. the communication complexity per multiplication gate is linear in the number of parties?” While a number of works have focused on reducing the communication complexity in this setting, the answer to the above question has remained elusive until now. We also focus on the concrete communication complexity of evaluating each multiplication gate. We resolve the above question in the affirmative by providing an MPC with communication complexity O(Cn\phi) bits (ignoring fixed terms which are independent of the circuit) where \phi is the length of an element in the field, C is the size of the (arithmetic) circuit, n is the number of parties. This is the first construction where the asymptotic communication complexity matches the best-known semi-honest protocol. This represents a strict improvement over the previously best-known communication complexity of O(C(n\phi + \kappa) + D_Mn^2\kappa) bits, where \kappa is the security parameter and D_M is the multiplicative depth of the circuit. Furthermore, the concrete communication complexity per multiplication gate is 5.5 field elements per party in the best case and 7.5 field elements in the worst case when one or more corrupted parties have been identified. This also roughly matches the best-known semi-honest protocol, which requires 5.5 field elements per gate. The above also yields the first secure-with-abort MPC protocol with the same cost per multiplication gate as the best-known semi-honest protocol. Our main result is obtained by compiling the secure-with-abort MPC protocol into a fully secure one.
2019
EUROCRYPT
Correlated-Source Extractors and Cryptography with Correlated-Random Tapes 📺
Vipul Goyal Yifan Song
In this paper, we consider the setting where a party uses correlated random tapes across multiple executions of a cryptographic algorithm. We ask if the security properties could still be preserved in such a setting. As examples, we introduce the notion of correlated-tape zero knowledge, and, correlated-tape multi-party computation, where, the zero-knowledge property, and, the ideal/real model security must still be preserved even if a party uses correlated random tapes in multiple executions.Our constructions are based on a new type of randomness extractor which we call correlated-source extractors. Correlated-source extractors can be seen as a dual of non-malleable extractors, and, allow an adversary to choose several tampering functions which are applied to the randomness source. Correlated-source extractors guarantee that even given the output of the extractor on the tampered sources, the output on the original source is still uniformly random. Given (seeded) correlated-source extractors, and, resettably-secure computation protocols, we show how to directly get a positive result for both correlated-tape zero-knowledge and correlated-tape multi-party computation in the CRS model. This is tight considering the known impossibility results on cryptography with imperfect randomness.Our main technical contribution is an explicit construction of a correlated-source extractor where the length of the seed is independent of the number of tamperings. Additionally, we also provide a (non-explicit) existential result for correlated source extractors with almost optimal parameters.
2019
EUROCRYPT
Founding Secure Computation on Blockchains 📺
We study the foundations of secure computation in the blockchain-hybrid model, where a blockchain – modeled as a global functionality – is available as an Oracle to all the participants of a cryptographic protocol. We demonstrate both destructive and constructive applications of blockchains:We show that classical rewinding-based simulation techniques used in many security proofs fail against blockchain-active adversaries that have read and post access to a global blockchain. In particular, we show that zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs with black-box simulation are impossible against blockchain-active adversaries.Nevertheless, we show that achieving security against blockchain-active adversaries is possible if the honest parties are also blockchain active. We construct an $$\omega (1)$$-round ZK protocol with black-box simulation. We show that this result is tight by proving the impossibility of constant-round ZK with black-box simulation.Finally, we demonstrate a novel application of blockchains to overcome the known impossibility results for concurrent secure computation in the plain model. We construct a concurrent self-composable secure computation protocol for general functionalities in the blockchain-hybrid model based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We develop a suite of techniques for constructing secure protocols in the blockchain-hybrid model that we hope will find applications to future research in this area.
2019
CRYPTO
Communication-Efficient Unconditional MPC with Guaranteed Output Delivery 📺
Vipul Goyal Yanyi Liu Yifan Song
We study the communication complexity of unconditionally secure MPC with guaranteed output delivery over point-to-point channels for corruption threshold $$t < n/3$$ . We ask the question: “is it possible to construct MPC in this setting s.t. the communication complexity per multiplication gate is linear in the number of parties?” While a number of works have focused on reducing the communication complexity in this setting, the answer to the above question has remained elusive for over a decade.We resolve the above question in the affirmative by providing an MPC with communication complexity $$O(Cn\kappa + n^3\kappa )$$ where $$\kappa $$ is the size of an element in the field, C is the size of the (arithmetic) circuit, and, n is the number of parties. This represents a strict improvement over the previously best known communication complexity of $$O(Cn\kappa +D_Mn^2\kappa +n^3\kappa )$$ where $$D_M$$ is the multiplicative depth of the circuit. To obtain this result, we introduce a novel technique called 4-consistent tuples of sharings which we believe to be of independent interest.
2019
CRYPTO
Simultaneous Amplification: The Case of Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge 📺
Vipul Goyal Aayush Jain Amit Sahai
In this work, we explore the question of simultaneous privacy and soundness amplification for non-interactive zero-knowledge argument systems (NIZK). We show that any $$\delta _s-$$sound and $$\delta _z-$$zero-knowledge NIZK candidate satisfying $$\delta _s+\delta _z=1-\epsilon $$, for any constant $$\epsilon >0$$, can be turned into a computationally sound and zero-knowledge candidate with the only extra assumption of a subexponentially secure public-key encryption.We develop novel techniques to leverage the use of leakage simulation lemma (Jetchev-Peitzrak TCC 2014) to argue amplification. A crucial component of our result is a new notion for secret sharing $$\mathsf {NP}$$ instances. We believe that this may be of independent interest.To achieve this result we analyze following two transformations:Parallel Repetition: We show that using parallel repetition any $$\delta _s-$$sound and $$\delta _z-$$zero-knowledge $$\mathsf {NIZK}$$ candidate can be turned into (roughly) $$\delta ^n_s-$$sound and $$1-(1-\delta _{z})^n-$$zero-knowledge candidate. Here n is the repetition parameter.MPC based Repetition: We propose a new transformation that amplifies zero-knowledge in the same way that parallel repetition amplifies soundness. We show that using this any $$\delta _s-$$sound and $$\delta _z-$$zero-knowledge $$\mathsf {NIZK}$$ candidate can be turned into (roughly) $$1-(1-\delta _s)^n-$$sound and $$2\cdot \delta ^n_{z}-$$zero-knowledge candidate. Then we show that using these transformations in a zig-zag fashion we can obtain our result. Finally, we also present a simple transformation which directly turns any $$\mathsf {NIZK}$$ candidate satisfying $$\delta _s,\delta _z<1/3 -1/\mathsf {poly}(\lambda )$$ to a secure one.
2019
TCC
Interactive Non-malleable Codes
Non-malleable codes (NMC) introduced by Dziembowski et al. [ICS’10] allow one to encode “passive” data in such a manner that when a codeword is tampered, the original data either remains completely intact or is essentially destroyed.In this work, we initiate the study of interactive non-malleable codes (INMCs) that allow for encoding “active communication” rather than passive data. An INMC allows two parties to engage in an interactive protocol such that an adversary who is able to tamper with the protocol messages either leaves the original transcript intact (i.e., the parties are able to reconstruct the original transcript) or the transcript is completely destroyed and replaced with an unrelated one.We formalize a tampering model for interactive protocols and put forward the notion of INMCs. Since constructing INMCs for general adversaries is impossible (as in the case of non-malleable codes), we construct INMCs for several specific classes of tampering functions. These include bounded state, split state, and fragmented sliding window tampering functions. We also obtain lower bounds for threshold tampering functions via a connection to interactive coding. All of our results are unconditional.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2018
CRYPTO
Promise Zero Knowledge and Its Applications to Round Optimal MPC 📺
We devise a new partitioned simulation technique for MPC where the simulator uses different strategies for simulating the view of aborting adversaries and non-aborting adversaries. The protagonist of this technique is a new notion of promise zero knowledge (ZK) where the ZK property only holds against non-aborting verifiers. We show how to realize promise ZK in three rounds in the simultaneous-message model assuming polynomially hard DDH (or QR or N$$^{th}$$-Residuosity).We demonstrate the following applications of our new technique:We construct the first round-optimal (i.e., four round) MPC protocol for general functions based on polynomially hard DDH (or QR or N$$^{th}$$-Residuosity).We further show how to overcome the four-round barrier for MPC by constructing a three-round protocol for “list coin-tossing” – a slight relaxation of coin-tossing that suffices for most conceivable applications – based on polynomially hard DDH (or QR or N$$^{th}$$-Residuosity). This result generalizes to randomized input-less functionalities. Previously, four round MPC protocols required sub-exponential-time hardness assumptions and no multi-party three-round protocols were known for any relaxed security notions with polynomial-time simulation against malicious adversaries.In order to base security on polynomial-time standard assumptions, we also rely upon a leveled rewinding security technique that can be viewed as a polynomial-time alternative to leveled complexity leveraging for achieving “non-malleability” across different primitives.
2018
CRYPTO
Non-malleable Secret Sharing for General Access Structures 📺
Vipul Goyal Ashutosh Kumar
Goyal and Kumar (STOC’18) recently introduced the notion of non-malleable secret sharing. Very roughly, the guarantee they seek is the following: the adversary may potentially tamper with all of the shares, and still, either the reconstruction procedure outputs the original secret, or, the original secret is “destroyed” and the reconstruction outputs a string which is completely “unrelated” to the original secret. Prior works on non-malleable codes in the 2 split-state model imply constructions which can be seen as 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing (NMSS) schemes. Goyal and Kumar proposed constructions of t-out-of-n NMSS schemes. These constructions have already been shown to have a number of applications in cryptography.We continue this line of research and construct NMSS for more general access structures. We give a generic compiler that converts any statistical (resp. computational) secret sharing scheme realizing any access structure into another statistical (resp. computational) secret sharing scheme that not only realizes the same access structure but also ensures statistical non-malleability against a computationally unbounded adversary who tampers each of the shares arbitrarily and independently. Instantiating with known schemes we get unconditional NMMS schemes that realize any access structures generated by polynomial size monotone span programs. Similarly, we also obtain conditional NMMS schemes realizing access structure in $$\mathbf {monotone \;P}$$ monotoneP (resp. $$\mathbf {monotone \;NP}$$ monotoneNP) assuming one-way functions (resp. witness encryption).Towards considering more general tampering models, we also propose a construction of n-out-of-n NMSS. Our construction is secure even if the adversary could divide the shares into any two (possibly overlapping) subsets and then arbitrarily tamper the shares in each subset. Our construction is based on a property of inner product and an observation that the inner-product based construction of Aggarwal, Dodis and Lovett (STOC’14) is in fact secure against a tampering class that is stronger than 2 split-states. We also show applications of our construction to the problem of non-malleable message transmission.
2017
TCC
2017
TCC
2017
PKC
2016
ASIACRYPT
2016
ASIACRYPT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
TCC
2015
TCC
2015
CRYPTO
2015
CRYPTO
2014
CRYPTO
2014
EUROCRYPT
2014
PKC
2014
TCC
2014
EPRINT
2014
EPRINT
2013
TCC
2013
TCC
2013
CRYPTO
2013
CRYPTO
2013
ASIACRYPT
2013
EUROCRYPT
2012
TCC
2012
EUROCRYPT
2012
CRYPTO
2011
TCC
2011
TCC
2011
CRYPTO
2011
ASIACRYPT
2011
ASIACRYPT
2010
TCC
2010
EPRINT
Interactive Locking, Zero-Knowledge PCPs, and Unconditional Cryptography
Motivated by the question of basing cryptographic protocols on stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens, we revisit the question of unconditional two-prover zero-knowledge proofs for $NP$. We show that such protocols exist in the {\em interactive PCP} model of Kalai and Raz (ICALP '08), where one of the provers is replaced by a PCP oracle. This strengthens the feasibility result of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson (STOC '88) which requires two stateful provers. In contrast to previous zero-knowledge PCPs of Kilian, Petrank, and Tardos (STOC '97), in our protocol both the prover and the PCP oracle are efficient given an $NP$ witness. Our main technical tool is a new primitive that we call {\em interactive locking}, an efficient realization of an unconditionally secure commitment scheme in the interactive PCP model. We implement interactive locking by adapting previous constructions of {\em interactive hashing} protocols to our setting, and also provide a direct construction which uses a minimal amount of interaction and improves over our interactive hashing based constructions. Finally, we apply the above results towards showing the feasibility of basing unconditional cryptography on {\em stateless} tamper-proof hardware tokens, and obtain the following results: *) We show that if tokens can be used to encapsulate other tokens, then there exist unconditional and statistically secure (in fact, UC secure) protocols for general secure computation. *) Even if token encapsulation is not possible, there are unconditional and statistically secure commitment protocols and zero-knowledge proofs for $NP$. *) Finally, if token encapsulation is not possible, then no protocol can realize statistically secure oblivious transfer.
2010
CRYPTO
2010
CRYPTO
2010
EPRINT
Founding Cryptography on Tamper-Proof Hardware Tokens
A number of works have investigated using tamper-proof hardwaretokens as tools to achieve a variety of cryptographic tasks. In particular, Goldreich and Ostrovsky considered the goal of software protection via oblivious RAM. Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum introduced the concept of \emph{one-time programs}: in a one-time program, an honest sender sends a set of {\em simple} hardware tokens to a (potentially malicious) receiver. The hardware tokens allow the receiver to execute a secret program specified by the sender's tokens exactly once (or, more generally, up to a fixed $t$ times). A recent line of work initiated by Katz examined the problem ofachieving UC-secure computation using hardware tokens. Motivated by the goal of unifying and strengthening these previous notions, we consider the general question of basing secure computation on hardware tokens. We show that the following tasks, which cannot be realized in the ``plain'' model, become feasible if the parties are allowed to generate and exchange tamper-proof hardware tokens. Unconditional non-interactive secure computation: We show that by exchanging simple stateful hardware tokens, any functionality can be realized with unconditional security against malicious parties. In the case of two-party functionalities $f(x,y)$ which take their inputs from a sender and a receiver and deliver their output to the receiver, our protocol is non-interactive and only requires a unidirectional communication of simple stateful tokens from the sender to the receiver. This strengthens previous feasibility results for one-time programs both by providing unconditional security and by offering general protection against malicious senders. As is typically the case for unconditionally secure protocols, our protocol is in fact UC-secure. This improves over previous works on UC-secure computation based on hardware tokens, which provided computational security under cryptographic assumptions. Interactive Secure computation from stateless tokens based on one-way functions: We show that stateless hardware tokens are sufficient to base general secure (in fact, UC-secure) computation on the existence of one-way functions. One cannot hope for security against unbounded adversaries with stateless tokens since an unbounded adversary could query the token multiple times to ``learn" the functionality it contains. Non-interactive secure computation from stateless tokens: We consider the problem of designing non-interactive secure computation from stateless tokens for stateless oblivious reactive functionalities, i.e., reactive functionalities which allow unlimited queries from the receiver (these are the only functionalities one can hope to realize non-interactively with stateless tokens). By building on recent techniques from resettably secure computation, we give a general positive result for stateless oblivious reactive functionalities under standard cryptographic assumption. This result generalizes the notion of (unlimited-use) obfuscation by providing security against a malicious sender, and also provides the first general feasibility result for program obfuscation using stateless tokens.
2010
EPRINT
Position-Based Quantum Cryptography
In this work, we initiate the study of position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim of position-based cryptography is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. This has interesting applications, e.g., it enables two military bases to talk to each other over insecure (i.e. neither private nor authenticated) channels and without having any pre-shared key, with the guarantee that only parties within the bases learn the content of the conversation. We present schemes for several important position-based cryptographic tasks: positioning, authentication, and key exchange, and we prove them unconditionally secure, i.e., without assuming any restriction on the adversaries (beyond the laws of quantum mechanics). At the core of our security proofs lies the strong complementary information tradeoff recently introduced by Renes and Boileau. An attractive feature of all our schemes is that they only involve ``simple'' quantum operations, namely to prepare, communicate and measure-upon-arrival individual qubits. We stress that the above position-based tasks are impossible in the classical setting without limiting the adversary. Therefore, our work shows that position-based quantum cryptography is one of the rare examples besides QKD for which there is such a strong separation between classical and quantum cryptography. Besides the schemes for which we give rigorous security proofs, we also present a couple of significantly more efficient schemes for which we can merely conjecture security; proving them secure remains an interesting challenge. Our results open a fascinating new direction for position-based security in cryptography where security of protocols is solely based on the laws of physics and proofs of security do not require any pre-existing infrastructure.
2010
EPRINT
On the Round Complexity of Covert Computation
Vipul Goyal Abhishek Jain
In STOC'05, von Ahn, Hopper and Langford introduced the notion of covert computation. In covert computation, a party runs a secure computation protocol over a covert (or steganographic) channel without knowing if the other parties are participating as well or not. At the end of the protocol, if all parties participated in the protocol and if the function output is "favorable" to all parties, then the output is revealed (along with the fact that everyone participated). All covert computation protocols known so far require a large polynomial number of rounds. In this work, we first study the question of the round complexity of covert computation and obtain the following results: 1) There does not exist a constant round covert computation protocol with respect to black box simulation even for the case of two parties. (In comparison, such protocols are known even for the multi-party case if there is no covertness requirement.) 2) By relying on the two slot non-black-box simulation technique of Pass (STOC'04) and techniques from cryptography in NC^0 (Applebaum et al, FOCS'04), we obtain a construction of a constant round covert multi-party computation protocol. Put together, the above adds one more example to the growing list of tasks for which non-black-box simulation techniques (introduced in the work of Barak in FOCS'01) are necessary. Finally, we study the problem of covert multi-party computation in the setting where the parties only have point to point (covert) communication channels. We observe that our covert computation protocol for the broadcast channel inherits, from the protocol of Pass, the property of secure composition in the bounded concurrent setting. Then, as an application of this protocol, somewhat surprisingly we show the existence of covert multi-party computation with point to point channels (assuming that the number of parties is a constant).
2009
EUROCRYPT
2009
CRYPTO
2008
TCC
2008
EUROCRYPT
2008
EUROCRYPT
2007
ASIACRYPT
2007
CRYPTO
2007
EPRINT
New Constructions for UC Secure Computation using Tamper-proof Hardware
The Universal Composability framework was introduced by Canetti to study the security of protocols which are concurrently executed with other protocols in a network environment. Unfortunately it was shown that in the so called plain model, a large class of functionalities cannot be securely realized. These severe impossibility results motivated the study of other models involving some sort of setup assumptions, where general positive results can be obtained. Until recently, all the setup assumptions which were proposed required some trusted third party (or parties). Katz recently proposed using a \emph{physical setup} to avoid such trusted setup assumptions. In his model, the physical setup phase includes the parties exchanging tamper proof hardware tokens implementing some functionality. The tamper proof hardware is modeled so as to assume that the receiver of the token can do nothing more than observe its input/output characteristics. It is further assumed that the sender \emph{knows} the program code of the hardware token which it distributed. Based on the DDH assumption, Katz gave general positive results for universally composable multi-party computation tolerating any number of dishonest parties making this model quite attractive. In this paper, we present new constructions for UC secure computation using tamper proof hardware (in a stronger model). Our results represent an improvement over the results of Katz in several directions using substantially different techniques. Interestingly, our security proofs do not rely on being able to rewind the hardware tokens created by malicious parties. This means that we are able to relax the assumptions that the parties \emph{know} the code of the hardware token which they distributed. This allows us to model real life attacks where, for example, a party may simply pass on the token obtained from one party to the other without actually knowing its functionality. Furthermore, our construction models the interaction with the tamper-resistant hardware as a simple request-reply protocol. Thus, we show that the hardware tokens used in our construction can be \emph{resettable}. In fact, it suffices to use token which are completely stateless (and thus cannot execute a multi-round protocol). Our protocol is also based on general assumptions (namely enhanced trapdoor permutations).
2007
EPRINT
Reducing Trust in the PKG in Identity Based Cryptosystems
Vipul Goyal
One day, you suddenly find that a private key corresponding to your Identity is up for sale at e-Bay. Since you do not suspect a key compromise, perhaps it must be the PKG who is acting dishonestly and trying to make money by selling your key. How do you find out for sure and even prove it in a court of law? This paper introduces the concept of Accountable Authority Identity based Encryption (A-IBE). A-IBE is a new approach to mitigate the (inherent) key escrow problem in identity based encryption schemes. Our main goal is to restrict the ways in which the PKG can misbehave. In our system, if the PKG ever maliciously generates and distributes a decryption key for an Identity, it runs the risk of being caught and prosecuted. In contrast to other mitigation approaches, our approach does not require multiple key generation authorities.
2007
EPRINT
Universally Composable Multi-Party Computation with an Unreliable Common Reference String
Vipul Goyal Jonathan Katz
Universally composable multi-party computation has been studied in two settings: \begin{itemize} \item When a majority of participants are honest, universally composable multi-party computation is known to be possible without any assumptions. \item When honest participants are \emph{not} in the majority, universally composable multi-party computation is known to be impossible (under any cryptographic assumption) in the bare model. On the other hand, feasibility results have been obtained (under standard cryptographic assumptions) in various augmented models, the most popular of which posits the existence of a \emph{common references string} (CRS) available to all parties who are executing the protocol. \end{itemize} In either of the above settings, some \emph{assumption} regarding the protocol execution is made (i.e., that many parties are honest in the first case, or that a legitimately-chosen string is available in the second), and if this assumption is incorrect then all security is lost. A natural question is whether it is possible to design protocols giving \emph{some} assurance of security in case \emph{either one} of these assumptions holds, i.e., a single protocol (that uses a CRS) which is secure if \emph{either} at most $s$ players are dishonest \emph{or} if up to $t$ players are dishonest (with $t > s$) but the CRS is chosen in the proscribed manner. We show that such protocols exist if and only if $s+t < n$.
2006
EPRINT
Attribute-Based Encryption for Fine-Grained Access Control of Encrypted Data
As more sensitive data is shared and stored by third-party sites on the Internet, there will be a need to encrypt data stored at these sites. One drawback of encrypting data, is that it can be selectively shared only at a coarse-grained level (i.e., giving another party your private key). We develop a new cryptosystem for fine-grained sharing of encrypted data that we call Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE). In our cryptosystem, ciphertexts are labeled with sets of attributes and private keys are associated with access structures that control which ciphertexts a user is able to decrypt. We demonstrate the applicability of our construction to sharing of audit-log information and broadcast encryption. Our construction supports delegation of private keys which subsumes Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE).
2006
EPRINT
Concurrent Statistical Zero-Knowledge Arguments for NP from One Way Functions
In this paper we show a general transformation from any honest verifier statistical zero-knowledge argument to a concurrent statistical zero-knowledge argument. Our transformation relies only on the existence of one-way functions. It is known that the existence of zero-knowledge systems for any non-trivial language implies one way functions. Hence our transformation \emph{unconditionally} shows that concurrent statistical zero-knowledge arguments for a non-trivial language exist if and only if standalone secure statistical zero-knowledge arguments for that language exist. Further, applying our transformation to the recent statistical zero-knowledge argument system of Nguyen et al (STOC'06) yields the first concurrent statistical zero-knowledge argument system for all languages in \textbf{NP} from any one way function.
2004
EPRINT
How To Re-initialize a Hash Chain
Vipul Goyal
Hash Chains are used extensively in various cryptographic systems such as one-time passwords, server supported signatures, secure address resolution, certificate revocation, micropayments etc. However, currently they suffer from the limitation that they have a finite number of links which when exhausted requires the system to be re-initialized. In this paper, we present a new kind of hash chain which we call a Re-initializable Hash Chain (RHC). A RHC has the property that if its links are exhausted, it can be securely re-initialized in a non-repudiable manner to result in another RHC. This process can be continued indefinitely to give rise to an infinite length hash chain, or more precisely, an infinite number of finite length hash chains tied together. Finally we illustrate how a conventional hash chain (CHC) may be profitable replaced with a RHC in cryptographic systems.
2004
EPRINT
More Efficient Server Assisted One Time Signatures
Vipul Goyal
Server assisted one time signature scheme was recently presented as a non-repudiation service for mobile and constrained devices. However, the scheme suffered with high storage requirements for the virtual server and high memory requirements for the mobile client. We improve the scheme by significantly reducing virtual server storage requirements as well as mobile client memory requirements. More precisely, the virtual server storage requirements in our scheme are reduced by a factor of more than 80 compared to the original scheme. Further, memory requirements for the mobile client are reduced by a factor of more than 130. This is done by generating various quantities pseudorandomly and storing just their cryptographic hash (instead of storing them fully) wherever possible, while still being able to perform dispute resolution.
2004
EPRINT
CompChall: Addressing Password Guessing Attacks
Even though passwords are the most convenient means of authentication, they bring along themselves the threat of dictionary attacks. Dictionary attacks may be of two kinds: online and offline. While offline dictionary attacks are possible only if the adversary is able to collect data for a successful protocol execution by eavesdropping on the communication channel and can be successfully countered using public key cryptography, online dictionary attacks can be performed by anyone and there is no satisfactory solution to counter them. This paper presents a new authentication protocol which is called CompChall (computational challenge). The proposed protocol uses only one way hash functions as the building blocks and attempts to eliminate online dictionary attacks by implementing a challenge-response system. This challenge-response system is designed in a fashion that it does not pose any difficulty to a genuine user but is time consuming and computationally intensive for an adversary trying to launch a large number of login requests per unit time as in the case of an online dictionary attack. The protocol is stateless and thus less vulnerable to DoS (Denial of Service) attacks.
2004
EPRINT
Construction and Traversal of Hash Chain with Public Links
Vipul Goyal
Current hash chain traversal techniques require that the intermediate links of the hash chain be stored secretly on a trusted storage. This requirement is undesirable in several applications. We propose a new construction of hash chains based on inserting a ?breakpoint? after fixed number of links in the chain. We also propose a method with which the current hash chain traversal techniques can be applied to our construction without any significant changes in the storage and computation requirements and with the added advantage that the intermediate links may be stored on a public and non-trusted storage. We are also able to prove the security of our construction by replacing the hash function with a MAC function.

Program Committees

Eurocrypt 2020
TCC 2020
Crypto 2017
Asiacrypt 2016
Eurocrypt 2016
Crypto 2014
Eurocrypt 2013
Asiacrypt 2013
TCC 2013
Asiacrypt 2012
TCC 2011
Crypto 2011