CryptoDB
Brent Waters
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2024
CRYPTO
Adaptive Security in SNARGs via iO and Lossy Functions
Abstract
We construct an adaptively sound SNARGs in the plain model with CRS
relying on the assumptions of (subexponential) indistinguishability obfuscation (iO),
subexponential one-way functions and a notion of lossy functions we call
length parameterized lossy functions. Length parameterized lossy functions take
in separate security and input length parameters and have the property that the
function image size in lossy mode depends only on the security parameter.
We then show a novel way of constructing such functions from the Learning with
Errors (LWE) assumption.
Our work provides an alternative path towards achieving adaptively secure
SNARGs from the recent work of Waters and Wu. Their work required
the use of (essentially) perfectly re-randomizable one way functions (in addition to
obfuscation). Such functions are only currently known to be realizable from
assumptions such as discrete log or factoring that are known to not hold
in a quantum setting.
2024
TCC
Batch Arguments to NIZKs from One-Way Functions
Abstract
Succinctness and zero-knowledge are two fundamental properties in the study of cryptographic proof systems. Several recent works have formalized the connections between these two notions by showing how to realize non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments from succinct non-interactive arguments. Specifically, Champion and Wu (CRYPTO 2023) as well as Bitansky, Kamath, Paneth, Rothblum, and Vasudevan (ePrint 2023) recently showed how to construct a NIZK argument for NP from a (somewhere-sound) non-interactive batch argument (BARG) and a dual-mode commitment scheme (and in the case of the Champion-Wu construction, a local pseudorandom generator). The main open question is whether a BARG suffices for a NIZK (just assuming one-way functions).
In this work, we first show that an adaptively-sound BARG for NP together with an one-way function imply a computational NIZK argument for NP. We then show that the weaker notion of somewhere soundness achieved by existing BARGs from standard algebraic assumptions are also adaptively sound if we assume sub-exponential security. This transformation may also be of independent interest. Taken together, we obtain a NIZK argument for NP from one-way functions and a sub-exponentially-secure somewhere-sound BARG for NP.
If we instead assume plain public-key encryption, we show that a standard polynomially-secure somewhere-sound batch argument for NP suffices for the same implication. As a corollary, this means a somewhere-sound BARG can be used to generically upgrade any semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme into one secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. More broadly, our results demonstrate that constructing non-interactive batch arguments for NP is essentially no easier than constructing NIZK arguments for NP.
2024
TCC
Monotone Policy BARGs from BARGs and Additively Homomorphic Encryption
Abstract
A monotone policy batch $\mathsf{NP}$ language $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}, P}$ is parameterized by a monotone policy $P \colon \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ and an $\mathsf{NP}$ relation $\mathcal{R}$. A statement $(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ is a \textsc{yes} instance if there exists $w_1, \ldots, w_k$ where $P(\mathcal{R}(x_1, w_1), \ldots, \mathcal{R}(x_k, w_k)) = 1$. For example, we might say that an instance $(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ is a \textsc{yes} instance if a majority of the statements are true. A monotone policy batch argument (BARG) for $\mathsf{NP}$ allows a prover to prove that $(x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}, P}$ with a proof of size $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda, |\mathcal{R}|, \log k)$, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter, $|\mathcal{R}|$ is the size of the Boolean circuit that computes $\mathcal{R}$, and $k$ is the number of instances. Recently, Brakerski, Brodsky, Kalai, Lombardi, and Paneth (CRYPTO~2023) gave the first monotone policy BARG for $\mathsf{NP}$ from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption.
In this work, we describe a generic approach for constructing monotone policy BARGs from any BARG for $\mathsf{NP}$ together with an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. This yields the first constructions of monotone policy BARGs from the $k$-$\ms{Lin}$ assumption in prime-order pairing groups as well as the (subexponential) DDH assumption in /pairing-free/ groups. Central to our construction is a notion of a zero-fixing hash function, which is a relaxed version of a predicate-extractable hash function from the work of Brakerski~et~al. Our relaxation enables a direct realization of zero-fixing hash functions from BARGs for $\mathsf{NP}$ and additively homomorphic encryption, whereas the previous notion relied on leveled homomorphic encryption, and by extension, the LWE assumption.
As an application, we also show how to combine a monotone policy BARG with a puncturable signature scheme to obtain a monotone policy aggregate signature scheme. Our work yields the first (statically-secure) monotone policy aggregate signatures that supports general monotone Boolean circuits from standard pairing-based assumptions. Previously, this was only known from LWE.
2024
CRYPTO
Reducing the CRS Size in Registered ABE Systems
Abstract
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a generalization of public-key encryption that enables fine-grained access control to encrypted data. In (ciphertext-policy) ABE, a central trusted authority issues decryption keys for attributes $x$ to users. In turn, ciphertexts are associated with a decryption policy $\mathcal{P}$. Decryption succeeds and recovers the encrypted message whenever $\mathcal{P}(x) = 1$. Recently, Hohenberger, Lu, Waters, and Wu (Eurocrypt 2023) introduced the notion of registered ABE, which is an ABE scheme without a trusted central authority. Instead, users generate their own public/secret keys (just like in public-key encryption) and then register their keys (and attributes) with a key curator. The key curator is a transparent and untrusted entity.
Currently, the best pairing-based registered ABE schemes support monotone Boolean formulas and an a priori bounded number of users $L$. A major limitation of existing schemes is that they require a (structured) common reference string (CRS) of size $L^2 \cdot |\mathcal{U}|$ where $|\mathcal{U}|$ is the size of the attribute universe. In other words, the size of the CRS scales quadratically with the number of users and multiplicatively with the size of the attribute universe. The large CRS makes these schemes expensive in practice and limited to a small number of users and a small universe of attributes.
In this work, we give two ways to reduce the CRS size in pairing-based registered ABE schemes. First, we introduce a combinatoric technique based on progression-free sets that enables registered ABE for the same class of policies but with a CRS whose size is sub-quadratic in the number of users. Asymptotically, we obtain a scheme where the CRS size is nearly linear in the number of users $L$ (i.e., $L^{1 + o(1)}$). If we take a more concrete-efficiency-oriented focus, we can instantiate our framework to obtain a construction with a CRS of size $L^{\log_2 3} \approx L^{1.6}$. For instance, in a scheme for 100,000 users, our approach reduces the CRS by a factor of over $115\times$ compared to previous approaches (and without incurring any overhead in encryption/decryption time). Our second approach for reducing the CRS size is to rely on a partitioning-based argument when arguing security of the registered ABE scheme. Previous approaches took a dual-system approach. Using a partitioning-based argument yields a registered ABE scheme where the size of the CRS is independent of the size of the attribute universe. The cost is the resulting scheme satisfies a weaker notion of static security. Our techniques for reducing the CRS size can be combined, and taken together, we obtain a pairing-based registered ABE scheme that supports monotone Boolean formulas with a CRS size of $L^{1 + o(1)}$. Notably, this is the first pairing-based registered ABE scheme that does not require imposing a bound on the size of the attribute universe during setup time.
As an additional application, we also show how to apply our techniques based on progression-free sets to the batch argument (BARG) for $\mathsf{NP}$ scheme of Waters and Wu (Crypto 2022) to obtain a scheme with a nearly-linear CRS without needing to rely on non-black-box bootstrapping techniques.
2024
TCC
Batching Adaptively-Sound SNARGs for NP
Abstract
A succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) for NP allows a prover to convince a verifier that an NP statement $x$ is true with a proof whose size is sublinear in the length of the traditional NP witness. Moreover, a SNARG is adaptively sound if the adversary can choose the statement it wants to prove after seeing the scheme parameters. Very recently, Waters and Wu (STOC 2024) showed how to construct adaptively-sound SNARGs for NP in the plain model from falsifiable assumptions (specifically, sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, sub-exponentially secure one-way functions, and polynomial hardness of discrete log).
We consider the batch setting where the prover wants to prove a collection of $T$ statements $x_1, \ldots, x_T$ and its goal is to construct a proof whose size is sublinear in both the size of a single witness and the number of instances $T$. In this setting, existing constructions either require the size of the public parameters to scale linearly with $T$ (and thus, can only support an a priori bounded number of instances), or only provide non-adaptive soundness, or have proof size that scales linearly with the size of a single NP witness. In this work, we give two approaches for batching adaptively-sound SNARGs for NP, and in particular, show that under the same set of assumptions as those underlying the Waters-Wu adaptively-sound SNARG, we can obtain an adaptively-sound SNARG for batch NP where the size of the proof is $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ and the size of the CRS is $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda + |C|)$, where $\lambda$ is a security parameter and $|C|$ is the size of the circuit that computes the associated NP relation.
Our first approach builds directly on top of the Waters-Wu construction and relies on indistinguishability obfuscation and a homomorphic re-randomizable one-way function. Our second approach shows how to combine ideas from the Waters-Wu SNARG with the chaining-based approach by Garg, Sheridan, Waters, and Wu (TCC 2022) to obtain a SNARG for batch NP.
2024
TCC
Adaptively Secure Attribute-Based Encryption from Witness Encryption
Abstract
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) enables fine-grained control over which ciphertexts various users can decrypt. A master authority can create secret keys $\sk_f$ with different functions (circuits) $f$ for different users. Anybody can encrypt a message under some attribute $x$ so that only recipients with a key $\sk_f$ for a function such that $f(x)=1$ will be able to decrypt. There are a number of different approaches toward achieving selectively secure ABE, where the adversary has to decide on the challenge attribute $x$ ahead of time before seeing any keys, including constructions via bilinear maps (for NC1 circuits), learning with errors, or witness encryption. However, when it comes adaptively secure ABE, the problem seems to be much more challenging and we only know of two potential approaches: via the ``dual systems'' methodology from bilinear maps, or via indistinguishability obfuscation. In this work, we give a new approach that constructs adaptively secure ABE from witness encryption (along with statistically sound NIZKs and one-way functions). While witness encryption is a strong assumption, it appears to be fundamentally weaker than indistinguishability obfuscation. Moreover, we have candidate constructions of witness encryption from some assumptions (e.g., evasive LWE) from which we do not know how to construct indistinguishability obfuscation, giving us adaptive ABE from these assumptions as a corollary of our work.
2023
PKC
Non-Interactive Publicly-Verifiable Delegation of Committed Programs
Abstract
In this work, we present the first construction of a fully non-interactive publicly-verifiable delegation scheme for committed programs. More specifically, we consider a setting where Alice is a trusted author who delegates to an untrusted worker the task of hosting a program $P$, represented as a Boolean circuit. Alice also commits to a succinct value based on $P$.
Any arbitrary user/verifier without knowledge of $P$ should be convinced that they are receiving from the worker an actual computation of Alice's program on a given input $x$.
Before our work, the only object known to imply this challenging form of delegation was a SNARG/SNARK for $\mathcal{NP}$. This is because from the point of view of the user/verifier, the program $P$ is an unknown witness to the computation. However, constructing a SNARG for
$\mathcal{NP}$ from standard assumptions remains a major open problem.
In our work, we show how to achieve delegation in this challenging context assuming only the hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, bypassing the apparent need for a SNARG for $\mathcal{NP}$.
2023
EUROCRYPT
Registered Attribute-Based Encryption
Abstract
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) generalizes public-key encryption and enables fine-grained control to encrypted data. However, ABE upends the traditional trust model of public-key encryption by requiring a single trusted authority to issue decryption keys. If an adversary compromises the central authority and exfiltrates its secret key, then the adversary can decrypt every ciphertext in the system.
This work introduces registered ABE, a primitive that allows users to generate secret keys on their own and then register the associated public key with a "key curator" along with their attributes. The key curator aggregates the public keys from the different users into a single compact master public key. To decrypt, users occasionally need to obtain helper decryption keys from the key curator which they combine with their own secret keys. We require that the size of the aggregated public key, the helper decryption keys, the ciphertexts, as well as the encryption/decryption times to be polylogarithmic in the number of registered users. Moreover, the key curator is entirely transparent and maintains no secrets. Registered ABE generalizes the notion of registration-based encryption (RBE) introduced by Garg et al. (TCC 2018), who focused on the simpler setting of identity-based encryption.
We construct a registered ABE scheme that supports an a priori bounded number of users and policies that can be described by a linear secret sharing scheme (e.g., monotone Boolean formulas) from assumptions on composite-order pairing groups. Our approach deviates sharply from previous techniques for constructing RBE and only makes black-box use of cryptography. All existing RBE constructions (a weaker notion than registered ABE) rely on heavy non-black-box techniques. The encryption and decryption costs of our construction are comparable to those of vanilla pairing-based ABE. Two limitations of our scheme are that it requires a structured reference string whose size scales quadratically with the number of users (and linearly with the size of the attribute universe) and the running time of registration scales linearly with the number of users.
Finally, as a feasibility result, we construct a registered ABE scheme that supports general policies and an arbitrary number of users from indistinguishability obfuscation and somewhere statistically binding hash functions.
2023
EUROCRYPT
Fully Adaptive Decentralized Multi-Authority ABE
Abstract
Decentralized multi-authority attribute-based encryption (MA-ABE) is a distributed generalization of standard (ciphertext-policy) attribute-based encryption where there is no trusted central authority: any party can become an authority and issue private keys, and there is no requirement for any global coordination other than the creation of an initial set of common reference parameters.
We present the first multi-authority attribute-based encryption schemes that are provably fully-adaptively secure. Namely, our construction is secure against an attacker that may corrupt some of the authorities as well as perform key queries adaptively throughout the life-time of the system. Our main construction relies on a prime order bilinear group where the k-linear assumption holds as well as on a random oracle. Along the way, we present a conceptually simpler construction relying on a composite order bilinear group with standard subgroup decision assumptions as well
as on a random oracle.
Prior to this work, there was no construction that could resist adaptive corruptions of authorities, no matter the assumptions used. In fact, we point out that even standard complexity leveraging style arguments do not work in the multi-authority setting.
2023
EUROCRYPT
On Non-uniform Security for Black-box Non-Interactive CCA Commitments
Abstract
We obtain a black-box construction of non-interactive CCA commitments against non-uniform adversaries. This makes black-box use of an appropriate base commitment scheme for small tag spaces, variants of sub-exponential hinting PRG (Koppula and Waters, Crypto 2019) and variants of keyless sub-exponentially collision-resistant hash function with security against non-uniform adversaries (Bitansky, Kalai and Paneth, STOC 2018 and Bitansky and Lin, TCC 2018).
All prior works on non-interactive non-malleable or CCA commitments without setup first construct a ``base'' scheme for a relatively small identity/tag space, and then build a tag amplification compiler to obtain commitments for an exponential-sized space of identities. Prior black-box constructions either add multiple rounds of interaction (Goyal, Lee, Ostrovsky and Visconti, FOCS 2012) or only achieve security against uniform adversaries (Garg, Khurana, Lu and Waters, Eurocrypt 2021).
Our key technical contribution is a novel tag amplification compiler for CCA commitments that replaces the non-interactive proof of consistency required in prior work. Our construction satisfies the strongest known definition of non-malleability, i.e., CCA2 (chosen commitment attack) security. In addition to only making black-box use of the base scheme, our construction replaces sub-exponential NIWIs with sub-exponential hinting PRGs, which can be obtained based on assumptions such as (sub-exponential) CDH or LWE.
2023
JOFC
Decentralized Multi-authority ABE for $\textsf{NC}^1$ from BDH
Abstract
Decentralized multi-authority attribute-based encryption ( $$\textsf{MA}$$ MA - $$\textsf{ABE}$$ ABE ) is a strengthening of standard ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption so that there is no trusted central authority: Any party can become an authority and there is no requirement for any global coordination other than the creation of an initial set of common reference parameters. Essentially, any party can act as an authority for some attribute by creating a public key of its own and issuing private keys to different users that reflect their attributes. This paper presents the first $$\textsf{MA}$$ MA - $$\textsf{ABE}$$ ABE proven secure under the standard search variant of bilinear Diffie–Hellman ( CBDH ) and in the random oracle model. Our scheme supports all access policies captured by $$\textsf{NC}^1$$ NC 1 circuits. All previous constructions were proven secure in the random oracle model and additionally were based on decision assumptions such as the DLIN assumption, non-standard q -type assumptions, or subspace decision assumptions over composite-order bilinear groups.
2023
CRYPTO
Security-Preserving Distributed Samplers: How to Generate any CRS in One Round without Random Oracles
Abstract
A distributed sampler is a way for several mutually distrusting parties to non-interactively generate a common reference string (CRS) that all parties trust. Previous work constructs distributed samplers in the random oracle model, or in the standard model with very limited security guarantees. This is no accident, as standard model distributed samplers with full security were shown impossible.
In this work, we provide new definitions for distributed samplers which we show achieve meaningful security guarantees in the standard model. In particular, our notion implies that the hardness of a wide range of security games is preserved when the CRS is replaced with a distributed sampler. We also show how to realize our notion of distributed samplers. A core technical tool enabling our construction is a new notion of single-message zero knowledge.
2023
CRYPTO
How to Use (Plain) Witness Encryption: Registered ABE, Flexible Broadcast, and More
Abstract
Witness encryption (WE) is a generalization of public-key encryption where the public key can be any NP statement x and the associated decryption key is any witness w for x. While early constructions of WE essentially relied on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), recent works have shown new pathways for direct constructions of WE that are significantly more efficient than iO (and also seem unlikely to yield iO). Motivated by this progress, we revisit the possibility of using WE to realize advanced cryptographic primitives previously only known to exist in ``obfustopia.''
In this work, we give new constructions of trustless encryption schemes from plain witness encryption (and the learning-with-errors assumption) that were previously only known from iO: (1) a distributed broadcast encryption scheme (a broadcast encryption scheme where users choose their own secret keys); and (2) registered attributed-based encryption scheme (a system where users choose their own keys and then register their public key together with their attributes with a deterministic and transparent key curator). We also show how to use our techniques to obtain an optimal broadcast encryption scheme in the random oracle model.
Underlying our constructions is a novel technique for using witness encryption based on a new primitive which we call function-binding hash functions. Whereas a somewhere statistically binding hash function binds a digest to a few bits of the input, a function-binding hash function binds a digest to the output of a function of the inputs. As we demonstrate in this work, function-binding hash functions provide us new ways to leverage the power of plain witness encryption and use it as the foundation of advanced cryptographic primitives. Finally, we show how to build function-binding hash functions for the class of disjunctions of block functions from leveled homomorphic encryption; this in combination with with witness encryption yields our main results.
2023
CRYPTO
Universal Amplification of KDM Security: From 1-Key Circular to Multi-Key KDM
Abstract
An encryption scheme is Key Dependent Message (KDM) secure if it is safe to encrypt messages that can arbitrarily depend on the secret keys themselves. In this work, we show how to upgrade essentially the weakest form of KDM security into the strongest one. In particular, we assume the existence of a symmetric-key bit-encryption that is circular-secure in the 1-key setting, meaning that it maintains security even if one can encrypt individual bits of a single secret key under itself. We also rely on a standard CPA-secure public-key encryption. We construct a public-key encryption scheme that is KDM secure for general functions (of a-priori bounded circuit size) in the multi-key setting, meaning that it maintains security even if one can encrypt arbitrary functions of arbitrarily many secret keys under each of the public keys. As a special case, the latter guarantees security in the presence of arbitrary length key cycles. Prior work already showed how to amplify n-key circular to n-key KDM security for general functions. Therefore, the main novelty of our work is to upgrade from 1-key to n-key security for arbitrary n.
As an independently interesting feature of our result, our construction does not need to know the actual specification of the underlying 1-key circular secure scheme, and we only rely on the existence of some such scheme in the proof of security. In particular, we present a universal construction of a multi-key KDM-secure encryption that is secure as long as some 1-key circular-secure scheme exists. While this feature is similar in spirit to Levin's universal construction of one-way functions, the way we achieve it is quite different technically, and does not come with the same galactic inefficiency.
2023
TCC
Non-Interactive Anonymous Router with Quasi-Linear Router Computation
Abstract
Anonymous routing is an important cryptographic primitive that allows users to communicate privately on the Internet, without revealing their message contents or their contacts. Until the very recent work of Shi and Wu (Eurocrypt’21), all classical anonymous routing schemes are interactive protocols, and their security rely on a threshold number of the routers being honest. The recent work of Shi and Wu suggested a new abstraction called Non-Interactive Anonymous Router (NIAR), and showed how to achieve anonymous routing non-interactively for the first time. In particular, a single untrusted router receives a token which allows it to obliviously apply a permutation to a set of encrypted messages from the senders. Shi and Wu’s construction suffers from two drawbacks: 1) the router takes time quadratic in the number of senders to obliviously route their messages; and 2) the scheme is proven secure only in the presence of static corruptions.
In this work, we show how to construct a non-interactive anonymous router scheme with sub-quadratic router computation, and achieving security in the presence of adaptive corruptions. To get this result, we assume the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. Our final result is obtained through a sequence of stepping stones. First, we show how to achieve the desired efficiency, but with security under static corruption and in a selective, single-challenge setting. Then, we go through a sequence of upgrades which eventually get us the final result. We devise various new techniques along the way which lead to some additional results. In particular, our techniques for reasoning about a network of obfuscated programs may be of independent interest.
2022
TCC
Adaptive Multiparty NIKE
Abstract
We construct adaptively secure multiparty non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) from polynomially-hard indistinguishability obfuscation and other standard assumptions. This improves on all prior such protocols, which required sub-exponential hardness. Along the way, we establish several compilers which simplify the task of constructing new multiparty NIKE protocols, and also establish a close connection with a particular type of constrained PRF.
2022
EUROCRYPT
Dynamic Collusion Bounded Functional Encryption from Identity-Based Encryption
📺
Abstract
Functional Encryption is a powerful notion of encryption in which each decryption key is associated with a function f such that decryption recovers the function evaluation f(m). Informally, security states that a user with access to function keys sk_f1,sk_f2,..., (and so on) can only learn f1(m), f2(m),... (and so on) but nothing more about the message. The system is said to be q-bounded collusion resistant if the security holds as long as an adversary gets access to at most q = q(λ) function keys. A major drawback of such statically bounded collusion systems is that the collusion bound q must be declared at setup time and is fixed for the entire lifetime of the system. We initiate the study of dynamically bounded collusion resistant functional encryption systems which provide more flexibility in terms of selecting the collusion bound, while reaping the benefits of statically bounded collusion FE systems (such as quantum resistance, simulation security, and general assumptions). Briefly, the virtues of a dynamically bounded scheme can be summarized as:
-Fine-grained individualized selection: It lets each encryptor select the collusion bound by weighing the trade-off between performance
overhead and the amount of collusion resilience.
-Evolving encryption strategies: Since the system is no longer tied to a single collusion bound, thus it allows to dynamically adjust the desired collusion resilience based on any number of evolving factors such as the age of the system, or a number of active users, etc.
-Ease and simplicity of updatability: None of the system parameters have to be updated when adjusting the collusion bound. That is, the same key skf can be used to decrypt ciphertexts for collusion bound q = 2 as well as q = 2^λ.
We construct such a dynamically bounded functional encryption scheme for the class of all polynomial-size circuits under the general assumption of Identity-Based Encryption
2022
CRYPTO
Batch Arguments for NP and More from Standard Bilinear Group Assumptions
📺 ★
Abstract
Non-interactive batch arguments for NP provide a way to amortize the cost of NP verification across multiple instances. They enable a prover to convince a verifier of multiple NP statements with communication much smaller than the total witness length and verification time much smaller than individually checking each instance.
In this work, we give the first construction of a non-interactive batch argument for NP from standard assumptions on groups with bilinear maps (specifically, from either the subgroup decision assumption in composite-order groups or from the k-Lin assumption in prime-order groups for any k >= 1). Previously, batch arguments for NP were only known from LWE, or a combination of multiple assumptions, or from non-standard/non-falsifiable assumptions. Moreover, our work introduces a new direct approach for batch verification and avoids heavy tools like correlation-intractable hash functions or probabilistically-checkable proofs common to previous approaches.
As corollaries to our main construction, we obtain the first publicly-verifiable non-interactive delegation scheme for RAM programs (i.e., a succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) for P) with a CRS of sublinear size (in the running time of the RAM program), as well as the first aggregate signature scheme (supporting bounded aggregation) from standard assumptions on bilinear maps.
2022
TCC
Multi-Authority ABE from Lattices without Random Oracles
Abstract
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) extends public-key encryption to enable fine-grained control to encrypted data. However, this comes at the cost of needing a central trusted authority to issue decryption keys. A multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) scheme decentralizes ABE and allows anyone to serve as an authority. Existing constructions of MA-ABE only achieve security in the random oracle model.
In this work, we develop new techniques for constructing MA-ABE for the class of subset policies (which captures policies such as conjunctions and DNF formulas) whose security can be based in the plain model without random oracles. We achieve this by relying on the recently-proposed "evasive" learning with errors (LWE) assumption by Wee (EUROCRYPT 2022) and Tsabury (CRYPTO 2022).
Along the way, we also provide a modular view of the MA-ABE scheme for DNF formulas by Datta et al. (EUROCRYPT 2021) in the random oracle model. We formalize this via a general version of a related-trapdoor LWE assumption by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan (ITCS 2022), which can in turn be reduced to the plain LWE assumption. As a corollary, we also obtain an MA-ABE scheme for subset policies from plain LWE with a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio in the random oracle model. This improves upon the Datta et al. construction which relied on LWE with a sub-exponential modulus-to-noise ratio. Moreover, we are optimistic that the generalized related-trapdoor LWE assumption will also be useful for analyzing the security of other lattice-based constructions.
2022
TCC
How to Sample a Discrete Gaussian (and more) from a Random Oracle
Abstract
The random oracle methodology is central to the design of many practical cryptosystems. A common challenge faced in several systems is the need to have a random oracle that outputs from a structured distribution D, even though most heuristic implementations such as SHA-3 are best suited for outputting bitstrings.
Our work explores the problem of sampling from discrete Gaussian (and related) distributions in a manner that they can be programmed into random oracles. We make the following contributions:
- We provide a definitional framework for our results. We say that a sampling algorithm Sample() for a distribution is explainable if there exists an algorithm Explain(), where, for a x in the domain, we have that Explain(x) -> r \in {0,1}^n such that Sample(r)=x. Moreover, if x is sampled from D the explained distribution is statistically close to choosing r uniformly at random. We consider a variant of this definition that allows the statistical closeness to be a "precision parameter" given to the Explain() algorithm. We show that sampling algorithms which satisfy our `explainability' property can be programmed as a random oracle.
- We provide a simple algorithm for explaining any sampling algorithm that works over distributions with polynomial sized ranges. This includes discrete Gaussians with small standard deviations.
- We show how to transform a (not necessarily explainable) sampling algorithm Sample() for a distribution into a new Sample'() that is explainable. The requirements for doing this is that (1) the probability density function is efficiently computable (2) it is possible to efficiently uniformly sample from all elements that have a probability density above a given threshold p, showing the equivalence of random oracles to these distributions and random oracles to uniform bitstrings. This includes a large class of distributions, including all discrete Gaussians.
- A potential drawback of the previous approach is that the transformation requires an additional computation of the density function. We provide a more customized approach that shows the Miccancio-Walter discrete Gaussian sampler is explainable as is. This suggests that other discrete Gaussian samplers in a similar vein might also be explainable as is.
2022
TCC
Fully Succinct Batch Arguments for NP from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Abstract
Non-interactive batch arguments for $\mathsf{NP}$ provide a way to amortize the cost of $\mathsf{NP}$ verification across multiple instances. In particular, they allow a prover to convince a verifier of multiple $\mathsf{NP}$ statements with communication that scales sublinearly in the number of instances.
In this work, we study fully succinct batch arguments for $\mathsf{NP}$ in the common reference string (CRS) model where the length of the proof scales not only sublinearly in the number of instances $T$, but also sublinearly with the size of the $\mathsf{NP}$ relation. Batch arguments with these properties are special cases of succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs); however, existing constructions of SNARGs either rely on idealized models or strong non-falsifiable assumptions. The one exception is the Sahai-Waters SNARG based on indistinguishability obfuscation. However, when applied to the setting of batch arguments, we must impose an a priori bound on the number of instances. Moreover, the size of the common reference string scales linearly with the number of instances.
In this work, we give a direct construction of a fully succinct batch argument for $\mathsf{NP}$ that supports an unbounded number of statements from indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. Then, by additionally relying on a somewhere statistically-binding (SSB) hash function, we show how to extend our construction to obtain a fully succinct and updatable batch argument. In the updatable setting, a prover can take a proof $\pi$ on $T$ statements $(x_1, \ldots, x_T)$ and "update" it to obtain a proof $\pi'$ on $(x_1, \ldots, x_T, x_{T + 1})$. Notably, the update procedure only requires knowledge of a (short) proof for $(x_1, \ldots, x_T)$ along with a single witness $w_{T + 1}$ for the new instance $x_{T + 1}$. Importantly, the update does not require knowledge of witnesses for $x_1, \ldots, x_T$.
2021
EUROCRYPT
Decentralized Multi-Authority ABE for DNFs from LWE
📺
Abstract
We construct the first decentralized multi-authority attribute-based
encryption (????????-????????????) scheme for a non-trivial class of access policies
whose security is based (in the random oracle model) solely on the
Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. The supported access policies
are ones described by ???????????? formulas. All previous constructions of
????????-???????????? schemes supporting any non-trivial class of access policies were
proven secure (in the random oracle model) assuming various assumptions
on bilinear maps.
In our system, any party can become an authority and there is no requirement
for any global coordination other than the creation of an initial
set of common reference parameters. A party can simply act as a standard
ABE authority by creating a public key and issuing private keys to
different users that reflect their attributes. A user can encrypt data in
terms of any ???????????? formulas over attributes issued from any chosen set of
authorities. Finally, our system does not require any central authority.
In terms of efficiency, when instantiating the scheme with a global bound
???? on the size of access policies, the sizes of public keys, secret keys, and
ciphertexts, all grow with ????.
Technically, we develop new tools for building ciphertext-policy ABE
(????????-????????????) schemes using LWE. Along the way, we construct the first
provably secure ????????-???????????? scheme supporting access policies in ????????^1 under
the LWE assumption that avoids the generic universal-circuit-based
key-policy to ciphertext-policy transformation. In particular, our construction
relies on linear secret sharing schemes with new properties and
in some sense is more similar to ????????-???????????? schemes that rely on bilinear
maps. While our ????????-???????????? construction is not more efficient than existing
ones, it is conceptually intriguing and further we show how to extend it
to get the ????????-???????????? scheme described above.
2021
EUROCRYPT
Black-Box Non-Interactive Non-Malleable Commitments
📺
Abstract
There has been recent exciting progress in building non-interactive non-malleable commitments from judicious assumptions. All proposed approaches proceed in two steps. First, obtain simple “base” commitment schemes for very small tag/identity spaces based on a various sub-exponential hardness assumptions. Next, assuming sub-exponential non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs (NIWIs), and variants of keyless collision-resistant hash functions, construct non-interactive compilers that convert tag-based non-malleable commitments for a small tag space into tag-based non-malleable commitments for a larger tag space.
We propose the first black-box construction of non-interactive non-malleable commitments. Our key technical contribution is a novel implementation of the non-interactive proof of consistency required for tag amplification. Prior to our work, the only known approach to tag amplification without setup and with black-box use of the base scheme (Goyal, Lee, Ostrovsky, and Visconti, FOCS 2012) added multiple rounds of interaction.
Our construction satisfies the strongest known definition of non-malleability, i.e., CCA (chosen commitment attack) security. In addition to being black-box, our approach dispenses with the need for sub-exponential NIWIs, that was common to all prior work. Instead of NIWIs, we rely on sub-exponential hinting PRGs which can be obtained based on a broad set of assumptions such as sub-exponential CDH or LWE.
2021
PKC
On the CCA Compatibility of Public-Key Infrastructure
📺
Abstract
In this work, we put forth the notion of compatibility of any key generation or setup algorithm. We focus on the specific case of encryption, and say that a key generation algorithm KeyGen is X-compatible (for X \in {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}) if there exist encryption and decryption algorithms that together with KeyGen, result in an X-secure public-key encryption scheme.
We study the following question: Is every CPA-compatible key generation algorithm also CCA-compatible? We obtain the following answers:
- Every sub-exponentially CPA-compatible KeyGen algorithm is CCA1-compatible, assuming the existence of hinting PRGs and sub-exponentially secure keyless collision resistant hash functions.
- Every sub-exponentially CPA-compatible KeyGen algorithm is also CCA2-compatible, assuming the existence of non-interactive CCA2 secure commitments, in addition to sub-exponential security of the assumptions listed in the previous bullet.
Here, sub-exponentially CPA-compatible KeyGen refers to any key generation algorithm for which there exist encryption and decryption algorithms that result in a CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme {\em against sub-exponential adversaries}.
This gives a way to perform CCA secure encryption given any public key infrastructure that has been established with only (sub-exponential) CPA security in mind. The resulting CCA encryption makes black-box use of the CPA scheme and all other underlying primitives.
2021
CRYPTO
Targeted Lossy Functions and Applications
📺
Abstract
Lossy trapdoor functions, introduced by Peikert and Waters (STOC '08), can be initialized in one of two indistinguishable modes: in injective mode, the function preserves all information about its input, and can be efficiently inverted given a trapdoor, while in lossy mode, the function loses some information about its input. Such functions have found countless applications in cryptography, and can be constructed from a variety of Cryptomania assumptions. In this work, we introduce \emph{targeted lossy functions (TLFs)}, which relax lossy trapdoor functions along two orthogonal dimensions. Firstly, they do not require an inversion trapdoor in injective mode. Secondly, the lossy mode of the function is initialized with some target input, and the function is only required to lose information about this particular target. The injective and lossy modes should be indistinguishable even given the target. We construct TLFs from Minicrypt assumptions, namely, injective pseudorandom generators, or even one-way functions under a natural relaxation of injectivity. We then generalize TLFs to incorporate \emph{branches}, and construct \emph{all-injective-but-one} and \emph{all-lossy-but-one} variants. We show a wide variety of applications of targeted lossy functions. In several cases, we get the first Minicrypt constructions of primitives that were previously only known under Cryptomania assumptions. Our applications include:
\begin{itemize}
\item \emph{Pseudo-entropy functions}
from one-way functions.
\item Deterministic leakage-resilient message-authentication codes and improved leakage-resilient symmetric-key encryption from one-way functions.
\item Extractors for \emph{extractor-dependent sources}
from one-way functions.
\item Selective-opening secure symmetric-key encryption from one-way functions.
\item A new construction of CCA PKE from (exponentially secure) trapdoor functions and injective pseudorandom generators.
\end{itemize}
We also discuss a fascinating connection to distributed point functions.
2021
ASIACRYPT
Bounded Collusion ABE for TMs from IBE
📺
Abstract
We give an attribute-based encryption system for Turing Machines that is provably secure assuming only the existence of identity- based encryption (IBE) for large identity spaces. Currently, IBE is known to be realizable from most mainstream number theoretic assumptions that imply public key cryptography including factoring, the search Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the Learning with Errors assumption.
Our core construction provides security against an attacker that makes a single key query for a machine T before declaring a challenge string w∗ that is associated with the challenge ciphertext. We build our construction by leveraging a Garbled RAM construction of Gentry, Halevi, Raykova and Wichs; however, to prove security we need to introduce a new notion of security called iterated simulation security.
We then show how to transform our core construction into one that is secure for an a-priori bounded number q = q(\lambda) of key queries that can occur either before or after the challenge ciphertext. We do this by first showing how one can use a special type of non-committing encryption to transform a system that is secure only if a single key is chosen before the challenge ciphertext is declared into one where the single key can be requested either before or after the challenge ciphertext. We give a simple construction of this non-committing encryption from public key encryption in the Random Oracle Model. Next, one can apply standard combinatorial techniques to lift from single-key adaptive security to q-key adaptive security.
2021
ASIACRYPT
Adaptive Security via Deletion in Attribute-Based Encryption: Solutions from Search Assumptions in Bilinear Groups
📺
Abstract
One of the primary research challenges in Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) is constructing and proving cryptosystems that are adaptively
secure. To date the main paradigm for achieving adaptive security in
ABE is dual system encryption. However, almost all such solutions in
bilinear groups rely on (variants of) either the subgroup decision
problem over composite order groups or the decision linear assumption.
Both of these assumptions are decisional rather than search
assumptions and the target of the assumption is a source or bilinear
group element. This is in contrast to earlier selectively secure ABE
systems which can be proven secure from either the decisional or
search Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this work we make
progress on closing this gap by giving a new ABE construction for the
subset functionality and prove security under the Search Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption.
We first provide a framework for
proving adaptive security in Attribute-Based Encryption systems. We
introduce a concept of ABE with deletable attributes where any party
can take a ciphertext encrypted under the attribute string x in {0,
1}^n and modify it into a ciphertext encrypted under any string x'
in {0, 1, bot}^n where x' is derived by replacing any bits of
x with bot symbols (i.e. ``deleting" attributes of x). The
semantics of the system are that any private key for a circuit C can
be used to decrypt a ciphertext associated with x' if none of the
input bits read by circuit C are bot symbols and C(x') = 1.
We show a pathway for combining ABE
with deletable attributes with constrained pseudorandom functions to
obtain adaptively secure ABE building upon the recent work of
[Tsabary19]. Our new ABE system will be adaptively
secure and be a ciphertext-policy ABE that supports the same
functionality as the underlying constrained PRF as long as the PRF is
``deletion conforming". Here we also provide a simple constrained PRF
construction that gives subset functionality.
Our approach enables us to access a
broader array of Attribute-Based Encryption schemes support deletion
of attributes. For example, we show that both the [GPSW06] and [Boyen13] ABE schemes can
trivially handle a deletion operation. And, by using a hardcore bit
variant of GPSW scheme we obtain an adaptively secure ABE scheme under
the Search Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in addition to
pseudo random functions in NC1. This gives the first adaptively
secure ABE from a search assumption as all prior work relied on
decision assumptions over source group elements.
2021
ASIACRYPT
Beyond Software Watermarking: Traitor-Tracing for Pseudorandom Functions
📺
Abstract
Software watermarking schemes allow a user to embed an identifier into a piece of code such that the resulting program is nearly functionally-equivalent to the original program, and yet, it is difficult to remove the identifier without destroying the functionality of the program. Such schemes are often considered for proving software ownership or for digital rights management. Existing constructions of watermarking have focused primarily on watermarking pseudorandom functions (PRFs).
In this work, we revisit the definitional foundations of watermarking, and begin by highlighting a major flaw in existing security notions. Existing security notions for watermarking only require that the identifier be successfully extracted from programs that preserve the exact input/output behavior of the original program. In the context of PRFs, this means that an adversary that constructs a program which computes a quarter of the output bits of the PRF or that is able to distinguish the outputs of the PRF from random are considered to be outside the threat model. However, in any application (e.g., watermarking a decryption device or an authentication token) that relies on PRF security, an adversary that manages to predict a quarter of the bits or distinguishes the PRF outputs from random would be considered to have defeated the scheme. Thus, existing watermarking schemes provide very little security guarantee against realistic adversaries. None of the existing constructions of watermarkable PRFs would be able to extract the identifier from a program that only outputs a quarter of the bits of the PRF or one that perfectly distinguishes.
To address the shortcomings in existing watermarkable PRF definitions, we introduce a new primitive called a traceable PRF. Our definitions are inspired by similar definitions from public-key traitor tracing, and aim to capture a very robust set of adversaries: namely, any adversary that produces a useful distinguisher (i.e., a program that can break PRF security), can be traced to a specific identifier. We provide a general framework for constructing traceable PRFs via an intermediate primitive called private linear constrained PRFs. Finally, we show how to construct traceable PRFs from a similar set of assumptions previously used to realize software watermarking. Namely, we obtain a single-key traceable PRF from standard lattice assumptions and a fully collusion-resistant traceable PRF from indistinguishability obfuscation (together with injective one-way functions).
2020
CRYPTO
Chosen Ciphertext Security from Injective Trapdoor Functions
★
Abstract
We provide a construction of chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption from (injective) trapdoor functions. Our construction is black box and assumes no special properties (e.g. ``lossy'', ``correlated product secure'') of the trapdoor function.
2020
CRYPTO
New Constructions of Hinting PRGs, OWFs with Encryption, and more
📺
Abstract
Over the last few years, there has been a surge of new cryptographic results, including laconic oblivious
transfer, (anonymous/ hierarchical) identity-based encryption, trapdoor functions, chosen-ciphertext security transformations, designated-verifier zero-knowledge proofs, due to a beautiful framework recently introduced in the works of Cho et al. (Crypto 2017), and Dottling and Garg (Crypto 2017). The primitive of one-way function with encryption (OWFE) and its relatives (chameleon encryption, one-time signatures with encryption, hinting PRGs, trapdoor hash encryption, batch encryption) has been a centerpiece in all these results.
While there exist multiple realizations of OWFE (and its relatives) from a variety of assumptions such as CDH, Factoring, and LWE, all such constructions fall under the same general ``missing block" framework. Although this framework has been instrumental in opening up a new pathway towards various cryptographic functionalities via the abstraction of OWFE (and its relatives), it has been accompanied by undesirable inefficiencies that might inhibit a much wider adoption in many practical scenarios. Motivated by the surging importance of the OWFE abstraction (and its relatives),
a natural question to ask is whether the existing approaches can be diversified to not only obtain more constructions from different assumptions, but also in developing newer frameworks. We believe
answering this question will eventually lead to important and previously unexplored performance trade-offs in the overarching applications of this novel cryptographic paradigm.
In this work, we propose a new accumulation-style framework for building a new class of OWFE as well as hinting PRG constructions with a special focus on achieving shorter ciphertext size and shorter
public parameter size (respectively). Such performance improvements parlay into shorter parameters in their corresponding applications. Briefly, we explore the following performance trade-offs --- (1) for OWFE, our constructions outperform in terms of ciphertext size as well as encryption time, but this comes at the cost of larger evaluation and setup times, (2) for hinting PRGs, our constructions provide a rather dramatic trade-off between evaluation time versus parameter size, with our construction leading to significantly shorter public parameter size. The trade-off enabled by our hinting PRG construction also leads to interesting implications in the CPA-to-CCA transformation provided in. We also provide concrete performance measurements for our constructions and compare them with existing approaches. We believe highlighting such trade-offs will lead to wider adoption of these abstractions in a practical sense.
2020
TCC
On Perfect Correctness in (Lockable) Obfuscation
📺
Abstract
In a lockable obfuscation scheme a party takes as input a program P, a lock value alpha, a message msg, and produces an obfuscated program P'. The obfuscated program can be evaluated on an input x to learn the message msg if P(x)= alpha. The security of such schemes states that if alpha is randomly chosen (independent of P and msg), then one cannot distinguish an obfuscation of $P$ from a dummy obfuscation. Existing constructions of lockable obfuscation achieve provable security under the Learning with Errors assumption. One limitation of these constructions is that they achieve only statistical correctness and allow for a possible one-sided error where the obfuscated program could output the msg on some value x where P(x) \neq alpha.
In this work we motivate the problem of studying perfect correctness in lockable
obfuscation for the case where the party performing the obfuscation might wish
to inject a backdoor or hole in the correctness. We begin by studying the existing
constructions and identify two components that are susceptible to imperfect correctness. The first is in the LWE-based pseudo-random generators (PRGs) that are non-injective, while the second is in the last level testing procedure of the core constructions.
We address each in turn. First, we build upon previous work to design injective
PRGs that are provably secure from the LWE assumption. Next, we design an alternative last level testing procedure that has an additional structure to prevent correctness errors. We then provide surgical proof of security (to avoid redundancy) that connects our construction to the construction by Goyal, Koppula, and Waters (GKW). Specifically, we show how for a random value alpha an obfuscation under our new construction is indistinguishable from an obfuscation under the existing GKW construction.
2020
TCC
New Techniques in Replica Encodings with Client Setup
📺
Abstract
A proof of replication system is a cryptographic primitive that allows a server (or group of servers) to prove to a client that it is dedicated to storing multiple copies or replicas of a file. Until recently, all such protocols required fined-grained timing assumptions on the amount of time it takes for a server to produce such replicas.
Damgard, Ganesh, and Orlandi [DGO19] proposed a novel notion that we will call proof of replication with client setup. Here, a client first operates with secret coins to generate the replicas for a file. Such systems do not inherently have to require fine-grained timing assumptions. At the core of their solution to building proofs of replication with client setup is an abstraction called replica encodings. Briefly, these comprise a private coin scheme where a client algorithm given a file m can produce an encoding \sigma. The encodings have the property that, given any encoding \sigma, one can decode and retrieve the original file m. Secondly, if a server has significantly less than n·|m| bit of storage, it cannot reproduce n encodings. The authors give a construction of encodings from ideal permutations and trapdoor functions.
In this work, we make three central contributions:
1) Our first contribution is that we discover and demonstrate that the security argument put forth by [DGO19] is fundamentally flawed. Briefly, the security argument makes assumptions on the attacker's storage behavior that does not capture general attacker strategies. We demonstrate this issue by constructing a trapdoor permutation which is secure assuming indistinguishability obfuscation, serves as a counterexample to their claim (for the parameterization stated).
2) In our second contribution we show that the DGO construction is actually secure in the ideal permutation model from any trapdoor permutation when parameterized correctly. In particular, when the number of rounds in the construction is equal to \lambda·n·b where \lambda is the security parameter, n is the number of replicas and b is the number of blocks. To do so we build up a proof approach from the ground up that accounts for general attacker storage behavior where we create an analysis technique that we call "sequence-then-switch".
3) Finally, we show a new construction that is provably secure in the random oracle (or random function) model. Thus requiring less structure on the ideal function.
2019
CRYPTO
ABE for DFA from k-Lin
📺
Abstract
We present the first attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme for deterministic finite automaton (DFA) based on static assumptions in bilinear groups; this resolves an open problem posed by Waters (CRYPTO 2012). Our main construction achieves selective security against unbounded collusions under the standard k-linear assumption in prime-order bilinear groups, whereas previous constructions all rely on q-type assumptions.
2019
PKC
Collusion Resistant Broadcast and Trace from Positional Witness Encryption
Abstract
An emerging trend is for researchers to identify cryptography primitives for which feasibility was first established under obfuscation and then move the realization to a different setting. In this work we explore a new such avenue—to move obfuscation-based cryptography to the assumption of (positional) witness encryption. Our goal is to develop techniques and tools, which we will dub “witness encryption friendly” primitives and use these to develop a methodology for building advanced cryptography from positional witness encryption.We take a bottom up approach and pursue our general agenda by attacking the specific problem of building collusion-resistant broadcast systems with tracing from positional witness encryption. We achieve a system where the size of ciphertexts, public key and private key are polynomial in the security parameter $$\lambda $$ and independent of the number of users N in the broadcast system. Currently, systems with such parameters are only known from indistinguishability obfuscation.
2019
CRYPTO
Realizing Chosen Ciphertext Security Generically in Attribute-Based Encryption and Predicate Encryption
📺
Abstract
We provide generic and black box transformations from any chosen plaintext secure Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) or One-sided Predicate Encryption system into a chosen ciphertext secure system. Our transformation requires only the IND-CPA security of the original ABE scheme coupled with a pseudorandom generator (PRG) with a special security property.In particular, we consider a PRG with an n bit input $$s \in \{0,1\}^n$$ and $$n \cdot \ell $$ bit output $$y_1, \ldots , y_n$$ where each $$y_i$$ is an $$\ell $$ bit string. Then for a randomly chosen s the following two distributions should be computationally indistinguishable. In the first distribution $$r_{s_i, i} = y_i$$ and $$r_{\bar{s}_i, i}$$ is chosen randomly for $$i \in [n]$$. In the second distribution all $$r_{b, i}$$ are chosen randomly for $$i \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}$$.We show that such PRGs can be built from either the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (in non-bilinear groups) or the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption (and potentially other assumptions). Thus, one can transform any IND-CPA secure system into a chosen ciphertext secure one by adding either assumption. (Or by simply assuming an existing PRG is hinting secure.) In addition, our work provides a new approach and perspective for obtaining chosen ciphertext security in the basic case of public key encryption.
2019
CRYPTO
Watermarking Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives
📺
Abstract
A software watermarking scheme enables users to embed a message or mark within a program while preserving its functionality. Moreover, it is difficult for an adversary to remove a watermark from a marked program without corrupting its behavior. Existing constructions of software watermarking from standard assumptions have focused exclusively on watermarking pseudorandom functions (PRFs).In this work, we study watermarking public-key primitives such as the signing key of a digital signature scheme or the decryption key of a public-key (predicate) encryption scheme. While watermarking public-key primitives might intuitively seem more challenging than watermarking PRFs, our constructions only rely on simple assumptions. Our watermarkable signature scheme can be built from the minimal assumption of one-way functions while our watermarkable public-key encryption scheme can be built from most standard algebraic assumptions that imply public-key encryption (e.g., factoring, discrete log, or lattice assumptions). Our schemes also satisfy a number of appealing properties: public marking, public mark-extraction, and collusion resistance. Our schemes are the first to simultaneously achieve all of these properties.The key enabler of our new constructions is a relaxed notion of functionality-preserving. While traditionally, we require that a marked program (approximately) preserve the input/output behavior of the original program, in the public-key setting, preserving the “functionality” does not necessarily require preserving the exact input/output behavior. For instance, if we want to mark a signing algorithm, it suffices that the marked algorithm still output valid signatures (even if those signatures might be different from the ones output by the unmarked algorithm). Similarly, if we want to mark a decryption algorithm, it suffices that the marked algorithm correctly decrypt all valid ciphertexts (but may behave differently from the unmarked algorithm on invalid or malformed ciphertexts). Our relaxed notion of functionality-preserving captures the essence of watermarking and still supports the traditional applications, but provides additional flexibility to enable new and simple realizations of this powerful cryptographic notion.
2019
CRYPTO
Broadcast and Trace with
$N^{\varepsilon }$
Ciphertext Size from Standard Assumptions
📺
Abstract
We construct a broadcast and trace scheme (also known as trace and revoke or broadcast, trace and revoke) with N users, where the ciphertext size can be made as low as
$$O(N^\varepsilon )$$
, for any arbitrarily small constant
$$\varepsilon >0$$
. This improves on the prior best construction of broadcast and trace under standard assumptions by Boneh and Waters (CCS ‘06), which had ciphertext size
$$O(N^{1/2})$$
. While that construction relied on bilinear maps, ours uses a combination of the learning with errors (LWE) assumption and bilinear maps.Recall that, in both broadcast encryption and traitor-tracing schemes, there is a collection of N users, each of which gets a different secret key
$${\mathsf {sk}}_i$$
. In broadcast encryption, it is possible to create ciphertexts targeted to a subset
$$S \subseteq [N]$$
of the users such that only those users can decrypt it correctly. In a traitor tracing scheme, if a subset of users gets together and creates a decoder box D that is capable of decrypting ciphertexts, then it is possible to trace at least one of the users responsible for creating D. A broadcast and trace scheme intertwines the two properties, in a way that results in more than just their union. In particular, it ensures that if a decoder D is able to decrypt ciphertexts targeted toward a set S of users, then it should be possible to trace one of the users in the set S responsible for creating D, even if other users outside of S also participated. As of recently, we have essentially optimal broadcast encryption (Boneh, Gentry, Waters CRYPTO ’05) under bilinear maps and traitor tracing (Goyal, Koppula, Waters STOC ’18) under LWE, where the ciphertext size is at most poly-logarithmic in N. The main contribution of our paper is to carefully combine LWE and bilinear-map based components, and get them to interact with each other, to achieve broadcast and trace.
2019
TCC
New Approaches to Traitor Tracing with Embedded Identities
Abstract
In a traitor tracing (TT) system for n users, every user has his/her own secret key. Content providers can encrypt messages using a public key, and each user can decrypt the ciphertext using his/her secret key. Suppose some of the n users collude to construct a pirate decoding box. Then the tracing scheme has a special algorithm, called $$\mathsf {Trace}$$, which can identify at least one of the secret keys used to construct the pirate decoding box.Traditionally, the trace algorithm output only the ‘index’ associated with the traitors. As a result, to use such systems, either a central master authority must map the indices to actual identities, or there should be a public mapping of indices to identities. Both these options are problematic, especially if we need public tracing with anonymity of users. Nishimaki, Wichs, and Zhandry (NWZ) [Eurocrypt 2016] addressed this problem by constructing a traitor tracing scheme where the identities of users are embedded in the secret keys, and the trace algorithm, given a decoding box D, can recover the entire identities of the traitors. We call such schemes ‘Embedded Identity Traitor Tracing’ schemes. NWZ constructed such schemes based on adaptively secure functional encryption (FE). Currently, the only known constructions of FE schemes are based on nonstandard assumptions such as multilinear maps and iO.In this work, we study the problem of embedded identities TT based on standard assumptions. We provide a range of constructions based on different assumptions such as public key encryption (PKE), bilinear maps and the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption. The different constructions have different efficiency trade offs. In our PKE based construction, the ciphertext size grows linearly with the number of users; the bilinear maps based construction has sub-linear ($$\sqrt{n}$$) sized ciphertexts. Both these schemes have public tracing. The LWE based scheme is a private tracing scheme with optimal ciphertexts (i.e., $$\log (n)$$). Finally, we also present other notions of traitor tracing, and discuss how they can be build in a generic manner from our base embedded identity TT scheme.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Output Compression, MPC, and iO for Turing Machines
Abstract
In this work, we study the fascinating notion of output-compressing randomized encodings for Turing Machines, in a shared randomness model. In this model, the encoder and decoder have access to a shared random string, and the efficiency requirement is, the size of the encoding must be independent of the running time and output length of the Turing Machine on the given input, while the length of the shared random string is allowed to grow with the length of the output. We show how to construct output-compressing randomized encodings for Turing machines in the shared randomness model, assuming iO for circuits and any assumption in the set
$$\{$$
LWE, DDH, N
$$^{th}$$
Residuosity
$$\}$$
.We then show interesting implications of the above result to basic feasibility questions in the areas of secure multiparty computation (MPC) and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO): 1.Compact MPC for Turing Machines in the Random Oracle Model. In the context of MPC, we consider the following basic feasibility question: does there exist a malicious-secure MPC protocol for Turing Machines whose communication complexity is independent of the running time and output length of the Turing Machine when executed on the combined inputs of all parties? We call such a protocol as a compact MPC protocol. Hubácek and Wichs [HW15] showed via an incompressibility argument, that, even for the restricted setting of circuits, it is impossible to construct a malicious secure two party computation protocol in the plain model where the communication complexity is independent of the output length. In this work, we show how to evade this impossibility by compiling any (non-compact) MPC protocol in the plain model to a compact MPC protocol for Turing Machines in the Random Oracle Model, assuming output-compressing randomized encodings in the shared randomness model.2.Succinct iO for Turing Machines in the Shared Randomness Model. In all existing constructions of iO for Turing Machines, the size of the obfuscated program grows with a bound on the input length. In this work, we show how to construct an iO scheme for Turing Machines in the shared randomness model where the size of the obfuscated program is independent of a bound on the input length, assuming iO for circuits and any assumption in the set
$$\{$$
LWE, DDH, N
$$^{th}$$
Residuosity
$$\}$$
.
2018
CRYPTO
Risky Traitor Tracing and New Differential Privacy Negative Results
Abstract
In this work we seek to construct collusion-resistant traitor tracing systems with small ciphertexts from standard assumptions that also move toward practical efficiency. In our approach we will hold steadfast to the principle of collusion resistance, but relax the requirement on catching a traitor from a successful decoding algorithm. We define a f-risky traitor tracing system as one where the probability of identifying a traitor is $$f(\lambda ,n)$$f(λ,n) times the probability a successful box is produced. We then go on to show how to build such systems from prime order bilinear groups with assumptions close to those used in prior works. Our core system achieves, for any $$k > 0$$k>0, $$f(\lambda ,n) \approx \frac{k}{n + k - 1}$$f(λ,n)≈kn+k-1 where ciphertexts consists of $$(k + 4)$$(k+4) group elements and decryption requires $$(k + 3)$$(k+3) pairing operations.At first glance the utility of such a system might seem questionable since the f we achieve for short ciphertexts is relatively small. Indeed an attacker in such a system can more likely than not get away with producing a decoding box. However, we believe this approach to be viable for four reasons:1.A risky traitor tracing system will provide deterrence against risk averse attackers. In some settings the consequences of being caught might bear a high cost and an attacker will have to weigh his utility of producing a decryption D box against the expected cost of being caught.2.Consider a broadcast system where we want to support low overhead broadcast encrypted communications, but will periodically allow for a more expensive key refresh operation. We refer to an adversary produced algorithm that maintains the ability to decrypt across key refreshes as a persistent decoder. We show how if we employ a risky traitor tracing systems in this setting, even for a small f, we can amplify the chances of catching such a “persistent decoder” to be negligibly close to 1.3.In certain resource constrained settings risky traitor tracing provides a best tracing effort where there are no other collusion-resistant alternatives. For instance, suppose we had to support 100 K users over a radio link that had just 10 KB of additional resources for extra ciphertext overhead. None of the existing $$\sqrt{N}$$N bilinear map systems can fit in these constraints. On the other hand a risky traitor tracing system provides a spectrum of tracing probability versus overhead tradeoffs and can be configured to at least give some deterrence in this setting.4.Finally, we can capture impossibility results for differential privacy from $$\frac{1}{n}$$1n-risky traitor tracing. Since our ciphertexts are short ($$O(\lambda )$$O(λ)), we get the negative result which matches what one would get plugging in the obfuscation based tracing system Boneh-Zhandry [9] solution into the prior impossibility result of Dwork et al. [14].
2018
TCC
Upgrading to Functional Encryption
Abstract
The notion of Functional Encryption (FE) has recently emerged as a strong primitive with several exciting applications. In this work, we initiate the study of the following question: Can existing public key encryption schemes be “upgraded” to Functional Encryption schemes without changing their public keys or the encryption algorithm? We call a public-key encryption scheme with this property to be FE-compatible. Indeed, assuming ideal obfuscation, it is easy to see that every CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme is FE-compatible. Despite the recent success in using indistinguishability obfuscation to replace ideal obfuscation for many applications, we show that this phenomenon most likely will not apply here. We show that assuming fully homomorphic encryption and the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, there exists a CCA-secure encryption scheme that is provably not FE-compatible. We also show that a large class of natural CCA-secure encryption schemes proven secure in the random oracle model are not FE-compatible in the random oracle model.Nevertheless, we identify a key structure that, if present, is sufficient to provide FE-compatibility. Specifically, we show that assuming sub-exponentially secure iO and sub-exponentially secure one way functions, there exists a class of public key encryption schemes which we call Special-CCA secure encryption schemes that are in fact, FE-compatible. In particular, each of the following popular CCA secure encryption schemes (some of which existed even before the notion of FE was introduced) fall into the class of Special-CCA secure encryption schemes and are thus FE-compatible:1.[CHK04] when instantiated with the IBE scheme of [BB04].2.[CHK04] when instantiated with any Hierarchical IBE scheme.3.[PW08] when instantiated with any Lossy Trapdoor Function.
2018
TCC
Impossibility of Simulation Secure Functional Encryption Even with Random Oracles
Abstract
In this work we study the feasibility of achieving simulation security in functional encryption (FE) in the random oracle model. Our main result is negative in that we give a functionality for which it is impossible to achieve simulation security even with the aid of random oracles.We begin by giving a formal definition of simulation security that explicitly incorporates the random oracles. Next, we show a particular functionality for which it is impossible to achieve simulation security. Here messages are interpreted as seeds to a (weak) pseudorandom function family F and private keys are ascribed to points in the domain of the function. On a message s and private key x one can learn F(s, x). We show that there exists an attacker that makes a polynomial number of private key queries followed by a single ciphertext query for which there exists no simulator.Our functionality and attacker access pattern closely matches the standard model impossibility result of Agrawal, Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee (CRYPTO 2013). The crux of their argument is that no simulator can succinctly program in the outputs of an unbounded number of evaluations of a pseudorandom function family into a fixed size ciphertext. However, their argument does not apply in the random oracle setting since the oracle acts as an additional conduit of information which the simulator can program. We overcome this barrier by proposing an attacker who decrypts the challenge ciphertext with the secret keys issued earlier without using the random oracle, even though the decryption algorithm may require it. This involves collecting most of the useful random oracle queries in advance, without giving the simulator too many opportunities to program.On the flip side, we demonstrate the utility of the random oracle in simulation security. Given only public key encryption and low-depth PRGs we show how to build an FE system that is simulation secure for any poly-time attacker that makes an unbounded number of message queries, but an a-priori bounded number of key queries. This bests what is possible in the standard model where it is only feasible to achieve security for an attacker that is bounded both in the number of key and message queries it makes. We achieve this by creating a system that leverages the random oracle to get one-key security and then adapt previously known techniques to boost the system to resist up to q queries.Finally, we ask whether it is possible to achieve simulation security for an unbounded number of messages and keys, but where all key queries are made after the message queries. We show this too is impossible to achieve using a different twist on our first impossibility result.
2018
TCC
Traitor-Tracing from LWE Made Simple and Attribute-Based
Abstract
A traitor tracing scheme is a public key encryption scheme for which there are many secret decryption keys. Any of these keys can decrypt a ciphertext; moreover, even if a coalition of users collude, put together their decryption keys and attempt to create a new decryption key, there is an efficient algorithm to trace the new key to at least one the colluders.Recently, Goyal, Koppula and Waters (GKW, STOC 18) provided the first traitor tracing scheme from LWE with ciphertext and secret key sizes that grow polynomially in $$\log n$$, where n is the number of users. The main technical building block in their construction is a strengthening of (bounded collusion secure) secret-key functional encryption which they refer to as mixed functional encryption (FE).In this work, we improve upon and extend the GKW traitor tracing scheme:We provide simpler constructions of mixed FE schemes based on the LWE assumption. Our constructions improve upon the GKW construction in terms of expressiveness, modularity, and security.We provide a construction of attribute-based traitor tracing for all circuits based on the LWE assumption.
2017
EUROCRYPT
2015
ASIACRYPT
2013
CRYPTO
2013
CRYPTO
2013
JOFC
Compact Proofs of Retrievability
Abstract
In a proof-of-retrievability system, a data storage center must prove to a verifier that he is actually storing all of a client’s data. The central challenge is to build systems that are both efficient and provably secure—that is, it should be possible to extract the client’s data from any prover that passes a verification check. In this paper, we give the first proof-of-retrievability schemes with full proofs of security against arbitrary adversaries in the strongest model, that of Juels and Kaliski.Our first scheme, built from BLS signatures and secure in the random oracle model, features a proof-of-retrievability protocol in which the client’s query and server’s response are both extremely short. This scheme allows public verifiability: anyone can act as a verifier, not just the file owner. Our second scheme, which builds on pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and is secure in the standard model, allows only private verification. It features a proof-of-retrievability protocol with an even shorter server’s response than our first scheme, but the client’s query is long. Both schemes rely on homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into one small authenticator value.
2012
CRYPTO
2010
EUROCRYPT
2008
EUROCRYPT
Program Committees
- Crypto 2024
- TCC 2021 (Program chair)
- Eurocrypt 2019
- Eurocrypt 2017
- TCC 2016
- Crypto 2014
- Crypto 2010
- PKC 2010
- TCC 2009
- Crypto 2008
- Eurocrypt 2008
- Eurocrypt 2007
- Asiacrypt 2007
Coauthors
- Damiano Abram (1)
- Shashank Agrawal (1)
- Jae Hyun Ahn (2)
- Benny Applebaum (1)
- Saikrishna Badrinarayanan (2)
- Mihir Bellare (4)
- Allison Bishop (11)
- Dan Boneh (10)
- Xavier Boyen (3)
- Eli Bradley (1)
- Jan Camenisch (2)
- Yilei Chen (1)
- Pratish Datta (3)
- Apoorvaa Deshpande (1)
- Lalita Devadas (1)
- Rafael Dowsley (1)
- Rex Fernando (2)
- David Freeman (1)
- Cody Freitag (1)
- Rachit Garg (6)
- Sanjam Garg (1)
- Craig Gentry (5)
- Michael Gerbush (1)
- Riddhi Ghosal (1)
- Junqing Gong (1)
- Rishab Goyal (15)
- Shai Halevi (1)
- Dennis Hofheinz (1)
- Susan Hohenberger (17)
- Yuval Ishai (1)
- Tibor Jager (1)
- Jonathan Katz (2)
- Dakshita Khurana (5)
- Eike Kiltz (1)
- Sam Kim (2)
- Ilan Komargodski (3)
- Venkata Koppula (18)
- Eyal Kushilevitz (1)
- Jiahui Liu (1)
- George Lu (7)
- Steve Lu (1)
- Nathan Manohar (1)
- Shafik Nassar (1)
- Adam O'Neill (2)
- Tatsuaki Okamoto (2)
- Rafail Ostrovsky (1)
- Chris Peikert (3)
- Krzysztof Pietrzak (1)
- Andrew Poelstra (1)
- Willy Quach (2)
- Kim Ramchen (1)
- Yannis Rouselakis (1)
- Andrew Russell (1)
- Amit Sahai (15)
- Hakan Seyalioglu (1)
- Hovav Shacham (4)
- Abhi Shelat (2)
- Emily Shen (2)
- Kristin Sheridan (1)
- Elaine Shi (2)
- Pratik Soni (1)
- Igors Stepanovs (1)
- Habeeb Syed (1)
- Katsuyuki Takashima (1)
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan (2)
- Nikhil Vanjani (1)
- Satyanarayana Vusirikala (3)
- Brent Waters (111)
- Hoeteck Wee (3)
- Daniel Wichs (6)
- David J. Wu (11)
- Scott Yilek (2)
- Mark Zhandry (5)