## CryptoDB

### Arpita Patra

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
CRYPTO
We give constructions of three-round secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols for general functions that make {\it black-box} use of a two-round oblivious transfer (OT). For the case of semi-honest adversaries, we make use of a two-round, semi-honest secure OT in the plain model. This resolves the round-complexity of black-box (semi-honest) MPC protocols from minimal assumptions and answers an open question of Applebaum et al. (ITCS 2020). For the case of malicious adversaries, we make use of a two-round maliciously-secure OT in the common random/reference string model that satisfies a (mild) variant of adaptive security for the receiver.
2021
JOFC
We settle the exact round complexity of three-party computation (3PC) in honest-majority setting, for a range of security notions such as selective abort, unanimous abort, fairness and guaranteed output delivery. It is a folklore that the implication holds from the guaranteed output delivery to fairness to unanimous abort to selective abort. We focus on computational security and consider two network settings—pairwise-private channels without and with a broadcast channel. In the minimal setting of pairwise-private channels, 3PC with selective abort is known to be feasible in just two rounds, while guaranteed output delivery is infeasible to achieve irrespective of the number of rounds. Settling the quest for exact round complexity of 3PC in this setting, we show that three rounds are necessary and sufficient for unanimous abort and fairness. Extending our study to the setting with an additional broadcast channel, we show that while unanimous abort is achievable in just two rounds, three rounds are necessary and sufficient for fairness and guaranteed output delivery. Our lower bound results extend for any number of parties in honest majority setting and imply tightness of several known constructions. While our lower bounds extend to the common reference string (CRS) model, all our upper bounds are in the plain model. The fundamental concept of garbled circuits underlies all our upper bounds. Concretely, our constructions involve transmitting and evaluating only constant number of garbled circuits. Assumption-wise, our constructions rely on injective (one-to-one) one-way functions.
2020
TCC
We study information-theoretic secure multiparty protocols that achieve full security, including guaranteed output delivery, at the presence of an active adversary that corrupts a constant fraction of the parties. It is known that 2 rounds are insufficient for such protocols even when the adversary corrupts only two parties (Gennaro, Ishai, Kushilevitz, and Rabin; Crypto 2002), and that perfect protocols can be implemented in three rounds as long as the adversary corrupts less than a quarter of the parties (Applebaum , Brakerski, and Tsabary; Eurocrypt, 2019). Furthermore, it was recently shown that the quarter threshold is tight for any 3-round \emph{perfectly-secure} protocol (Applebaum, Kachlon, and Patra; FOCS 2020). Nevertheless, one may still hope to achieve a better-than-quarter threshold at the expense of allowing some negligible correctness errors and/or statistical deviations in the security. Our main results show that this is indeed the case. Every function can be computed by 3-round protocols with \emph{statistical} security as long as the adversary corrupts less than third of the parties. Moreover, we show that any better resiliency threshold requires four rounds. Our protocol is computationally inefficient and has an exponential dependency in the circuit's depth $d$ and in the number of parties $n$. We show that this overhead can be avoided by relaxing security to computational, assuming the existence of a non-interactive commitment (NICOM). Previous 3-round computational protocols were based on stronger public-key assumptions. When instantiated with statistically-hiding NICOM, our protocol provides \emph{everlasting statistical} security, i.e., it is secure against adversaries that are computationally unlimited \emph{after} the protocol execution. To prove these results, we introduce a new hybrid model that allows for 2-round protocols with linear resliency threshold. Here too we prove that, for perfect protocols, the best achievable resiliency is $n/4$, whereas statistical protocols can achieve a threshold of $n/3$. We also construct the first 2-round $n/3$-statistical verifiable secret sharing that supports second-level sharing and prove a matching lower-bound, extending the results of Patra, Choudhary, Rabin, and Rangan (Crypto 2009). Overall, our results refines the differences between statistical and perfect models of security, and show that there are efficiency gaps even in the regime of realizable thresholds.
2020
ASIACRYPT
The two traditional streams of multiparty computation (MPC) protocols consist of-- (a) protocols achieving guaranteed output delivery (\god) or fairness (\fair) in the honest-majority setting and (b) protocols achieving unanimous or selective abort (\uab, \sab) in the dishonest-majority setting. The favorable presence of honest majority amongst the participants is necessary to achieve the stronger notions of \god~or \fair. While the constructions of each type are abound in the literature, one class of protocols does not seem to withstand the threat model of the other. For instance, the honest-majority protocols do not guarantee privacy of the inputs of the honest parties in the face of dishonest majority and likewise the dishonest-majority protocols cannot achieve $\god$ and $\fair$, tolerating even a single corruption, let alone dishonest minority. The promise of the unconventional yet much sought-after species of MPC, termed as Best-of-Both-Worlds' (BoBW), is to offer the best possible security depending on the actual corruption scenario. This work nearly settles the exact round complexity of two classes of BoBW protocols differing on the security achieved in the honest-majority setting, namely $\god$ and $\fair$ respectively, under the assumption of no setup (plain model), public setup (CRS) and private setup (CRS + PKI or simply PKI). The former class necessarily requires the number of parties to be strictly more than the sum of the bounds of corruptions in the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting, for a feasible solution to exist. Demoting the goal to the second-best attainable security in the honest-majority setting, the latter class needs no such restriction. Assuming a network with pair-wise private channels and a broadcast channel, we show that 5 and 3 rounds are necessary and sufficient for the class of BoBW MPC with $\fair$ under the assumption of no setup' and `public and private setup' respectively. For the class of BoBW MPC with $\god$, we show necessity and sufficiency of 3 rounds for the public setup case and 2 rounds for the private setup case. In the no setup setting, we show the sufficiency of 5 rounds, while the known lower bound is 4. All our upper bounds are based on polynomial-time assumptions and assume black-box simulation. With distinct feasibility conditions, the classes differ in terms of the round requirement. The bounds are in some cases different and on a positive note at most one more, compared to the maximum of the needs of the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting. Our results remain unaffected when security with abort and fairness are upgraded to their identifiable counterparts.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Two of the most sought-after properties of Multi-party Computation (MPC) protocols are fairness and guaranteed output delivery (GOD), the latter also referred to as robustness. Achieving both, however, brings in the necessary requirement of malicious-minority. In a generalised adversarial setting where the adversary is allowed to corrupt both actively and passively, the necessary bound for a n-party fair or robust protocol turns out to be $t_a + t_p < n$, where $t_a,t_p$ denote the threshold for active and passive corruption with the latter subsuming the former. Subsuming the malicious-minority as a boundary special case, this setting, denoted as dynamic corruption, opens up a range of possible corruption scenarios for the adversary. While dynamic corruption includes the entire range of thresholds for $(t_a,t_p)$ starting from $(\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1, \lfloor n/2 \rfloor )$ to $(0,n-1)$, the boundary corruption restricts the adversary only to the boundary cases of $(\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1, \lfloor n/2 \rfloor )$ and $(0,n-1)$. Notably, both corruption settings empower an adversary to control majority of the parties, yet ensuring the count on active corruption never goes beyond $\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil - 1$. We target the round complexity of fair and robust MPC tolerating dynamic and boundary adversaries. As it turns out, $\lceil n/2 \rceil + 1$ rounds are necessary and sufficient for fair as well as robust MPC tolerating dynamic corruption. The non-constant barrier raised by dynamic corruption can be sailed through for a boundary adversary. The round complexity of 3 and 4 is necessary and sufficient for fair and GOD protocols respectively, with the latter having an exception of allowing 3 round protocols in the presence of a single active corruption. While all our lower bounds assume pair-wise private and broadcast channels and are resilient to the presence of both public (CRS) and private (PKI) setup, our upper bounds are broadcast-only and assume only public setup. The traditional and popular setting of malicious-minority, being restricted compared to both dynamic and boundary setting, requires 3 and 2 rounds in the presence of public and private setup respectively for both fair as well as GOD protocols.
2018
CRYPTO
We settle the exact round complexity of three-party computation (3PC) in honest-majority setting, for a range of security notions such as selective abort, unanimous abort, fairness and guaranteed output delivery. Selective abort security, the weakest in the lot, allows the corrupt parties to selectively deprive some of the honest parties of the output. In the mildly stronger version of unanimous abort, either all or none of the honest parties receive the output. Fairness implies that the corrupted parties receive their output only if all honest parties receive output and lastly, the strongest notion of guaranteed output delivery implies that the corrupted parties cannot prevent honest parties from receiving their output. It is a folklore that the implication holds from the guaranteed output delivery to fairness to unanimous abort to selective abort. We focus on two network settings– pairwise-private channels without and with a broadcast channel.In the minimal setting of pairwise-private channels, 3PC with selective abort is known to be feasible in just two rounds, while guaranteed output delivery is infeasible to achieve irrespective of the number of rounds. Settling the quest for exact round complexity of 3PC in this setting, we show that three rounds are necessary and sufficient for unanimous abort and fairness. Extending our study to the setting with an additional broadcast channel, we show that while unanimous abort is achievable in just two rounds, three rounds are necessary and sufficient for fairness and guaranteed output delivery. Our lower bound results extend for any number of parties in honest majority setting and imply tightness of several known constructions.The fundamental concept of garbled circuits underlies all our upper bounds. Concretely, our constructions involve transmitting and evaluating only constant number of garbled circuits. Assumption-wise, our constructions rely on injective (one-to-one) one-way functions.
2018
PKC
Zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols are undoubtedly among the central primitives in cryptography, lending their power to numerous applications such as secure computation, voting, auctions, and anonymous credentials to name a few. The study of efficient ZK protocols for non-algebraic statements has seen rapid progress in recent times, relying on secure computation techniques. The primary contribution of this work lies in constructing efficient UC-secure constant round ZK protocols from garbled circuits that are secure against adaptive corruptions, with communication linear in the size of the statement. We begin by showing that the practically efficient ZK protocol of Jawurek et al. (CCS 2013) is adaptively secure when the underlying oblivious transfer (OT) satisfies a mild adaptive security guarantee. We gain adaptive security with little to no overhead over the static case. A conditional verification technique is then used to obtain a three-round adaptively secure zero-knowledge argument in the non-programmable random oracle model (NPROM). Our three-round protocol yields a proof size that is shorter than the known UC-secure practically-efficient schemes in the short-CRS model with the right choice of security parameters.We draw motivation from state-of-the-art non-interactive secure computation protocols and leveraging specifics of ZK functionality show a two-round protocol that achieves static security. It is a proof, while most known efficient ZK protocols and our three round protocol are only arguments.
2017
CRYPTO
2017
JOFC
2015
JOFC
2015
ASIACRYPT
2014
TCC
2013
ASIACRYPT
2011
ASIACRYPT
2010
ASIACRYPT
2009
CRYPTO

Asiacrypt 2020
PKC 2019
Asiacrypt 2019
Eurocrypt 2018
PKC 2018
Asiacrypt 2018
PKC 2017
Asiacrypt 2017