## CryptoDB

### Papers from PKC 2019

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2019

PKC

Efficient Attribute-Based Signatures for Unbounded Arithmetic Branching Programs
Abstract

This paper presents the first attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme in which the correspondence between signers and signatures is captured in an arithmetic model of computation. Specifically, we design a fully secure, i.e., adaptively unforgeable and perfectly signer-private ABS scheme for signing policies realizable by arithmetic branching programs (ABP), which are a quite expressive model of arithmetic computations. On a more positive note, the proposed scheme places no bound on the size and input length of the supported signing policy ABP’s, and at the same time, supports the use of an input attribute for an arbitrary number of times inside a signing policy ABP, i.e., the so called unbounded multi-use of attributes. The size of our public parameters is constant with respect to the sizes of the signing attribute vectors and signing policies available in the system. The construction is built in (asymmetric) bilinear groups of prime order, and its unforgeability is derived in the standard model under (asymmetric version of) the well-studied decisional linear (DLIN) assumption coupled with the existence of standard collision resistant hash functions. Due to the use of the arithmetic model as opposed to the boolean one, our ABS scheme not only excels significantly over the existing state-of-the-art constructions in terms of concrete efficiency, but also achieves improved applicability in various practical scenarios. Our principal technical contributions are (a) extending and refining the techniques of Okamoto and Takashima [PKC 2011, PKC 2013], which were originally developed in the context of boolean span programs, to the arithmetic setting; and (b) innovating new ideas to allow unbounded multi-use of attributes inside ABP’s, which themselves are of unbounded size and input length.

2019

PKC

Decentralizing Inner-Product Functional Encryption
Abstract

Multi-client functional encryption (MCFE) is a more flexible variant of functional encryption whose functional decryption involves multiple ciphertexts from different parties. Each party holds a different secret key and can independently and adaptively be corrupted by the adversary. We present two compilers for MCFE schemes for the inner-product functionality, both of which support encryption labels. Our first compiler transforms any scheme with a special key-derivation property into a decentralized scheme, as defined by Chotard et al. (ASIACRYPT 2018), thus allowing for a simple distributed way of generating functional decryption keys without a trusted party. Our second compiler allows to lift an unnatural restriction present in existing (decentralized) MCFE schemes, which requires the adversary to ask for a ciphertext from each party. We apply our compilers to the works of Abdalla et al. (CRYPTO 2018) and Chotard et al. (ASIACRYPT 2018) to obtain schemes with hitherto unachieved properties. From Abdalla et al., we obtain instantiations of DMCFE schemes in the standard model (from DDH, Paillier, or LWE) but without labels. From Chotard et al., we obtain a DMCFE scheme with labels still in the random oracle model, but without pairings.

2019

PKC

Non-zero Inner Product Encryption Schemes from Various Assumptions: LWE, DDH and DCR
Abstract

In non-zero inner product encryption (NIPE) schemes, ciphertexts and secret keys are associated with vectors and decryption is possible whenever the inner product of these vectors does not equal zero. So far, much effort on constructing bilinear map-based NIPE schemes have been made and this has lead to many efficient schemes. However, the constructions of NIPE schemes without bilinear maps are much less investigated. The only known other NIPE constructions are based on lattices, however, they are all highly inefficient due to the need of converting inner product operations into circuits or branching programs.To remedy our rather poor understanding regarding NIPE schemes without bilinear maps, we provide two methods for constructing NIPE schemes: a direct construction from lattices and a generic construction from schemes for inner products (LinFE). For our first direct construction, it highly departs from the traditional lattice-based constructions and we rely heavily on new tools concerning Gaussian measures over multi-dimensional lattices to prove security. For our second generic construction, using the recent constructions of LinFE schemes as building blocks, we obtain the first NIPE constructions based on the DDH and DCR assumptions. In particular, we obtain the first NIPE schemes without bilinear maps or lattices.

2019

PKC

Efficient Invisible and Unlinkable Sanitizable Signatures
Abstract

Sanitizable signatures allow designated parties (the sanitizers) to apply arbitrary modifications to some restricted parts of signed messages. A secure scheme should not only be unforgeable, but also protect privacy and hold both the signer and the sanitizer accountable. Two important security properties that are seemingly difficult to achieve simultaneously and efficiently are invisibility and unlinkability. While invisibility ensures that the admissible modifications are hidden from external parties, unlinkability says that sanitized signatures cannot be linked to their sources. Achieving both properties simultaneously is crucial for applications where sensitive personal data is signed with respect to data-dependent admissible modifications. The existence of an efficient construction achieving both properties was recently posed as an open question by Camenisch et al. (PKC’17). In this work, we propose a solution to this problem with a two-step construction. First, we construct (non-accountable) invisible and unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures on equivalence classes and other basic primitives. Second, we put forth a generic transformation using verifiable ring signatures to turn any non-accountable sanitizable signature into an accountable one while preserving all other properties. When instantiating in the generic group and random oracle model, the efficiency of our construction is comparable to that of prior constructions, while providing stronger security guarantees.

2019

PKC

Function Private Predicate Encryption for Low Min-Entropy Predicates
Abstract

In this work, we propose new constructions for zero inner-product encryption (ZIPE) and non-zero inner-product encryption (NIPE) from prime-order bilinear pairings, which are both attribute and function private in the public-key setting.
Our ZIPE scheme is adaptively attribute private under the standard Matrix DDH assumption for unbounded collusions. It is additionally computationally function private under a min-entropy variant of the Matrix DDH assumption for predicates sampled from distributions with super-logarithmic min-entropy. Existing (statistically) function private ZIPE schemes due to Boneh et al. [Crypto’13, Asiacrypt’13] necessarily require predicate distributions with significantly larger min-entropy in the public-key setting.Our NIPE scheme is adaptively attribute private under the standard Matrix DDH assumption, albeit for bounded collusions. In addition, it achieves computational function privacy under a min-entropy variant of the Matrix DDH assumption for predicates sampled from distributions with super-logarithmic min-entropy. To the best of our knowledge, existing NIPE schemes from bilinear pairings were neither attribute private nor function private.
Our constructions are inspired by the linear FE constructions of Agrawal et al. [Crypto’16] and the simulation secure ZIPE of Wee [TCC’17]. In our ZIPE scheme, we show a novel way of embedding two different hard problem instances in a single secret key - one for unbounded collusion-resistance and the other for function privacy. For NIPE, we introduce new techniques for simultaneously achieving attribute and function privacy. We further show that the two constructions naturally generalize to a wider class of predicate encryption schemes such as subspace membership, subspace non-membership and hidden-vector encryption.

2019

PKC

Group Signatures with Selective Linkability
Abstract

Group signatures allow members of a group to anonymously produce signatures on behalf of the group. They are an important building block for privacy-enhancing applications, e.g., enabling user data to be collected in authenticated form while preserving the user’s privacy. The linkability between the signatures thereby plays a crucial role for balancing utility and privacy: knowing the correlation of events significantly increases the utility of the data but also severely harms the user’s privacy. Therefore group signatures are unlinkable per default, but either support linking or identity escrow through a dedicated central party or offer user-controlled linkability. However, both approaches have significant limitations. The former relies on a fully trusted entity and reveals too much information, and the latter requires exact knowledge of the needed linkability at the moment when the signatures are created. However, often the exact purpose of the data might not be clear at the point of data collection. In fact, data collectors tend to gather large amounts of data at first, but will need linkability only for selected, small subsets of the data. We introduce a new type of group signature that provides a more flexible and privacy-friendly access to such selective linkability. When created, all signatures are fully unlinkable. Only when strictly needed or desired, should the required pieces be made linkable with the help of a central entity. For privacy, this linkability is established in an oblivious and non-transitive manner. We formally define the requirements for this new type of group signatures and provide an efficient instantiation that provably satisfies these requirements under discrete-logarithm based assumptions.

2019

PKC

Let a Non-barking Watchdog Bite: Cliptographic Signatures with an Offline Watchdog
Abstract

We study how to construct secure digital signature schemes in the presence of kleptographic attacks. Our work utilizes an offline watchdog to clip the power of subversions via only one-time black-box testing of the implementation. Previous results essentially rely on an online watchdog which requires the collection of all communicating transcripts (or active re-randomization of messages).We first give a simple but generic construction, without random oracles, in the partial-subversion model in which key generation and signing algorithms can be subverted. Then, we give the first digital signature scheme in the complete-subversion model in which all cryptographic algorithms can be subverted. This construction is based on the full-domain hash. Along the way, we enhance the recent result of Russell et al. (CRYPTO 2018) about correcting a subverted random oracle.

2019

PKC

Adaptively Single-Key Secure Constrained PRFs for $\mathrm {NC}^1$
Abstract

We present a construction of an adaptively single-key secure constrained PRF (CPRF) for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) and the subgroup hiding assumption over a (pairing-free) composite order group. This is the first construction of such a CPRF in the standard model without relying on a complexity leveraging argument.To achieve this, we first introduce the notion of partitionable CPRF, which is a CPRF accommodated with partitioning techniques and combine it with shadow copy techniques often used in the dual system encryption methodology. We present a construction of partitionable CPRF for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ based on IO and the subgroup hiding assumption over a (pairing-free) group. We finally prove that an adaptively single-key secure CPRF for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ can be obtained from a partitionable CPRF for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ and IO.

2019

PKC

Obfuscating Simple Functionalities from Knowledge Assumptions
Abstract

This paper shows how to obfuscate several simple functionalities from a new Knowledge of OrthogonALity Assumption (KOALA) in cyclic groups which is shown to hold in the Generic Group Model. Specifically, we give simpler and stronger security proofs for obfuscation schemes for point functions, general-output point functions and pattern matching with wildcards. We also revisit the work of Bishop et al. (CRYPTO 2018) on obfuscating the pattern matching with wildcards functionality. We improve upon the construction and the analysis in several ways:attacks and stronger guarantees: We show that the construction achieves virtual black-box security for a simulator that runs in time roughly $$2^{n/2}$$, as well as distributional security for larger classes of distributions. We give attacks that show that our results are tight.weaker assumptions: We prove security under KOALA.better efficiency: We also provide a construction that outputs $$n+1$$ instead of 2n group elements.
We obtain our results by first obfuscating a simpler “big subset functionality”, for which we establish full virtual black-box security; this yields a simpler and more modular analysis for pattern matching. Finally, we extend our distinguishing attacks to a large class of simple linear-in-the-exponent schemes.

2019

PKC

Zero-Knowledge Elementary Databases with More Expressive Queries
Abstract

Zero-knowledge elementary databases (ZK-EDBs) are cryptographic schemes that allow a prover to commit to a set $$\mathsf {D}$$ of key-value pairs so as to be able to prove statements such as “x belongs to the support of $$\mathsf {D}$$ and $$\mathsf {D}(x)=y$$” or “x is not in the support of $$\mathsf {D}$$”. Importantly, proofs should leak no information beyond the proven statement and even the size of $$\mathsf {D}$$ should remain private. Chase et al. (Eurocrypt’05) showed that ZK-EDBs are implied by a special flavor of non-interactive commitment, called mercurial commitment, which enables efficient instantiations based on standard number theoretic assumptions. On the other hand, the resulting ZK-EDBs are only known to support proofs for simple statements like (non-)membership and value assignments. In this paper, we show that mercurial commitments actually enable significantly richer queries. We show that, modulo an additional security property met by all known efficient constructions, they actually enable range queries over keys and values – even for ranges of super-polynomial size – as well as membership/non-membership queries over the space of values. Beyond that, we exploit the range queries to realize richer queries such as $$k$$-nearest neighbors and revealing the $$k$$ smallest or largest records within a given range. In addition, we provide a new realization of trapdoor mercurial commitment from standard lattice assumptions, thus obtaining the most expressive quantum-safe ZK-EDB construction so far.

2019

PKC

Efficient Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs in Cross-Domains Without Trusted Setup
Abstract

With the recent emergence of efficient zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs for general circuits, while efficient zero-knowledge proofs of algebraic statements have existed for decades, a natural challenge arose to combine algebraic and non-algebraic statements. Chase et al. (CRYPTO 2016) proposed an interactive ZK proof system for this cross-domain problem. As a use case they show that their system can be used to prove knowledge of a RSA/DSA signature on a message m with respect to a publicly known Pedersen commitment $$g^m h^r$$. One drawback of their system is that it requires interaction between the prover and the verifier. This is due to the interactive nature of garbled circuits, which are used in their construction. Subsequently, Agrawal et al. (CRYPTO 2018) proposed an efficient non-interactive ZK (NIZK) proof system for cross-domains based on SNARKs, which however require a trusted setup assumption.In this paper, we propose a NIZK proof system for cross-domains that requires no trusted setup and is efficient both for the prover and the verifier. Our system constitutes a combination of Schnorr based ZK proofs and ZK proofs for general circuits by Giacomelli et al. (USENIX 2016). The proof size and the running time of our system are comparable to the approach by Chase et al. Compared to Bulletproofs (SP 2018), a recent NIZK proofs system on committed inputs, our techniques achieve asymptotically better performance on prover and verifier, thus presenting a different trade-off between the proof size and the running time.

2019

PKC

What About Bob? The Inadequacy of CPA Security for Proxy Reencryption
Abstract

In the simplest setting of proxy reencryption, there are three parties: Alice, Bob, and Polly (the proxy). Alice keeps some encrypted data that she can decrypt with a secret key known only to her. She wants to communicate the data to Bob, but not to Polly (nor anybody else). Using proxy reencryption, Alice can create a reencryption key that will enable Polly to reencrypt the data for Bob’s use, but which will not help Polly learn anything about the data.There are two well-studied notions of security for proxy reencryption schemes: security under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) and security under chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). Both definitions aim to formalize the security that Alice enjoys against both Polly and Bob.In this work, we demonstrate that CPA security guarantees much less security against Bob than was previously understood. In particular, CPA security does not prevent Bob from learning Alice’s secret key after receiving a single honestly reencrypted ciphertext. As a result, CPA security provides scant guarantees in common applications.We propose security under honest reencryption attacks (HRA), a strengthening of CPA security that better captures the goals of proxy reencryption. In applications, HRA security provides much more robust security. We identify a property of proxy reencryption schemes that suffices to amplify CPA security to HRA security and show that two existing proxy reencryption schemes are in fact HRA secure.

2019

PKC

Sub-logarithmic Distributed Oblivious RAM with Small Block Size
Abstract

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a client to securely execute RAM programs over data that is stored in an untrusted server. Distributed Oblivious RAM is a variant of ORAM, where the data is stored in $$m>1$$ servers. Extensive research over the last few decades have succeeded to reduce the bandwidth overhead of ORAM schemes, both in the single-server and the multi-server setting, from $$O(\sqrt{N})$$ to O(1). However, all known protocols that achieve a sub-logarithmic overhead either require heavy server-side computation (e.g. homomorphic encryption), or a large block size of at least $$\varOmega (\log ^3 N)$$.In this paper, we present a family of distributed ORAM constructions that follow the hierarchical approach of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [17]. We enhance known techniques, and develop new ones, to take better advantage of the existence of multiple servers. By plugging efficient known hashing schemes in our constructions, we get the following results:1.For any number $$m\ge 2$$ of servers, we show an m-server ORAM scheme with $$O(\log N/\log \log N)$$ overhead, and block size $$\varOmega (\log ^2 N)$$. This scheme is private even against an $$(m-1)$$-server collusion.2.A three-server ORAM construction with $$O(\omega (1)\cdot \log N/\log \log N)$$ overhead and a block size almost logarithmic, i.e. $$\varOmega (\log ^{1+\epsilon }N)$$.
We also investigate a model where the servers are allowed to perform a linear amount of light local computations, and show that constant overhead is achievable in this model, through a simple four-server ORAM protocol. From theoretical viewpoint, this is the first ORAM scheme with asymptotic constant overhead, and polylogarithmic block size, that does not use homomorphic encryption. Practically speaking, although we do not provide an implementation of the suggested construction, evidence from related work (e.g. [12]) confirms that despite the linear computational overhead, our construction is practical, in particular when applied to secure computation.

2019

PKC

Collusion Resistant Broadcast and Trace from Positional Witness Encryption
Abstract

An emerging trend is for researchers to identify cryptography primitives for which feasibility was first established under obfuscation and then move the realization to a different setting. In this work we explore a new such avenue—to move obfuscation-based cryptography to the assumption of (positional) witness encryption. Our goal is to develop techniques and tools, which we will dub “witness encryption friendly” primitives and use these to develop a methodology for building advanced cryptography from positional witness encryption.We take a bottom up approach and pursue our general agenda by attacking the specific problem of building collusion-resistant broadcast systems with tracing from positional witness encryption. We achieve a system where the size of ciphertexts, public key and private key are polynomial in the security parameter $$\lambda $$ and independent of the number of users N in the broadcast system. Currently, systems with such parameters are only known from indistinguishability obfuscation.

2019

PKC

Shorter Quadratic QA-NIZK Proofs
Abstract

Despite recent advances in the area of pairing-friendly Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs, there have not been many efficiency improvements in constructing arguments of satisfiability of quadratic (and larger degree) equations since the publication of the Groth-Sahai proof system (JoC’12). In this work, we address the problem of aggregating such proofs using techniques derived from the interactive setting and recent constructions of SNARKs. For certain types of quadratic equations, this problem was investigated before by González et al. (ASIACRYPT’15). Compared to their result, we reduce the proof size by approximately 50% and the common reference string from quadratic to linear, at the price of using less standard computational assumptions. A theoretical motivation for our work is to investigate how efficient NIZK proofs based on falsifiable assumptions can be. On the practical side, quadratic equations appear naturally in several cryptographic schemes like shuffle and range arguments.

2019

PKC

Adaptively Secure Proxy Re-encryption
Abstract

A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme is a public-key encryption scheme that allows the holder of a key pk to derive a re-encryption key for any other key
$$pk'$$
. This re-encryption key lets anyone transform ciphertexts under pk into ciphertexts under
$$pk'$$
without having to know the underlying message, while transformations from
$$pk'$$
to pk should not be possible (unidirectional). Security is defined in a multi-user setting against an adversary that gets the users’ public keys and can ask for re-encryption keys and can corrupt users by requesting their secret keys. Any ciphertext that the adversary cannot trivially decrypt given the obtained secret and re-encryption keys should be secure.All existing security proofs for PRE only show selective security, where the adversary must first declare the users it wants to corrupt. This can be lifted to more meaningful adaptive security by guessing the set of corrupted users among the n users, which loses a factor exponential in , rendering the result meaningless already for moderate .Jafargholi et al. (CRYPTO’17) proposed a framework that in some cases allows to give adaptive security proofs for schemes which were previously only known to be selectively secure, while avoiding the exponential loss that results from guessing the adaptive choices made by an adversary. We apply their framework to PREs that satisfy some natural additional properties. Concretely, we give a more fine-grained reduction for several unidirectional PREs, proving adaptive security at a much smaller loss. The loss depends on the graph of users whose edges represent the re-encryption keys queried by the adversary. For trees and chains the loss is quasi-polynomial in the size and for general graphs it is exponential in their depth and indegree (instead of their size as for previous reductions). Fortunately, trees and low-depth graphs cover many, if not most, interesting applications.Our results apply e.g. to the bilinear-map based PRE schemes by Ateniese et al. (NDSS’05 and CT-RSA’09), Gentry’s FHE-based scheme (STOC’09) and the LWE-based scheme by Chandran et al. (PKC’14).

2019

PKC

Break-glass Encryption
Abstract

“Break-glass” is a term used in IT healthcare systems to denote an emergency access to private information without having the credentials to do so.In this paper we introduce the concept of break-glass encryption for cloud storage, where the security of the ciphertexts – stored on a cloud – can be violated exactly once, for emergency circumstances, in a way that is detectable and without relying on a trusted party.Detectability is the crucial property here: if a cloud breaks glass without permission from the legitimate user, the latter should detect it and have a proof of such violation. However, if the break-glass procedure is invoked by the legitimate user, then semantic security must still hold and the cloud will learn nothing. Distinguishing that a break-glass is requested by the legitimate party is also challenging in absence of secrets.In this paper, we provide a formalization of break-glass encryption and a secure instantiation using hardware tokens. Our construction aims to be a feasibility result and is admittedly impractical. Whether hardware tokens are necessary to achieve this security notion and whether more practical solutions can be devised are interesting open questions.

2019

PKC

Lossy Algebraic Filters with Short Tags
Abstract

Lossy algebraic filters (LAFs) are function families where each function is parametrized by a tag, which determines if the function is injective or lossy. While initially introduced by Hofheinz (Eurocrypt 2013) as a technical tool to build encryption schemes with key-dependent message chosen-ciphertext (KDM-CCA) security, they also find applications in the design of robustly reusable fuzzy extractors. So far, the only known LAF family requires tags comprised of $$\varTheta (n^2)$$ group elements for functions with input space $$\mathbb {Z}_p^n$$, where p is the group order. In this paper, we describe a new LAF family where the tag size is only linear in n and prove it secure under simple assumptions in asymmetric bilinear groups. Our construction can be used as a drop-in replacement in all applications of the initial LAF system. In particular, it can shorten the ciphertexts of Hofheinz’s KDM-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme by 19 group elements. It also allows substantial space improvements in a recent fuzzy extractor proposed by Wen and Liu (Asiacrypt 2018). As a second contribution, we show how to modify our scheme so as to prove it (almost) tightly secure, meaning that security reductions are not affected by a concrete security loss proportional to the number of adversarial queries.

2019

PKC

Short Discrete Log Proofs for FHE and Ring-LWE Ciphertexts
Abstract

In applications of fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) that involve computation on encryptions produced by several users, it is important that each user proves that her input is indeed well-formed. This may simply mean that the inputs are valid FHE ciphertexts or, more generally, that the plaintexts m additionally satisfy
$$f(m)=1$$
for some public function f. The most efficient FHE schemes are based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem and so a natural solution would be to use lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs for proving properties about the ciphertext. Such methods, however, require larger-than-necessary parameters and result in rather long proofs, especially when proving general relationships.In this paper, we show that one can get much shorter proofs (roughly 1.25 KB) by first creating a Pedersen commitment from the vector corresponding to the randomness and plaintext of the FHE ciphertext. To prove validity of the ciphertext, one can then prove that this commitment is indeed to the message and randomness and these values are in the correct range. Our protocol utilizes a connection between polynomial operations in the lattice scheme and inner product proofs for Pedersen commitments of Bünz et al. (S&P 2018). Furthermore, our proof of equality between the ciphertext and the commitment is very amenable to amortization – proving the equivalence of k ciphertext/commitment pairs only requires an additive factor of
$$O(\log {k})$$
extra space than for one such proof. For proving additional properties of the plaintext(s), one can then directly use the logarithmic-space proofs of Bootle et al. (Eurocrypt 2016) and Bünz et al. (IEEE S&P 2018) for proving arbitrary relations of discrete log commitment.Our technique is not restricted to FHE ciphertexts and can be applied to proving many other relations that arise in lattice-based cryptography. For example, we can create very efficient verifiable encryption/decryption schemes with short proofs in which confidentiality is based on the hardness of Ring-LWE while the soundness is based on the discrete logarithm problem. While such proofs are not fully post-quantum, they are adequate in scenarios where secrecy needs to be future-proofed, but one only needs to be convinced of the validity of the proof in the pre-quantum era. We furthermore show that our zero-knowledge protocol can be easily modified to have the property that breaking soundness implies solving discrete log in a short amount of time. Since building quantum computers capable of solving discrete logarithm in seconds requires overcoming many more fundamental challenges, such proofs may even remain valid in the post-quantum era.

2019

PKC

Generic Constructions of Robustly Reusable Fuzzy Extractor
Abstract

Robustly reusable Fuzzy Extractor (rrFE) considers reusability and robustness simultaneously. We present two approaches to the generic construction of rrFE. Both of approaches make use of a secure sketch and universal hash functions. The first approach also employs a special pseudo-random function (PRF), namely unique-input key-shift (ui-ks) secure PRF, and the second uses a key-shift secure auxiliary-input authenticated encryption (AIAE). The ui-ks security of PRF (resp. key-shift security of AIAE), together with the homomorphic properties of secure sketch and universal hash function, guarantees the reusability and robustness of rrFE. Meanwhile, we show two instantiations of the two approaches respectively. The first instantiation results in the first rrFE from the LWE assumption, while the second instantiation results in the first rrFE from the DDH assumption over non-pairing groups.

2019

PKC

Publicly Verifiable Proofs from Blockchains
Abstract

A proof system is publicly verifiable, if anyone, by looking at the transcript of the proof, can be convinced that the corresponding theorem is true. Public verifiability is important in many applications since it allows to compute a proof only once while convincing an unlimited number of verifiers.Popular interactive proof systems (e.g., $$\varSigma $$-protocols) protect the witness through various properties (e.g., witness indistinguishability (WI) and zero knowledge (ZK)) but typically they are not publicly verifiable since such proofs are convincing only for those verifiers who contributed to the transcripts of the proofs. The only known proof systems that are publicly verifiable rely on a non-interactive (NI) prover, through trust assumptions (e.g., NIZK in the CRS model), heuristic assumptions (e.g., NIZK in the random oracle model), specific number-theoretic assumptions on bilinear groups or relying on obfuscation assumptions (obtaining NIWI with no setups).In this work we construct publicly verifiable witness-indistinguishable proof systems from any $$\varSigma $$-protocol, based only on the existence of a very generic blockchain. The novelty of our approach is in enforcing a non-interactive verification (thus guaranteeing public verifiability) while allowing the prover to be interactive and talk to the blockchain (this allows us to circumvent the need of strong assumptions and setups). This opens interesting directions for the design of cryptographic protocols leveraging on blockchain technology.

2019

PKC

Safety in Numbers: On the Need for Robust Diffie-Hellman Parameter Validation
Abstract

We consider the problem of constructing Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters which pass standard approaches to parameter validation but for which the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is relatively easy to solve. We consider both the finite field setting and the elliptic curve setting.For finite fields, we show how to construct DH parameters (p, q, g) for the safe prime setting in which
$$p=2q+1$$
is prime, q is relatively smooth but fools random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with some reasonable probability, and g is of order q mod p. The construction involves modifying and combining known methods for obtaining Carmichael numbers. Concretely, we provide an example with 1024-bit p which passes OpenSSL’s Diffie-Hellman validation procedure with probability
$$2^{-24}$$
(for versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0i). Here, the largest factor of q has 121 bits, meaning that the DLP can be solved with about
$$2^{64}$$
effort using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. We go on to explain how this parameter set can be used to mount offline dictionary attacks against PAKE protocols. In the elliptic curve case, we use an algorithm of Bröker and Stevenhagen to construct an elliptic curve E over a finite field
$${\mathbb {F}}_p$$
having a specified number of points n. We are able to select n of the form
$$h\cdot q$$
such that h is a small co-factor, q is relatively smooth but fools random-base Miller-Rabin primality testing with some reasonable probability, and E has a point of order q. Concretely, we provide example curves at the 128-bit security level with
$$h=1$$
, where q passes a single random-base Miller-Rabin primality test with probability 1/4 and where the elliptic curve DLP can be solved with about
$$2^{44}$$
effort. Alternatively, we can pass the test with probability 1/8 and solve the elliptic curve DLP with about
$$2^{35.5}$$
effort. These ECDH parameter sets lead to similar attacks on PAKE protocols relying on elliptic curves.Our work shows the importance of performing proper (EC)DH parameter validation in cryptographic implementations and/or the wisdom of relying on standardised parameter sets of known provenance.

2019

PKC

Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption with Efficient Revocation
Abstract

Identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) is an effective method to protect the data security and privacy in multi-receiver scenarios, which can make broadcast encryption more practical. This paper further expands the study of scalable revocation methodology in the setting of IBBE, where a key authority releases a key update material periodically in such a way that only non-revoked users can update their decryption keys. Following the binary tree data structure approach, a concrete instantiation of revocable IBBE scheme is proposed using asymmetric pairings of prime order bilinear groups. Moreover, this scheme can withstand decryption key exposure, which is proven to be semi-adaptively secure under chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model by reduction to static complexity assumptions. In particular, the proposed scheme is very efficient both in terms of computation costs and communication bandwidth, as the ciphertext size is constant, regardless of the number of recipients. To demonstrate the practicality, it is further implemented in Charm, a framework for rapid prototyping of cryptographic primitives.

2019

PKC

Hunting and Gathering – Verifiable Random Functions from Standard Assumptions with Short Proofs
Abstract

A verifiable random function (VRF) is a pseudorandom function, where outputs can be publicly verified. That is, given an output value together with a proof, one can check that the function was indeed correctly evaluated on the corresponding input. At the same time, the output of the function is computationally indistinguishable from random for all non-queried inputs.We present the first construction of a VRF which meets the following properties at once: It supports an exponential-sized input space, it achieves full adaptive security based on a non-interactive constant-size assumption and its proofs consist of only a logarithmic number of group elements for inputs of arbitrary polynomial length.Our construction can be instantiated in symmetric bilinear groups with security based on the decision linear assumption. We build on the work of Hofheinz and Jager (TCC 2016), who were the first to construct a verifiable random function with security based on a non-interactive constant-size assumption. Basically, their VRF is a matrix product in the exponent, where each matrix is chosen according to one bit of the input. In order to allow verification given a symmetric bilinear map, a proof consists of all intermediary results. This entails a proof size of $$\varOmega (L)$$ group elements, where L is the bit-length of the input.Our key technique, which we call hunting and gathering, allows us to break this barrier by rearranging the function, which – combined with the partitioning techniques of Bitansky (TCC 2017) – results in a proof size of $$\ell $$ group elements for arbitrary $$\ell \in \omega (1)$$.

2019

PKC

Tightly Secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
Abstract

We construct the first tightly secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme based on standard assumptions, which solves an open problem from Blazy, Kiltz, and Pan (CRYPTO 2014). At the core of our constructions is a novel randomization technique that enables us to randomize user secret keys for identities with flexible length.The security reductions of previous HIBEs lose at least a factor of $$ Q $$, which is the number of user secret key queries. Different to that, the security loss of our schemes is only dependent on the security parameter. Our schemes are adaptively secure based on the Matrix Diffie-Hellman assumption, which is a generalization of standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions such as $$k$$-Linear. We have two tightly secure constructions, one with constant ciphertext size, and the other with tighter security at the cost of linear ciphertext size. Among other things, our schemes imply the first tightly secure identity-based signature scheme by a variant of the Naor transformation.

2019

PKC

Lattice-Based Revocable (Hierarchical) IBE with Decryption Key Exposure Resistance
Abstract

Revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) is an extension of IBE that supports a key revocation mechanism, which is an indispensable feature for practical cryptographic schemes. Due to this extra feature, RIBE is often required to satisfy a strong security notion unique to the revocation setting called decryption key exposure resistance (DKER). Additionally, hierarchal IBE (HIBE) is another orthogonal extension of IBE that supports key delegation functionalities allowing for scalable deployments of cryptographic schemes. So far, R(H)IBE constructions with DKER are only known from bilinear maps, where all constructions rely heavily on the so-called key re-randomization property to achieve the DKER and/or hierarchal feature. Since lattice-based schemes seem to be inherently ill-fit with the key re-randomization property, no construction of lattice-based R(H)IBE schemes with DKER are known.In this paper, we propose the first lattice-based RHIBE scheme with DKER without relying on the key re-randomization property, departing from all the previously known methods. We start our work by providing a generic construction of RIBE schemes with DKER, which uses as building blocks any two-level standard HIBE scheme and (weak) RIBE scheme without DKER. Based on previous lattice-based RIBE constructions without DKER, our result implies the first lattice-based RIBE scheme with DKER. Then, building on top of our generic construction, we construct the first lattice-based RHIBE scheme with DKER, by further exploiting the algebraic structure of lattices. To this end, we prepare a new tool called the level conversion keys, which enables us to achieve the hierarchal feature without relying on the key re-randomization property.

2019

PKC

Leakage-Resilient Identity-Based Encryption in Bounded Retrieval Model with Nearly Optimal Leakage-Ratio
Abstract

We propose new constructions of leakage-resilient public-key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes in the bounded retrieval model (BRM). In the BRM, adversaries are allowed to obtain at most
$$\ell $$
-bit leakage from a secret key and we can increase
$$\ell $$
only by increasing the size of secret keys without losing efficiency in any other performance measure. We call
$$\ell /|\mathsf {sk}|$$
leakage-ratio where
$$|\mathsf {sk}|$$
denotes a bit-length of a secret key. Several PKE/IBE schemes in the BRM are known. However, none of these constructions achieve a constant leakage-ratio under a standard assumption in the standard model. Our PKE/IBE schemes are the first schemes in the BRM that achieve leakage-ratio
$$1-\epsilon $$
for any constant
$$\epsilon >0$$
under standard assumptions in the standard model.As previous works, we use identity-based hash proof systems (IB-HPS) to construct IBE schemes in the BRM. It is known that a parameter for IB-HPS called the universality-ratio is translated into the leakage-ratio of the resulting IBE scheme in the BRM. We construct an IB-HPS with universality-ratio
$$1-\epsilon $$
for any constant
$$\epsilon >0$$
based on any inner-product predicate encryption (IPE) scheme with compact secret keys. Such IPE schemes exist under the d-linear, subgroup decision, learning with errors, or computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions. As a result, we obtain IBE schemes in the BRM with leakage-ratio
$$1-\epsilon $$
under any of these assumptions. Our PKE schemes are immediately obtained from our IBE schemes.

2019

PKC

Towards Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge for NP from LWE
Abstract

Non-interactive zero-knowledge (
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
) is a fundamental primitive that is widely used in the construction of cryptographic schemes and protocols. Despite this, general purpose constructions of
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof systems are only known under a rather limited set of assumptions that are either number-theoretic (and can be broken by a quantum computer) or are not sufficiently well understood, such as obfuscation. Thus, a basic question that has drawn much attention is whether it is possible to construct general-purpose
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof systems based on the learning with errors (
$$\mathsf {LWE}$$
) assumption.Our main result is a reduction from constructing
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof systems for all of
$$\mathbf {NP}$$
based on
$$\mathsf {LWE}$$
, to constructing a
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof system for a particular computational problem on lattices, namely a decisional variant of the Bounded Distance Decoding (
$$\mathsf {BDD}$$
) problem. That is, we show that assuming
$$\mathsf {LWE}$$
, every language
$$L \in \mathbf {NP}$$
has a
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof system if (and only if) the decisional
$$\mathsf {BDD}$$
problem has a
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof system. This (almost) confirms a conjecture of Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (CRYPTO, 2008).To construct our
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof system, we introduce a new notion that we call prover-assisted oblivious ciphertext sampling (
$$\mathsf {POCS}$$
), which we believe to be of independent interest. This notion extends the idea of oblivious ciphertext sampling, which allows one to sample ciphertexts without knowing the underlying plaintext. Specifically, we augment the oblivious ciphertext sampler with access to an (untrusted) prover to help it accomplish this task. We show that the existence of encryption schemes with a
$$\mathsf {POCS}$$
procedure, as well as some additional natural requirements, suffices for obtaining
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proofs for
$$\mathbf {NP}$$
. We further show that such encryption schemes can be instantiated based on
$$\mathsf {LWE}$$
, assuming the existence of a
$$\mathsf {NIZK}$$
proof system for the decisional
$$\mathsf {BDD}$$
problem.

2019

PKC

Additively Homomorphic IBE from Higher Residuosity
Abstract

We present an identity-Based encryption (IBE) scheme that is group homomorphic for addition modulo a “large” (i.e. superpolynomial) integer, the first such group homomorphic IBE. Our first result is the construction of an IBE scheme supporting homomorphic addition modulo a poly-sized prime e. Our construction builds upon the IBE scheme of Boneh, LaVigne and Sabin (BLS). BLS relies on a hash function that maps identities to $$e^{\text {th}}$$ residues. However there is no known way to securely instantiate such a function. Our construction extends BLS so that it can use a hash function that can be securely instantiated. We prove our scheme secure under the (slightly modified) $$e^{\text {th}}$$ residuosity assumption in the random oracle model and show that it supports a (modular) additive homomorphism. By using multiple instances of the scheme with distinct primes and leveraging the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we can support homomorphic addition modulo a “large” (i.e. superpolynomial) integer. We also show that our scheme for $$e > 2$$ is anonymous by additionally assuming the hardness of deciding solvability of a special system of multivariate polynomial equations. We provide a justification for this assumption by considering known attacks.

2019

PKC

More Efficient Algorithms for the NTRU Key Generation Using the Field Norm
Abstract

NTRU lattices [13] are a class of polynomial rings which allow for compact and efficient representations of the lattice basis, thereby offering very good performance characteristics for the asymmetric algorithms that use them. Signature algorithms based on NTRU lattices have fast signature generation and verification, and relatively small signatures, public keys and private keys.A few lattice-based cryptographic schemes entail, generally during the key generation, solving the NTRU equation: $$\begin{aligned} f G - g F = q \mod x^n + 1 \end{aligned}$$Here f and g are fixed, the goal is to compute solutions F and G to the equation, and all the polynomials are in $${\mathbb {Z}}[x]/(x^n + 1)$$. The existing methods for solving this equation are quite cumbersome: their time and space complexities are at least cubic and quadratic in the dimension n, and for typical parameters they therefore require several megabytes of RAM and take more than a second on a typical laptop, precluding onboard key generation in embedded systems such as smart cards.In this work, we present two new algorithms for solving the NTRU equation. Both algorithms make a repeated use of the field norm in tower of fields; it allows them to be faster and more compact than existing algorithms by factors $${\tilde{O}}(n)$$. For lattice-based schemes considered in practice, this reduces both the computation time and RAM usage by factors at least 100, making key pair generation within range of smart card abilities.

2019

PKC

Upper and Lower Bounds for Continuous Non-Malleable Codes
Abstract

Recently, Faust et al. (TCC’14) introduced the notion of continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC), which provides stronger security guarantees than standard non-malleable codes, by allowing an adversary to tamper with the codeword in a continuous way instead of one-time tampering. They also showed that CNMC with information theoretic security cannot be constructed in the 2-split-state tampering model, and presented a construction in the common reference string (CRS) model from collision-resistant hash functions and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.In this work, we ask if it is possible to construct CNMC from weaker assumptions. We answer this question by presenting lower as well as upper bounds. We show that it is impossible to construct 2-split-state CNMC, with no CRS, for one-bit messages from any falsifiable assumption, thus establishing the lower bound. We additionally provide an upper bound by constructing 2-split-state CNMC for one-bit messages, assuming only the existence of a family of injective one way functions. We note that in a recent work, Ostrovsky et al. (CRYPTO’18) considered the construction of a relaxed notion of 2-split-state CNMC from minimal assumptions.We also present a construction of 4-split-state CNMC for multi-bit messages in CRS model from the same assumptions. Additionally, we present definitions of the following new primitives: (1) One-to-one commitments, and (2) Continuous Non-Malleable Randomness Encoders, which may be of independent interest.

2019

PKC

Efficiently Masking Binomial Sampling at Arbitrary Orders for Lattice-Based Crypto
Abstract

With the rising popularity of lattice-based cryptography, the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem has emerged as a fundamental core of numerous encryption and key exchange schemes. Many LWE-based schemes have in common that they require sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution which comes with a number of challenges for the practical instantiation of those schemes. One of these is the inclusion of countermeasures against a physical side-channel adversary. While several works discuss the protection of samplers against timing leaks, only few publications explore resistance against other side-channels, e.g., power. The most recent example of a protected binomial sampler (as used in key encapsulation mechanisms to sufficiently approximate Gaussian distributions) from CHES 2018 is restricted to a first-order adversary and cannot be easily extended to higher protection orders.In this work, we present the first protected binomial sampler which provides provable security against a side-channel adversary at arbitrary orders. Our construction relies on a new conversion between Boolean and arithmetic (B2A) masking schemes for prime moduli which outperforms previous algorithms significantly for the relevant parameters, and is paired with a new masked bitsliced sampler allowing secure and efficient sampling even at larger protection orders. Since our proposed solution supports arbitrary moduli, it can be utilized in a large variety of lattice-based constructions, like NewHope, LIMA, Saber, Kyber, HILA5, or Ding Key Exchange.

2019

PKC

Improved Security Evaluation Techniques for Imperfect Randomness from Arbitrary Distributions
Abstract

Dodis and Yu (TCC 2013) studied how the security of cryptographic primitives that are secure in the “ideal” model in which the distribution of a randomness is the uniform distribution, is degraded when the ideal distribution of a randomness is switched to a “real-world” (possibly biased) distribution that has some lowerbound on its min-entropy or collision-entropy. However, in many constructions, their security is guaranteed only when a randomness is sampled from some non-uniform distribution (such as Gaussian in lattice-based cryptography), in which case we cannot directly apply the results by Dodis and Yu.In this paper, we generalize the results by Dodis and Yu using the Rényi divergence, and show how the security of a cryptographic primitive whose security is guaranteed when the ideal distribution of a randomness is a general (possibly non-uniform) distribution Q, is degraded when the distribution is switched to another (real-world) distribution R. More specifically, we derive two general inequalities regarding the Rényi divergence of R from Q and an adversary’s advantage against the security of a cryptographic primitive. As applications of our results, we show (1) an improved reduction for switching the distributions of distinguishing problems with public samplability, which is simpler and much tighter than the reduction by Bai et al. (ASIACRYPT 2015), and (2) how the differential privacy of a mechanism is degraded when its randomness comes from not an ideal distribution Q but a real-world distribution R. Finally, we show methods for approximate-sampling from an arbitrary distribution Q with some guaranteed upperbound on the Rényi divergence (of the distribution R of our sampling methods from Q).

2019

PKC

Decryption Failure Attacks on IND-CCA Secure Lattice-Based Schemes
Abstract

In this paper we investigate the impact of decryption failures on the chosen-ciphertext security of lattice-based primitives. We discuss a generic framework for secret key recovery based on decryption failures and present an attack on the NIST Post-Quantum Proposal ss-ntru-pke. Our framework is split in three parts: First, we use a technique to increase the failure rate of lattice-based schemes called failure boosting. Based on this technique we investigate the minimal effort for an adversary to obtain a failure in three cases: when he has access to a quantum computer, when he mounts a multi-target attack or when he can only perform a limited number of oracle queries. Secondly, we examine the amount of information that an adversary can derive from failing ciphertexts. Finally, these techniques are combined in an overall analysis of the security of lattice based schemes under a decryption failure attack. We show that an attacker could significantly reduce the security of lattice based schemes that have a relatively high failure rate. However, for most of the NIST Post-Quantum Proposals, the number of required oracle queries is above practical limits. Furthermore, a new generic weak-key (multi-target) model on lattice-based schemes, which can be viewed as a variant of the previous framework, is proposed. This model further takes into consideration the weak-key phenomenon that a small fraction of keys can have much larger decoding error probability for ciphertexts with certain key-related properties. We apply this model and present an attack in detail on the NIST Post-Quantum Proposal – ss-ntru-pke – with complexity below the claimed security level.

2019

PKC

On Tightly Secure Primitives in the Multi-instance Setting
Abstract

We initiate the study of general tight reductions in cryptography. There already exist a variety of works that offer tight reductions for a number of cryptographic tasks, ranging from encryption and signature schemes to proof systems. However, our work is the first to provide a universal definition of a tight reduction (for arbitrary primitives), along with several observations and results concerning primitives for which tight reductions have not been known.Technically, we start from the general notion of reductions due to Reingold, Trevisan, and Vadhan (TCC 2004), and equip it with a quantification of the respective reduction loss, and a canonical multi-instance extension to primitives. We then revisit several standard reductions whose tight security has not yet been considered. For instance, we revisit a generic construction of signature schemes from one-way functions, and show how to tighten the corresponding reduction by assuming collision-resistance from the used one-way function. We also obtain tightly secure pseudorandom generators (by using suitable rerandomisable hard-core predicates), and tightly secure lossy trapdoor functions.

2019

PKC

Reducing the Key Size of McEliece Cryptosystem from Automorphism-induced Goppa Codes via Permutations
Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new general construction to reduce the public key size of McEliece cryptosystems constructed from automorphism-induced Goppa codes. In particular, we generalize the ideas of automorphism-induced Goppa codes by considering nontrivial subsets of automorphism groups to construct Goppa codes with a nice block structure. By considering additive and multiplicative automorphism subgroups, we provide explicit constructions to demonstrate our technique. We show that our technique can be applied to automorphism-induced Goppa codes based cryptosystems to further reduce their key sizes.

2019

PKC

Key Encapsulation Mechanism with Explicit Rejection in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Abstract

The recent post-quantum cryptography standardization project launched by NIST increased the interest in generic key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) constructions in the quantum random oracle (QROM). Based on a OW-CPA-secure public-key encryption (PKE), Hofheinz, Hövelmanns and Kiltz (TCC 2017) first presented two generic constructions of an IND-CCA-secure KEM with quartic security loss in the QROM, one with implicit rejection (a pseudorandom key is return for an invalid ciphertext) and the other with explicit rejection (an abort symbol is returned for an invalid ciphertext). Both are widely used in the NIST Round-1 KEM submissions and the ones with explicit rejection account for 40%. Recently, the security reductions have been improved to quadratic loss under a standard assumption, and be tight under a nonstandard assumption by Jiang et al. (Crypto 2018) and Saito, Xagawa and Yamakawa (Eurocrypt 2018). However, these improvements only apply to the KEM submissions with implicit rejection and the techniques do not seem to carry over to KEMs with explicit rejection.In this paper, we provide three generic constructions of an IND-CCA-secure KEM with explicit rejection, under the same assumptions and with the same tightness in the security reductions as the aforementioned KEM constructions with implicit rejection (Crypto 2018, Eurocrypt 2018). Specifically, we develop a novel approach to verify the validity of a ciphertext in the QROM and use it to extend the proof techniques for KEM constructions with implicit rejection (Crypto 2018, Eurocrypt 2018) to our KEM constructions with explicit rejection. Moreover, using an improved version of one-way to hiding lemma by Ambainis, Hamburg and Unruh (ePrint 2018/904), for two of our constructions, we present tighter reductions to the standard IND-CPA assumption. Our results directly apply to 9 KEM submissions with explicit rejection, and provide tighter reductions than previously known (TCC 2017).

2019

PKC

Registration-Based Encryption from Standard Assumptions
Abstract

The notion of Registration-Based Encryption (RBE) was recently introduced by Garg, Hajiabadi, Mahmoody, and Rahimi [TCC’18] with the goal of removing the private-key generator (PKG) from IBE. Specifically, RBE allows encrypting to identities using a (compact) master public key, like how IBE is used, with the benefit that the PKG is substituted with a weaker entity called “key curator” who has no knowledge of any secret keys. Here individuals generate their secret keys on their own and then publicly register their identities and their corresponding public keys to the key curator. Finally, individuals obtain “rare” decryption-key updates from the key curator as the population grows. In their work, they gave a construction of RBE schemes based on the combination of indistinguishability obfuscation and somewhere statistically binding hash functions. However, they left open the problem of constructing RBE schemes based on standard assumptions.In this work, we resolve the above problem and construct RBE schemes based on standard assumptions (e.g., CDH or LWE). Furthermore, we show a new application of RBE in a novel context. In particular, we show that anonymous variants of RBE (which we also construct under standard assumptions) can be used for realizing abstracts forms of anonymous messaging tasks in simple scenarios in which the parties communicate by writing messages on a shared board in a synchronized way.

2019

PKC

Factoring Products of Braids via Garside Normal Form
Abstract

Braid groups are infinite non-abelian groups naturally arising from geometric braids. For two decades they have been proposed for cryptographic use. In braid group cryptography public braids often contain secret braids as factors and it is hoped that rewriting the product of braid words hides individual factors. We provide experimental evidence that this is in general not the case and argue that under certain conditions parts of the Garside normal form of factors can be found in the Garside normal form of their product. This observation can be exploited to decompose products of braids of the form ABC when only B is known.Our decomposition algorithm yields a universal forgery attack on WalnutDSATM, which is one of the 20 proposed signature schemes that are being considered by NIST for standardization of quantum-resistant public-key cryptography. Our attack on WalnutDSATM can universally forge signatures within seconds for both the 128-bit and 256-bit security level, given one random message-signature pair. The attack worked on 99.8% and 100% of signatures for the 128-bit and 256-bit security levels in our experiments.Furthermore, we show that the decomposition algorithm can be used to solve instances of the conjugacy search problem and decomposition search problem in braid groups. These problems are at the heart of other cryptographic schemes based on braid groups.

2019

PKC

Non-interactive Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials
Abstract

Anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {AC}$$) schemes are protocols which allow for authentication of authorized users without compromising their privacy. Of particular interest are non-interactive anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {NIAC}$$) schemes, where the authentication process only requires the user to send a single message that still conceals its identity. Unfortunately, all known $$\mathsf {NIAC}$$ schemes in the standard model require pairing based cryptography, which limits them to a restricted set of specific assumptions and requires expensive pairing computations. The notion of keyed-verification anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {KVAC}$$) was introduced in (Chase et al., CCS’14) as an alternative to standard anonymous credential schemes allowing for more efficient instantiations; yet, making existing $$\mathsf {KVAC}$$ non-interactive either requires pairing-based cryptography, or the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.In this work, we construct the first non-interactive keyed-verification anonymous credential ($$\mathsf {NIKVAC}$$) system in the standard model, without pairings. Our scheme is efficient, attribute-based, supports multi-show unlinkability, and anonymity revocation. We achieve this by building upon a combination of algebraic $$\mathsf {MAC}$$ with the recent designated-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge ($$\mathsf {DVNIZK}$$) proof of knowledge of (Couteau and Chaidos, Eurocrypt’18). Toward our goal of building $$\mathsf {NIKVAC}$$, we revisit the security analysis of a $$\mathsf {MAC}$$ scheme introduced in (Chase et al., CCS’14), strengthening its guarantees, and we introduce the notion of oblivious non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system, where the prover can generate non-interactive proofs for statements that he cannot check by himself, having only a part of the corresponding witness, and where the proof can be checked efficiently given the missing part of the witness. We provide an efficient construction of an oblivious $$\mathsf {DVNIZK}$$, building upon the specific properties of the $$\mathsf {DVNIZK}$$ proof system of (Couteau and Chaidos, Eurocrypt’18).

2019

PKC

FE for Inner Products and Its Application to Decentralized ABE
Abstract

In this work, we revisit the primitive functional encryption (FE) for inner products and show its application to decentralized attribute-based encryption (ABE). Particularly, we derive an FE for inner products that satisfies a stronger notion, and show how to use such an FE to construct decentralized ABE for the class $$\{0,1\}$$-$$\mathsf {LSSS} $$ against bounded collusions in the plain model. We formalize the FE notion and show how to achieve such an FE under the LWE or DDH assumption. Therefore, our resulting decentralized ABE can be constructed under the same standard assumptions, improving the prior construction by Lewko and Waters (Eurocrypt 2011). Finally, we also point out challenges to construct decentralized ABE for general functions by establishing a relation between such an ABE and witness encryption for general NP statements.

2019

PKC

Shorter Ring Signatures from Standard Assumptions
Abstract

Ring signatures, introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman (ASIACRYPT 2001), allow to sign a message on behalf of a set of users while guaranteeing authenticity and anonymity. Groth and Kohlweiss (EUROCRYPT 2015) and Libert et al. (EUROCRYPT 2016) constructed schemes with signatures of size logarithmic in the number of users. An even shorter ring signature, of size independent from the number of users, was recently proposed by Malavolta and Schröder (ASIACRYPT 2017). However, all these short signatures are obtained relying on strong and controversial assumptions. Namely, the former schemes are both proven secure in the random oracle model while the later requires non-falsifiable assumptions.The most efficient construction under mild assumptions remains the construction of Chandran et al. (ICALP 2007) with a signature of size $$\varTheta (\sqrt{n})$$, where n is the number of users, and security is based on the Diffie-Hellman assumption in bilinear groups (the SXDH assumption in asymmetric bilinear groups).In this work we construct an asymptotically shorter ring signature from the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman assumption in bilinear groups. Each signature comprises $$\varTheta (\root 3 \of {n})$$ group elements, signing a message requires computing $$\varTheta (\root 3 \of {n})$$ exponentiations, and verifying a signature requires $$\varTheta (n^{2/3})$$ pairing operations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ring signature based on bilinear groups with $$o(\sqrt{n})$$ signatures and sublinear verification complexity.